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Foreword 
T HE distribution and administration of prop-erty on death is a subject of perennial interest, whether from a comparative or a practical 
point of view. Provision must be made to care for the 
assets in the estate of the decedent pending their 
liquidation and/or transfer to those respectively en-
titled-the family heirs, the legatees, the creditors, 
and the tax authorities. This process of administration 
may be organized, as in the Civil Law, by operation of 
law, casting the universal succession on the legitimate 
heir, or by the appointment of a fiduciary, as in the 
Common Law, to administer the estate for the benefit 
of those interested. In the process, complications may 
arise, not only from differences in the rules applying to 
different types of assets-of which the distinction made 
in the Common Law and certain other systems of 
succession, between interests in land, governed by the 
law of the situs, and other property, subject to the 
personal law of the domicil or nationality, is a common 
illustration-but especially when the assets are found 
in a number of jurisdictions, with variations in their 
laws and systems of administration, each in effective 
control of some part of the estate. With the increased 
fluidity of property across state borders and widespread 
interstate or international investments, the frequency 
of such situations, where it is necessary to provide for 
the simultaneous administration of decedents' estates 
in several states, has correspondingly multiplied, 
notably in the United States. In this subject matter, 
the position of the personal representative of the 
Vll 
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deceased appointed in one state, as respects adminis-
tration of property located elsewhere, is of central 
practical interest, as the present study sufficiently 
evmces. 
In dealing with the legal rules affecting foreign 
personal representatives, the author of the present 
monograph is to be commended for the lucid analysis 
in the following pages of the principal questions that 
an executor or administrator appointed in one state 
will encounter in the administration of a single estate 
on a multi-jurisdictional basis: his right to sue and 
liability to suit in other states, the effects of his extra-
legal action outside the state of his appointment, and 
the possibilities of reforming existing laws so as to 
make feasible a system of single administration of 
decedents' estates. This analysis is preceded in the 
first chapter by a useful historical and comparative 
survey, summarizing the basic differences between the 
Civil Law system of universal succession and the 
Anglo-American system of divided administration and 
suggesting that the latter, as derived from the practice 
in the ecclesiastical courts, is in a sense an historical 
accident. Doubtless, the principle of the latter system 
that the management of a single mass of property 
should be divided, for official purposes, among as many 
jurisdictions as there may be in which property is found, 
owes its durability to the dispersion of authority in the 
field of private law within the United States and in 
the international sphere. But the principle is a source 
of practical difficulty that has inspired the important 
exceptions that have had to be introduced to secure a 
reasonable measure of adjustment in settling estates in 
a world governed by many territorial sovereigns. It is 
to the author's credit that he has not limited himself 
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to careful consideration of these improvisations but has 
also constructively contemplated the needs of modern 
life that argue for the development of a unified system 
to administer estates that pass on death. This is a 
subject that obviously concerns every lawyer and 
everyone else. 
HESSEL E. y NTEMA 
Preface 
T HE preparation of this work was undertaken as the research project which is the major require-ment for the degree of Doctor of the Science of 
Law at the University of Michigan. The topic was sug-
gested by a discussion in a course on Conflict of Laws 
under Professor Y ntema, which arose out of a considera-
tion of several leading cases, notably Wilkins v. Ellett, 
Maasv. German Savings Bank, and Vaughan. v Northrup. 
The rules developed to deal with extraterritorial actions 
of personal representatives caught my interest as one 
of the most graphic illustrations of a field where blind 
adherence to the system of legal logic has obscured 
what is obviously a socially undesirable result. It is 
hoped that this discussion, if it does not pose satis-
factory solutions, will at least demonstrate the problems 
which need to be solved. 
Some expression of gratitude must be made to those 
people who have assisted me materially in this project. 
Firsti wish to thankthe Committee on Graduate Study 
at the University of Michigan Law School, who awarded 
me a fellowship from the William W. Cook Research 
Fund for my year of study there. My great debt is to 
Professor Hessel E. Yntema, who taught me Conflict of 
Laws and who, as chairman of my graduate committee, 
guided this work with tolerance and understanding. I 
am also deeply indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes, 
who read my drafts carefully and made a number of 
very helpful suggestions. A word of gratitude must be 
given to Alan Mewett, who graciously helped me with 
any problems that I had in the English materials. 
Whatever merit there is in this study is due in large 
measure to the helpfulness of these people. 
BANKS McDowELL, JR. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Personal Representative 
PROPERTY is probably the most vital relationship in modern legal systems. It may not be the bul-wark of civilization that John Adams felt it was 
when he wrote: 
"The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property 
is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a 
force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and 
tyranny commence. "1 
Still the experience of even such a society as the com-
munistic state of Soviet Russia, where most property 
rights have been taken away from individuals and trans-
ferred to the government, has been that there is need 
for a vast number of legal rules to regulate property 
relations. 2 So long as man lays claim to the material 
objects in his environment, some rules must be devised 
to control the way in which those objects are enjoyed 
and to settle disputes which arise. 
An integral part of every system of property law deals 
with the problems of devolution of property on the 
death of the owner. As a matter of theory, a legal order 
could provide that any property which a person ac-
quired during his lifetime would revert to the state on 
his death, thereby abolishing any rights of succession. 
However, no legal system has seriously attempted doing 
that. A man may leave dependents after his death who 
1 Adams, THE WoRKS OF JoHN ADAMs, Vol. VI, 9 (1851). 
2 For a detailed discussion, see Gsovski, SoviET CIVIL LAw, Vol. II, 
I8-148 (1948). 
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must be cared for and maintained. If his property inter-
ests pass to such persons, society will have fewer prob-
lems in the support of elderly people, widows, and 
minor children. Beyond this, it is felt that an individual 
who has accumulated property through his industry 
should have the power to dispose of it on his death to 
those friends whom he wishes to reward. Hence, within 
limits, a man is usually permitted to leave his property 
on death to anyone he designates by will, or in the ab-
sence of a will, the legal order specifies which relatives 
will be his heirs. 
The transfer of a man's property interests after his 
death creates some serious practical problems. The 
primary reason for this is the complex nature of prop-
erty in modern societies. There are such various types 
as real property, movable chattels, corporate stocks, 
negotiable instruments, insurance, bank deposits, etc. 
The decedent may own an absolute interest in these or 
he may share them with other persons. His right to use 
the objects may be immediate or to take effect in futuro. 
If the estate is very large, the assets will be located in 
many jurisdictions. As the property interests of a dece-
dent may be of various kinds and frequently will be 
widely scattered, a period of some time will be required 
for the legal order to determine what objects and obli-
gations he has claimed as his own and what his interests 
in them are. 
Once the legal order has discovered all the assets of a 
deceased person, a number of claims to this property 
must be adjudicated. Creditors will want the obligations 
of the decedent owing to them satisfied. The state may 
have a claim in the form of estate taxes. It is possible 
that potential heirs or beneficiaries under a will might 
disagree on who will succeed the decedent and what 
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each one's interest is to be. While these various claims 
are being presented and adjudicated, the property of 
the decedent must be conserved and then delivered to 
the successful claimants and heirs. 
In order to solve these problems arising from the 
death of a property owner, some procedure must be de-
vised whereby the property of decedent is collected and 
conserved, a period is provided during which claims 
against the estate may be presented and paid, and then 
the property is distributed to the persons entitled to 
take it under the law of succession. The procedure by 
which this is done in Anglo-American systems is the 
probate administration, and the person who performs 
the functions of administration is designated as the 
personal representative. 
I. THE UNIVERSAL SuccESSOR 
American lawyers, because of a certain provincialism 
in their training, tend to regard Anglo-American solu-
tions to legal problems as the only possible solutions or, 
at any rate, the best ones. However, it is important to 
note that there is a scheme of administration which is 
much older in origin and more widespread in modern 
usage than the one with which we are familiar. It had 
its beginning in that highly developed legal system 
found embodied in the Corpus Juris. 
The Romans developed a rather elaborate law of 
succession. 3 There were a number of different types of 
wills by which a testator could devise his property. 
There was also a complete system of intestate succes-
sion, but early there developed a dislike of intestacy for 
3 The following discussion on the Roman scheme of administration is 
based on Buckland, A TExT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAw FROM AuGuSTUS TO 
JusTINIAN, 2nd Ed., chapters VII-IX (1921). 
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religious reasons, so that in the great majority of deaths, 
property was transferred by a testamentary instrument. 
According to Buckland, 
"The Will of Roman Law had for its primary purpose in 
historical times the appointment of a heres or heredes, a 
successor or successors in whom the rights and liabilities of 
the deceased should vest as a whole."4 
It is this institution of the heres or heir which is the sig-
nificant concept for our purposes. His importance in the 
scheme of succession is attested by the fact that the 
institutio heredis by which he was appointed had to 
appear first in the will and any legacy which preceded 
it was void. 
The first important point to note about the heres was 
that he took title to all the property of the decedent. 
There might be several heredes, but their shares had to 
be such that they totalled the entire estate of the dece-
dent. Of course, the testator could leave legacies to 
other persons which the heres was obligated to pay, but 
the title to the entire estate went to the heres as soon as 
he entered on his duties. For a time testators granted 
such excessive legacies that the heres would refuse to 
accept the hereditas and so the decedent would die in tes-
tate, but by the lex Falcidia of 40 B.C., it was provided 
that the heres must be left at least a quarter of the 
estate. 
In later theory, the heres was said to be a continuation 
of the personality of the decedent. This was not true for 
all purposes, but the results of the concept were that in 
addition to receiving title to all of the decedent's prop-
erty, the heres was liable for all his debts. The explana-
tion for this phenomenon is not clear, but seems to lie 
4 Id. at 282. 
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in the social and religious nature of early Rome. The 
main function of the early will may have been to trans-
fer the chieftainship from the deceased head of the 
family to his successor. Then he would receive not only 
the property of the decedent, but his obligations as well. 
More probably, the institutio here dis was developed to 
insure that the religious obligations to the family gods 
would be carried out. It was thought to be a great dis-
grace to die without providing a successor who would 
perform these religious duties on behalf of the family. 
Just as the language of the Romans has become a 
dead language, so the law of the Corpus I uris has ceased 
to operate as a legal system. But Latin lives on in the 
Romance languages, and likewise, Roman Law has 
survived in the civil law which operates in a large por-
tion of the countries of the world, including most of the 
European nations. This adoption of Roman Law nat-
urally included its scheme of administration of a 
decedent's estate. The Roman heres has become the 
"universal successor" in the civil law. To illustrate the 
institution of the universal successor, its operation in 
French law will be considered. 5 
The decedent may make a will, and then the universal 
successor is the legataire universe!. In addition, there is a 
system of intestate succession. This seems to be so sat-
isfactory that only a small portion of Frenchmen make 
wills. When a man dies intestate, his universal succes-
sor is the heir or heirs specified by the law of succession. 
The heir becomes the owner of the estate at the time 
of death. He is faced with three choices-(!) he may 
accept pure and simple, (2) he may accept with benefit 
of inventory, or (3) he may renounce the succession. 
5 The discussion of the universal successor in French Law is based on 
Amos and Walton, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAw, chapter XIII (1935). 
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The act of acceptance pure and simple must be suffi-
cient to indicate that he assumes the character of heir. 
This is the heir who continues the person of the dece-
dent. He owns all the estate of the decedent, and there 
is complete confusion between that estate and his own. 
He can prosecute all actions which belonged to the dece-
dent. The heir is liable for all of the decedent's debts. 
This is the type of universal successor most similar to 
the classical Roman heres. 
When an heir accepts with benefit of inventory, he 
must make a declaration in court and inscribe it on a 
special register. Within a specified period thereafter, he 
must make an inventory of the movable estate of the 
decedent. The effect of this type of acceptance is to pre-
vent the confusion between the property of the heir and 
that of the decedent. The heir is then liable for dece-
dent's debts only to the extent to which there is prop-
erty of the decedent to satisfy them. 
An heir may renounce the succession and is then con-
sidered as if he had never been an heir. His share of the 
estate will go to his co-heirs who are in the same degree, 
or if there are no co-heirs, to the next heir in the line of 
succession. If there is no heir other than the renouncing 
one, the state will serve as the universal successor. 
There may be several heirs. Those who accept will 
receive their proportionate share of the estate and will 
likewise be liable for their share of the deceased's obli-
gations, but the aggregate of these interests must always 
equal the total estate of the decedent. 
Thus one method of solving the problems raised in 
the administration of an estate is to require the person 
who receives the property of the decedent under the 
law of succession to perform the necessary duties. If the 
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heir is treated as receiving title to the whole estate of 
the decedent, as being able to bring any actions belong-
ing to him, as liable for decedent's debts, and for the 
payment of legacies, an easy and relatively simple solu-
tion is provided. Such a system can be effectively used 
only in those societies where the heir who is to act as 
universal successor will receive, in most instances, a 
substantial portion of the decedent's estate. If he does 
not receive much of the property to keep as his own, he 
will refuse to accept the duties of administration. This 
was the experience which the Romans had when they 
found it necessary to provide that the heres was entitled 
to receive at least a fourth of the estate. The important 
distinction to bear in mind is that the universal suc-
cessor is treated as the owner of all the property left by 
the decedent from the date of death. The estate of the 
decedent is thus treated as a single entity or as a whole 
passing to the universal successor regardless of the loca-
tion of the property. The development across the Eng-
lish Channel brought about a very different theory of 
the nature and the authority of a personal representa-
tive and is responsible for the legal problems discussed 
in this work. 
2. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The type of administration with which we are familiar 
developed in England. Actually our study of the evolu-
tion of the personal representative begins on the con-
tinent of Europe with a concept of Germanic origin. 
The executor in English law probably originated from 
the Germanic institution of the sa/man. 6 This was a per-
6 Holdsworth, A HisToRY OF ENGLISH LAw, Vol. III 563 (rgo8); 
Holmes, "Early English Equity," I L.Q.R. 162, 165 (I885). 
8 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
son to whom property was transferred in order that he 
might convey it according to the grantor's wishes. The 
only right which a salman acquired over the property 
was the right to reconvey it according to the grantor's 
directions. 7 This institution was a flexible instrument 
which could be used for many purposes,8 the most im-
portant of which was the making of a revocable will.9 
Originally the salman was appointed by a bilateral act 
in which both he and the testator took part, but by the 
time the sal man was introduced in to England, it was 
customary to appoint him in a clause of the will itself.10 
From this, the modern legal concept developed that the 
executor is a personal representative appointed by the 
testator in the will. 
The first important event to occur in England was the 
separation of the lay from the ecclesiastical courts by a 
royal ordinance in the reign of William the Conqueror. 11 
Although the common-law courts and later the chancery 
court had important roles to play in the administration 
of estates, it was the ecclesiastical court where the most 
significant developments took place in the history of the 
personal representative. The organization of the eccle-
7 Goffin, THE TESTAMENTARY ExECUTOR IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE, 
26 (1901). 
8 Among other uses, there was a sort of trust by which persons, such as 
Jews, who were prohibited from owning land, could have the enjoyment of 
the property. There was also a transaction whereby a sale of land would be 
made through a powerful noble as sa/man to give security to the transfer. 
9 An example of this type of transaction would be as follows: " ... a man 
gong to war or on a journey would make over his property to a sa/mann 
with instructions to convey it to some church or other holy foundation in 
the event of his death, but to deliver it back to himself if he returned 
safely." Goffin, op cit., supra note 7 at 25. 
10 I d. at 32. 
11 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 
8 MissouRI L. REv. 107 at Io9 (I943). 
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siastical courts was rather irregular. 12 There were usu-
ally the courts of the bishop in each diocese, which were 
presided over by the ordinary. The ordinary was fre-
quently the bishop of the diocese himself, but might be 
a deputy such as an abbot or an archdeacon. 13 There 
were also peculiar courts having testamentary juris-
diction. Appeal from these courts went to the courts of 
the archbishop in the respective provinces, Canterbury 
and York. Prior to the Reformation, appeals from the 
archbishops' courts went to the Pope, but later to the 
High Court of Delegates made up of three common-law 
judges and four to six doctors of the civil and canon law. 
Real property was always outside the jurisdiction of 
the ecclesiastical courts. 14 If a man died intestate, the 
title to the land passed automatically to his heirs. If 
the land was devised by will, the will was treated as a 
deed. All questions of title to land were determined by 
the common-law courts and consequently were com-
pletely outside the orbit of the ecclesiastical courts. 
It was with the disposition of a man's chattels that 
the personal representative was concerned. At the time 
of Glanville, a man could leave by will only one third of 
his chattels if he left a wife and heir and half if he left no 
wife. 15 At this time, the heir was the true representative 
of the testator. He probably could sue to recover debts 
due to the decedent. He paid the debts and if the dece-
dent's effects were not sufficient, he had to make it up 
out of his own property. 16 He was also obliged to ob-
serve any reasonable testaments of his decedentY 
12 /d. at II5. 
1a Goffin, op cit., supra note 7 at 68. 
14 Atkinson, supra note II at 121. 
16 I d. at IIO. 
16 Holmes, "Executors", 9 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1896). 
17 Atkinson, supra note II at IIO. 
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Glanville mentions the executor, so that this institu-
tion was in use in England before the end of the twelfth 
century. 18 The most probable explanation for its appear-
ance was the fact that clergymen travelled a good bit 
between England and the English possessions on the 
continent. They had always been interested in testa-
mentary matters, and it is likely that they brought the 
institution of the salman back with them. The executor 
of this period had a very limited function, chiefly to see 
that legacies were paid out of those chattels from which 
a testator could make a bequest. If the heir refused to 
pay the legacy or interfered in any way, he could bring 
suit to enforce payment. 19 
The heir at this point was not a universal successor, 
although he was similar in many respects to the Roman 
heres. A universal succession requires that the estate 
pass as a whole to the heir. Yet in England a portion of 
a testator's chattels had to go to the widow, and the 
heir did not control these. Further, if a man died intes-
tate, either the church or his lord would take a part of 
his personal property. The use of the executor to insure 
payment of legacies was also inconsistent with a theory 
of universal succession.20 The clergy whose influence in 
testamentary matters became so powerful through the 
ecclesiastical courts were thoroughly familiar with 
Roman Law and its scheme of administration. How-
ever, their powerful influence when the English admin-
istration was in its most fluid state led toward the 
development of the personal representative rather 
than endeavoring to convert the heir into a universal 
successor. 
18 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note 6 at 563. 
19 Atkinson, supra note I I at I I I. 
20 This analysis of the difference between the heir and the universal 
successor was made in Atkinson, supra note I I at I I I. 
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For a hundred and fifty years after the time of Glan-
ville, there was a gradual transfer of representative 
functions from the heir to the sa/man or executor. It is 
not important for the purposes of this work to trace the 
detail of this development, particularly since several 
very good studies have been made of it. 21 By the end of 
the thirteenth century, the executor could be sued both 
by the beneficiares under the will and by the creditors 
of the decedent. 22 The executor could not prove his title 
until he had gotten probate of the will in the ecclesias-
tical courts, but after this was done, he could sue to 
collect the debts of the testator. 23 During the early pe-
riod of his development, the executor was probably 
treated as having absolute ownership of the decedent's 
chattels and thus was liable out of his own property for 
decedent's debts, much in the same position as the Eng-
lish heir and the Roman heres had been.24 However, by 
the middle of the fourteenth century, it was recognized 
that a separation existed between the testator's prop-
erty and that of the executor, and a judgment rendered 
against the executor in favor of a creditor of the dece-
dent was de bonis testatoris. 25 From this time on, the 
executor is a personal representative in the modern 
sense of the term. 
The development of the executor as a personal repre-
sentative has been traced many times, but the true 
explanation for this peculiar phenomenon, instead of 
the assimilation of the Roman scheme of universal suc-
cession, is obscure. It may lie, as does the reason for 
21 Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 
8 MissouRI L. REv. I07 (1943); Goffin, op. cit.; Holdsworth, op. cit., supra 
note 6 at 563-595; Holmes, op. cit., supra note I6. 
22 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note 2I at 565. 
23 Id. at 566. 
24 Holmes, supra note 2.1 at 43· 
26 I d. at 45· 
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many English legal concepts, in the struggle between 
courts for jurisdiction. The ecclesiastical courts were 
attempting in this period to obtain jurisdiction over 
all testamentary matters. As might be expected, the 
common-law courts were not too friendly toward this 
ambition. The ecclesiastical courts first obtained the 
concession from the temporal courts that the executor 
had to probate the will in their courts.26 Further, before 
they were willing to admit the will to probate, they in-
sisted that the executor give an oath that he would 
account for all his dealings to the ordinary.27 This duty 
to account was enforced by the then very potent threat 
of excommunication for failure to obey the orders of the 
ecclesiastical courts. Also, the executor could be re-
moved for misconduct by the church courts. 28 The 
common-law courts retained the power to entertain 
actions of debt by and against executors and always 
had exclusive jurisdiction over real property. If a scheme 
of universal succession were adopted, the only aspects 
of administration which would require adjudication 
could be adequately handled in the common-law 
courts. Since the universal successor is personally liable 
for all debts and legacies, the creditors and legatees 
would have a satisfactory remedy in the common-law 
action of debt. Quite possibly, the clergy, who were 
always influential with those persons who had reached 
that time in life when they become aware of the neces-
sity of making a will, suggested the use of the executor, 
because it was the institution which was most subject 
to control by the church and the ecclesiastical courts. 
Another reason probably lies in the different practices 
26 Atkinson, supra note 21 at 112. 
'J:l Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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of succession. In Rome, the universal successor was 
developed largely for family and religious reasons. In 
France it was adopted because of the influence of 
Roman Law, but it worked well enough because the 
general practice was to die intestate, thus leaving the 
total estate to the heirs. With the property in their 
hands, they can easily be required to perform the duties 
of administration. In England, however, there seemed 
to be a greater fondness for disposing of one's chattels 
by will. In addition, these legacies seemed frequently to 
go to persons other than a man's lawful heirs. Thus the 
institution of sa/man or executor was first used to insure 
that an unwilling heir could not interfere with the pay-
ment of legacies. It soon became the regular custom 
for a testator who wished to make legacies to provide an 
executor to make sure that the legacies were paid. From 
this, it was an easy step to the use of an executor to 
administer all of a testator's chattels under the watchful 
eye of the ecclesiastical courts. 
The concept of the executor was responsible for the 
development of another type of personal representative. 
If a person died intestate or left a will without having 
appointed an executor, his estate was administered in 
the ecclesiastical courts. Originally, the ordinary took 
possession and administered the decedent's goods, but 
it early became common for him to appoint a person to 
carry out the actual duties of administration.29 It was 
this appointee who was to become the administrator. 
In this early period, the ordinary was not a true per-
sonal representative of the decedent since he could not 
sue to recover his assets nor be sued for his debts. 30 
29 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra note 21 at 567-568. 
30 ld. at 568. 
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It was the statute of 135731 that really originated the 
administrator.32 It compelled the ordinary to appoint 
an administrator from among the close friends of the 
decedent. It also gave the administrator power to sue on 
obligations due to the decedent and made him answer-
able for decedent's debts. This statute modeled the 
administrator on the already well-established concept 
of the executor. 
Thus the two personal representatives with whom 
we are familiar in Anglo-American law are the testa-
mentary executor and the administrator.33 The executor 
is the appointee of the testator in the will, while the ad_. 
ministrator is appointed by the probate court. As a 
practical matter, the distinction between the two 
causes only a few minor differences as respects the appli-
cable legal rules in the modern administration. 34 The 
law relating to one is generally applicable to the other. 
There is another historical development in the con-
cept of the personal representative which is of primary 
importance in the problems discussed in this work. As 
we have seen, the personal representative, in early Eng-
lish law, had to obtain his right to administer the 
estate from the ecclesiastical courts. The estate would 
be probated in the diocese where the decedent was 
domiciled at the date of his death. 36 However, if he left 
31 JI Edward III, st. I, c. II. 
32 Holdsworth, op cit., supra note 2I at 568-569. 
aa There is a quasi personal representative known as the executor de son 
tort which may be treated as a third type of personal representative. For a 
brief discussion of this concept, see infra pp. I22-I24· 
34 The only difference of importance to this study is that an executor 
may be given a power to sell decedent's real property in the will and he will 
be permitted to exercise this power by a conveyance to foreign lands. Need-
less to say, the administrator has no such privilege. See infra pp. I25-I29. 
35 Sweet v. Partridge, 5 Ves. Jun. I48, JI Eng. Rep. 5I7 (I799). 
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bona notabilia86 of more than five pounds in a diocese 
other than the one in which he was domiciled, there 
would have to be a prerogative probate in the court of 
the archbishop of the province. 37 There were two prov-
inces in England, York and Canterbury. When a man 
left bona notabilia in one or more dioceses in each prov-
ince, an early case decided in I 596 that the prerogative 
probate of Canterbury would govern, on the ground of 
the necessity for a unified administration.38 However, in 
1661, it was held to be the rule that when a man died 
leaving bona notabilia in each province, it would be nec-
essary to have two administrations.39 This became the 
settled law.40 This was also held to be the result when a 
man at death left bona notabilia in a diocese in a prov-
ince and also in a peculiar carved out of that same 
province.41 From these early cases, the rule has devel-
oped that the authority of a personal representative 
does not extend beyond the territory of the jurisdiction 
which appointed him. 
The disruption which has been caused in probate 
administration by this theory raises the interesting 
problem why this rule developed. Probably the arch-
bishops were jealous of any invasion of their authority 
and wished to maintain supreme control in their respec-
36 Bona notabilia are goods and chattels of a decedent which are of 
sufficient value to be accounted for in an administration. This value be-
came fixed at five pounds. 
37 Burston v. Ridley, I Salkeld 39, 91 Eng. Rep. 40 (1702); Stokes v. 
Bates, 5 B. & C. 491, 108 Eng. Rep. 183 (1826). 
38 Byron v. Byron, Cro. Eliz. 472, 78 Eng. Rep. 709 (1596). 
39 Allison and Sharpley v. Dickenson, Hardres 216, 145 Eng. Rep. 460 
(1661). 
40 Burston v. Ridley, I Salkeld 39, 91 Eng. Rep. 40 (1702); Stokes v. 
Bates, 5 B. & C. 491, 108 Eng. Rep. 183 (1826). 
41 Price v. Simpson, Cro. Eliz. 718, 78 Eng. Rep. 953 (1599). 
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tive jurisdictions.42 Certainly, permitting a personal 
representative appointed elsewhere to administer goods 
in his province would deprive the archbishop of all 
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate. The case author-
ity which first established the rule supports this theory 
when it said: 
" ... administration granted in one province, is void as to 
goods in another, because there are distinct supreme juris-
dictions. " 43 
The cases on this point were decided in the temporal 
rather than the ecclesiastical courts. They involved 
actions for debt brought in the common-law courts by 
an administrator appointed in one province against a 
debtor residing in another province, or an equity action 
to discover property in a province other than the one in 
which the administrator was appointed. In these cases, 
the temporal courts had to determine the source of the 
administrator's authority and its territorial extent as 
defined by the ecclesiastical courts. Therefore their 
reasoning, based on jurisdictional limitations, should 
accurately reflect the attitudes of the ecclesiastical 
courts. 
Whatever may be the explanation for its develop-
ment, this concept of the territorial limitation on the 
authority of the personal representative has become a 
firmly established rule of Anglo-American law. The 
theory behind the rule seems to be that the personal 
representative is an artificial person created by the law 
of the state in which he is appointed, and since the law 
of that state cannot extend beyond its territorial limits, 
42 Buchanan & Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of 
First National Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. REv. 9II at 913 (1935). 
43 Allison and Sharpley v. Dickenson, Hardres 216, 145 Eng. Rep. 460 
(1661). 
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the personal representative cannot exist outside its 
boundaries. 44 The important consequence of this type 
of thinking has been the requirement of separate admin-
istrations on a single estate comprising assets in several 
states. If a decedent dies testate, his executor will qual-
ify as the personal representative where the decedent 
was domiciled at the date of death. However, it is very 
likely that the decedent will have property in another 
jurisdiction. Under the traditional theory, the executor 
cannot by virtue of his original grant of letters collect 
or administer that property. He must qualify as ancil-
lary administrator in the second state, or some other 
person may be appointed administrator there. This 
ancillary administration, even if the same person is the 
personal representative in both, goes through all the 
proceedings of administration under the supervision of 
the local probate court and is completely independent 
of the domiciliary administration. 45 Thus, the phenom-
enon frequently appears of two or more administrations 
proceeding under the control of as many different legal 
systems, each concerned with administering and deter-
mining the succession to the property of a single de-
ceased person. It is from this concept of separate ad-
mmlstrations in each jurisdiction that most of the 
conflict of laws problems in probate administration 
ar1se. 
3· THE MoDERN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
An understanding of the conflicts problems relating 
to personal representatives requires some general under-
44 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, 1447 (1916). 
45 Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 164 F. 817, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 553 
(8th Cir. 1908); Voyles v. Robinson, 151 Miss. 585, 18 So. 420 (1928); 
State ex rel. Finley v. District Court, 99 Mont. 200, 43 P. (2d) 682 (1935). 
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standing of the functions of a personal representative in 
a purely domestic administration. His functions are 
completely interwoven with the problems of adminis-
tering the decedent's estate. This is because the executor 
or administrator performs all the activities of the admin-
istration. However, it is not the purpose of this study 
to discuss problems of essentially probate law. It will be 
assumed that the administration has been granted. 46 
Therefore the problems of jurisdiction to grant a probate 
administration and who may apply to secure an admin-
istration will not be considered. Also, this discussion 
of administration ends with the final accounting by the 
personal representative, so that it is not within the 
scope of this work to treat problems of succession. 
When a will has been admitted to probate or an 
administration has been granted on the estate of a per-
son dying intestate, the first duty of the probate court 
is to appoint the personal representative. If the decedent 
has left a will and that instrument nominates a specified 
person as executor, the court must appoint him as the 
personal representative unless he is completely incom-
petent to perform the duties of administration.47 If 
there is no will or if the will fails to nominate an exec-
utor, the court will appoint an administrator. The per-
sonal representative may be a corporation as well as a 
natural person, 48 but about a third of the states prohibit 
46 A false impression may be created unless it is realized that it is in only 
about one out of every four deaths that there is an administration. If the 
estate is small, the heirs may by agreement pay off the debts of decedent 
and distribute his property among themselves. In addition, there have 
been statutory enactments dispensing with administration on estates 
below a specified value. For a discussion of this matter, see Atkinson, 
HANDBOOK oN THE LAw OF WILLS, 2nd Ed., 565-575 (I937). 
47 In re Lawrence's Estate, 53 Ariz. I, 85 P. (2d) 45 (I938); In re Le-
land's Will, 2I9 N.Y. 387, II4 N.E. 854 (1916). 
48 In re Lawrence's Estate, 53 Ariz. I, 85 P. (2d) 45 (1938); Equitable 
Trust Co. v. Plume, 92 Conn. 649, I03 A. 940 (1918). 
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nonresidents or foreign corporations from serving as 
personal representatives. 49 There may be joint repre-
sentatives in one administration. 60 
The authority of the personal representative is said 
to be derived from the court which appointed him. 61 
Actually, he is often described as an "officer of the 
court." 62 It was always understood that the authority 
of the administrator was obtained from the ordinary 
or court which appointed him. However, the old com-
mon-law theory was that the executor derived his 
authority from the will itself and the appointment by 
the probate court was merely evidence of his right. 63 
The more modern view is that the executor, as well as 
the administrator, gets his authority solely from the 
appointment by the probate court in which the admin-
istration is being had. 64 
It should be clear at this point that the "estate" is 
not an entity. 66 The term "estate" refers to decedent's 
property. The executor or administrator cannot be said 
to be an agent or representative of the estate. The per-
sonal representative is more properly an agent of the 
court which appointed him, and he has title to dece-
dent's personal property and to some extent control 
49 See infra p. 34· 
60 In reDrew's Estate, 183 Minn. 374,236 N.W. 701 (1931); Lethbridge 
v. Lauder, 13 Wyo. 9, 76 P. 682 (1904). 
61 In re Estate of Ferris, 234 Iowa 960, 14 N.W. (2d) 889 (1940); Har-
grave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 287, 193 So. 648 (1940). 
62 Estate of Conkey, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 581, 96 P. (2d) 383 (1939); In re 
Estate of Ferris, 234 Iowa 960, 14 N.W. (2d) 889 (1940); In re Drew's 
Estate, 183 Minn. 374, 236 N.W. 701 (1931). 
63 Middleton's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 28b, 77 Eng. Rep. 93 (1603); In re 
Miller's Estate, 216 Pa. 247, 65 A. 681 (1907). 
64 Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F. (2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2d Cir. 1931), 
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 551; In re Van Vleck's Estate, 
123 Iowa 89, 98 N.W. 557 (1904). 
66 A. L. Goetzman Co. v. Gazett, 172 Minn. 68, 214 N.W. 895 (1927); 
Ferrin v. Myrick, 41 N.Y. 315 (1869). 
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over his realty. Therefore, it is the personal representa-
tive rather than the estate with whom third persons and 
courts must deal. 
The function of the personal representative is to ad-
minister the property of the decedent. As will be seen 
constantly throughout this work, the distinction be-
tween immovable or real property and personal prop-
erty is fundamental in problems of administration. This 
is evident in the type of control which the personal 
representative has over these two kinds of property 
interests. In the case of immovable property, the 
common-law rule is that title to the real property of the 
decedent descends directly to the heirs or devisees with-
out any action on the part of the personal representa-
tive.56 However, the modern view is that realty, while 
still the property of the heir or devisee, may be taken to 
pay decedent's debts if the personal property is not 
sufficient to satisfy them. 57 Some states have legislation 
which gives the personal representative the right to take 
possession of the decedent's real property, to manage it, 
and to collect the rents and profits. 58 The control of the 
personal representative over the decedent's personalty 
is much greater. At the time of his appointment, he 
obtains title to all the personal property of the decedent, 
both tangible and intangible. 59 If there is more than one 
personal representative appointed on the estate, there 
may be difficulty in determining which has title to any 
particular piece of personal property. This difficulty is 
avoided by the rule that the personal representative who 
66 Stephens v. Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., 54 Ariz. 519, 97 P. (2d) 
202 (1939); Aubuchon v. Lory, 23 Mo. 99 (1856). 
57 See cases cited supra note 56. 
68 See infra Chapter IV, p. 135. 
69 Cunningham v. Rodgers, 267 F. 609 (D.C. Cir. 1920). 
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collects the asset by reducing it to his possession will 
have title to it. It should be clear that the title of the 
personal representative is not absolute. He is a fiduciary 
whose position is somewhat analogous to that of the 
trustee. 60 He is administering the property for the 
benefit of the creditors and beneficiaries or heirs, and 
when the administration is completed, he must transfer 
his title to those persons whom the court designates. 
The first. duty of the personal representative is to 
collect the assets of the decedent. These assets include 
tangible personal property, intangible choses in action 
which survive the death, and real property if the per-
sonal representative is given by will or statute the 
power to sell this realty. In the collection of assets, he 
may accept voluntary payment of obligations due to 
the decedent and give a valid discharge for them. 61 If 
the obligor is unwilling to make payment, he may bring 
suit to collect the asset. If the cause of action accrued 
prior to the death, he sues in his official capacity as per-
sonal representative. 62 If it arose subsequent to the 
death, he may sue in his official or personal character. 63 
The personal representative is required to file an inven-
tory listing all of the decedent's assets within a certain 
period after his appointment, usually from one to three 
months, at which time he should have completed his 
collection of the assets. 
The next duty of the personal representative is to 
conserve the assets he has collected and keep them 
60 In re Stewart's Estate, 145 Ore. 460, 28 P. (2d) 642, 91 A.L.R. 818 
(1934). 
61 See cases cited infra Chapter V, note 35· 
62 Kane v. Paul, 14 Pet. 33, 10 L.Ed. 341 (U.S. 184o); Hanover Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Street, 234 Ala. 537, 176 So. 350 (1937); Kent v. Bothwell, I 52 Mass. 
341, 25 N.E. 721, 9 L.R.A. 258 {1890). 
63 See cases cited supra note 61. 
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safely during the period of administration. In modern 
estates of much size, this can be by far the most difficult 
obligation of the personal representative. There may be 
business enterprises which must be kept in operation. 
In the absence of permission in the will, by statute, or 
by the court, any expenditures made in this operation 
of a business would be at the personal representative's 
risk, and he would be personally liable for all losses 
accruing during the business venture. 64 It may be nec-
essary for the most efficient management to convert 
some of the decedent's property into a more convenient 
type of assets. In regard to personal property that he 
has collected, the personal representative has the 
power 65 and in some cases the duty to sell it, such as 
when the assets are perishable goods. 66 In the case of 
real property, he may have the power to sell it if given 
by the will or statute. 67 He may also have the duty to 
invest the cash which comes into his hands from sale or 
otherwise, and his standard of duty will be the exercise 
of good and conservative business judgment. 68 He is 
personally liable for his own conversion of assets of the 
estate in his control 69 and for any waste which occurs 
to the assets through any action on his part which a 
reasonably prudent man acting in good faith would not 
have taken. 70 The personal liability which accrues 
64 Mayo v. Arkansas Valley Trust Co., 132 Ark. 64, 200 S.W. sos (1917) 
In re Jenning's Estate, 74 Mont. 449, 241 P. 648 (I92S). 
65 Smith v. Steen, 20 N.M. s36, I so P. 927 (191 S); In re Heinze's 
Estate, 224 N.Y. I, 120 N.E. 63 (1918). 
66 Atkinson, op. cit., supra note 46 at 667. 
67 See infra Chapter IV, pp. I2S-I32. 
68 In re Macky's Estate, 73 Colo. I, 213 P. 131 (1923); In re Wilmerd-
ing's Estate, 238 N.Y.S. 37S (1929). 
69 Meyers' Adm'rv. Meyers, 244 Ky. 248, so S.W. (2d) 81 (1932); Heap 
v. Heap, 2S8 Mich. 2so, 242 N.W. 252 (1932). 
70 In re Janke's Estate, 193 Minn. 201, 2S8 N.W. 3II (I93S); In re 
Belcher's Estate, 221 N.Y.S. 7II (1927); In re Reilly's Estate, 77 Pa. 
Super. 178 (1921). 
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against the personal representative for failure to con-
serve and manage the assets properly, like all liability 
of the personal representative to the heirs or benefi-
ciaries, will be imposed on him at the time of his final 
account by a surcharge.71 
Another of the duties of the personal representative is 
to pay off the debts of the decedent and claims which 
accrue after his death, such as funeral expenses and 
estate taxes. The common practice is to provide a 
period after the appointment of the executor or admin-
istrator during which claims can be presented for 
payment. The length of this period varies anywhere 
from three months to a year, with the average being 
about six months. Those claims which are not pre-
sented to the personal representative within the spec-
ified time are barred.72 A creditor may sue the personal 
representative on an obligation of the decedent and 
secure a judgment against him.73 However, such a 
judgment cannot be satisfied by levying an execution on 
any of decedent's property.74 The judgment must be 
presented as a claim. 75 The purpose of this procedure is 
to effectuate one of the most basic policies underlying 
our probate proceeding, which is to secure equality of 
payment to all the creditors of the decedent. After the 
period for the presentment of claims has run, the 
personal representative will pay out of the assets in his 
hands the claims, first those classes of creditors which 
71 Shinn's Estate, I66 Pa. I2I, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (I895). 
72 Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 2.99 U.S. 2I7, 57 S.Ct. I5I, 8I L.Ed. I33 
(I936); Davis v. Shepard, I35 Wash. I24, 237 P. 2I, 4I A.L.R. I63 (I925). 
73 Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U.S. 2I7, 57 S.Ct. I5I, 8I L.Ed. I33 
(I936); Eddy v. Adams, I45 Mass. 489, I4 N.E. 509 (I888); Roberts v. 
Roberts, 62. Wyo. 77, I62 P. (2d) I I7 (I945). 
74 Brown v. Sweat, I49 Fla. 524, 6 So. (2d) 538 (I942); Grife v. Equi-
table Life Assur. Soc., 233 Iowa 83, 8 N.W. (2d) 584 (I943); In re Mannix 
Estate, I46 Ore. I87, 29 P. (2d) 364 (1934). 
76 Meredith v. Scallion, 5I Ark. 36I, II S.W. 516,3 L.R.A. 8I2 (I888). 
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are preferred. Then he will pay the general creditors. If 
there are not sufficient assets to cover their claims, he 
will pay them in equal shares the remaining assets. 
Lastly, the personal representative must file his final 
account with the court which appointed him. If the 
court does not regard any given expenditure listed in 
the account as proper, he will be surcharged with the 
amount.76 Also, he may be personally liable for failure 
to collect certain assets. 77 After the final account has 
been approved, he will be directed to turn over the 
remaining assets in his hands to those beneficiaries or 
heirs who the court has decided are entitled to them, 
and is then discharged as the personal representative.78 
4· THE ScoPE AND PLAN OF THIS WoRK 
The conditions of modern American life have inten-
sified the conflicts problems in administering a dece-
dent's estate. Although we have retained forty-eight 
separate legal systems with distinctive geographical 
territories, the barriers which prevent people and 
property from moving freely across national borders 
have been eliminated between our states by the Con-
stitution. Certainly, people today do not confine their 
lives and their possessions to one community as was 
common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
when the rules of ancillary administration were being 
worked out. Due to improved transportation facilities 
and the homogeneous quality of the people, our popula-
76 Shinn's Estate, 166 Pa. 121, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895). 
77 Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878). 
78 This discussion of the functions of the modern personal representative 
is very brief and is not intended to be more than a framework on which the 
conflicts discussion can be hung. For a more complete, but still brief picture 
of this area, see Atkinson, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF WILLS, 2nd Ed., 
chapters 12 & 13 (1937). 
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tion has become highly mobile, so that many persons 
move periodically from state to state, frequently leaving 
property behind them. At the death of such a person, 
each state in which he left some of his property will be 
faced with problems involving conflict of laws. 
A second factor is the equalization of wealth which has 
occurred in the twentieth century. There are more 
medium-sized estates which will have scattered prop-
erty interests in various jurisdictions. Therefore in a 
larger proportion of deaths, there may be a need for 
ancillary administration. 
The commercial nature of modern property interests 
has contributed to magnifying the problems. Much of 
the total wealth of the nation is represented by credit 
transactions. Since these are intangible interests and 
therefore consist solely of legal relationships between 
two or more persons, it is difficult to fix a situs for them. 
Very often the debtor and creditor will reside in different 
states so that, when one of the parties dies, conflicts 
problems will be raised in the administration of his 
estate. Frequently, the credit transaction will be 
evidenced by a negotiable instrument which passes 
freely from holder to holder and carries the situs of the 
debt with it. This increases the possibility that the 
parties to the transaction will be in different jurisdic-
tions, thereby raising conflicts questions. Another type 
of commercial interest which forms a substantial part 
of property today is in the form of corporate stocks. 
These shares of stock are usually treated as property in 
the state of incorporation.79 Since it is common to 
organize a corporation in a state which is far removed 
79 Nashville Trust Co. v. Cleage, 246 Ala. 513, 21 So. (2d) 441 (1945); 
Murphy v. Crouse, 135 Cal. 14, 66 P. 971, 87 Am. St. Rep. 90 (1901); 
Black Eagle Mining Co. v. Conroy, 94 Okla. 199, 221 P. 425 (1923). 
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from its place of business, and since our huge corpora-
tions have national and international lists of stock-
holders, it is very likely that the domicile of a deceased 
person will not coincide with the state where the 
corporation in which he owns stock was organized. 
The problems of multiple administrations are not 
confined to a large estate, but will frequently occur in 
the medium-sized and many times in the small ones. 
Even a person from a low income group is likely to own 
one or two shares of stock in a foreign corporation or to 
have loaned money to a friend who has moved out of 
the state without paying him. On his death, the problem 
is raised how to collect these assets and whether an 
ancillary administration is necessary. 
As has been discussed previously, the general theory 
is that a personal representative has no authority to act 
in a jurisdiction other than the one in which he was 
appointed. If there are assets to be administered in 
another state, there must be an ancillary administration 
in that jurisdiction. Since this result is usually explained 
on the theory that the personal representative is an 
artificial creature who has no existence outside of the 
state which created him, it would seem logical to suppose 
that he never performs acts in any other state. As a 
matter of fact, the pressure of necessity has forced the 
courts and legislatures to make frequent exceptions in 
order to permit executors and administrators to act in 
other jurisdictions. These exceptions have become so 
numerous and are so fundamental that they raise the 
questions whether ancillary administrations as a matter 
of legal logic are still defensible and whether as a matter 
of social policy it is desirable to retain the principle of 
a separate administration in each jurisdiction. 
The purpose of this work is to determine what acts a 
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personal representative appointed in one jurisdiction can 
perform in other states. The next chapter will consider 
those instances where either by statutory modification 
or by common-law decision the personal representative 
is permitted to resort to the courts of other states to 
secure some relief. The third chapter will discuss the 
problems raised when the forum seeks to exercise 
jurisdiction over an executor or administrator from 
another state. The fourth chapter will treat the problems 
of a personal representative in transactions regarding 
immovable property located in foreign states. The 
fifth chapter will deal with the effects of extra-legal 
action by a personal representative when he enters 
another state and there collects some property belong-
ing to the decedent and removes it to the jurisdiction 
where he is administering the estate. The final chapter 
will consider whether the conditions of modern life 
require that we consolidate and expand the numerous 
exceptions that have been made by developing a system 
of a single administration on a decedent's estate which 
will operate in all jurisdictions. If this is found to be 
desirable, then the best means of achieving it must be 
determined. 
It should be clear by now that this is primarily a 
study in jurisdiction. The jurisdictional questions will 
be raised on two levels. The first is the question of the 
power of a legal order to adjudicate as to a personal 
representative acting extraterritorially. Can the legal 
system which appoints a personal representative au-
thorize him] to act in another jurisdiction? Does the 
state in which he attempts to act have the power to 
permit him to do so? Can the state in which he acts 
control his actions in regard to the act or in regard to 
all aspects of the administration? All of these represent 
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problems as to the power of a legal order to affect 
rights of a personal representative who acts in a foreign 
jurisdiction. Assuming that the legal system does 
exercise jurisdiction, the second level to be discussed is 
whether other states must recognize that action or 
whether they have the jurisdiction to refuse to give it 
effect. However, any study must go beyond the question 
of mere power to act. It is necessary to consider next 
what states actually do. This requires an examination 
of the cases and statutes which permit a personal rep-
resentative to act in other jurisdictions. Finally 
these rules must be examined to see whether they are 
desirable and what changes should be made. 
Something should be said about the terminology 
which will be used. There are technical terms by which 
various types of personal representatives are distin-
guished .. If the personal representative is nominated in 
the will and confirmed by the probate court, he is 
spoken of as an executor. If he is appointed by the 
probate court, he is an administrator. If there is a will 
and he is appointed to administer under the will, he will 
be referred to as an administrator cum testamento 
annexo or c.t.a. If the administration has been started 
and he is appointed to complete it, he is designated as 
an administrator de bonis non or d.b.n. The term, 
personal representative, refers, of course, to all types of 
executors and administrators. Since the purpose of this 
study is to treat the jurisdictional questions raised 
when a personal representative appointed in one state 
acts in another, the distinctions represented by this 
terminology are not important and therefore will not be 
used. Unless it is made clear during the discussion of a 
problem that the distinction is important, the terms, 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 29 
personal representative, executor, and administrator, 
will be treated as synonymous and will be used inter-
changeably. 
The phrases, "foreign personal representative," "for-
eign executor," or "foreign administrator," mean one 
who is appointed in a state other than the forum in 
which he is a party to a suit or is performing some 
action. The converse of this terminology, namely, a 
"personal representative acting in a foreign jurisdic-
tion," means that he is appointed in the forum and 
performs some action in another state. 
CHAPTER II 
Capacity of a Foreign Personal 
Representative to Sue 
I. GENERAL RuLE AT CoMMON LAw 
T HE LEGAL validity of any act performed by a personal representative outside the state of his appointment is dependent on the effect which 
courts will ascribe to that act. The court which makes 
such a determination may be the one which appointed 
the personal representative and thus has complete 
control over his activities. On the other hand, a court of 
the state in which the act is performed may decide the 
question. It may do so when passing on title to property 
in relation to the foreign administrator or when it is 
asked to give him some form of relief. This chapter will 
consider the latter problem. When will the courts of 
one state take jurisdiction of a case if the party seeking 
relief is an administrator or executor appointed in 
another state? 
The general rule at common law is stated by Story as 
follows: 
"It has hence become a general doctrine of the common 
law, recognised both in England and America, that no suit 
can be brought or maintained by any executor or administra-
tor, ... in his official capacity, in the Courts of any other 
country, except that from which he derives his authority to 
act in virtue of the probate and letters testamentary or the 
letters of administration there granted to him .... " 1 
A host of cases in the United States have laid down in 
1 Story, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, znd Ed., sec. 513, 
(1841). 
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accord with Story's statement the general rule that in 
the absence of statutory permission a foreign admin-
istrator or executor may not sue in the courts of their 
states. 2 This is also the rule in England3 and probably 
the Commonwealth countries as well. 4 
The traditional explanation for the rule has been 
given by Professor Beale thus: 
" ... But as has been seen the claim due to the decedent is at 
common law not to be paid to anyone else; and an admin-
istrator can sue only because of a statutory power given him. 
But this power, like all created by statute, extends only to 
the boundaries of the state; and the administrator appointed 
in the state cannot claim the power."5 
This is based on an accentuated "territoriality" concept 
of law. It seems to say that the administrator as a legal 
person is a statutory creation, and since the statutes of 
a state cannot by their own power operate outside the 
boundaries of the state, the administrator cannot func-
tion as such outside its territory. The explanation is 
questionable on its face and becomes completely un-
satisfactory when it appears that the administrator 
often performs acts outside the territory of the state 
which appointed him 6 and that he frequently appears 
as a party in the courts of other states.7 
2 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, I935 (I9I6). See cases 
cited in note I, I352; Reynolds v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. T. Ry. Co., 7 
F.R.D. I65 (E.D Ky. I945); McKeen v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., I I I F. Supp. 
876 (W.D. Mo. I953); Warren v. Globe Indemnity Co., 216 La. 107, 43 
So. (2d) 234 (I949); Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. I30, 6I N.E. (2d) 412 
(1945);Cannon v. Cannon, 228 N.C. 2II,45 S.E. (2d) 34 (1947);Wilcoxv. 
District Court, 2 Utah (2d) 227, 272 P. (2d) 147 (1954); Joseph v. The 
National Bank, 124 W.Va. 500, 2I S.E. (2d) I41 (1942). 
3 Tourton v. Flower, 3 P.Will. 368,24 Eng. Rep. II05 (1735); Cheshire, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 4th Ed., 5I5-5I6 (I952). 
4 Lunn v. Barber, [1949] Ontario Rep. 34· 
5 Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at I533· 
6 See infra Chapter V, pp. 15I-I62. 
7 Infra PP· 35-54· 
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It must be clearly understood that the rule is not the 
result of lack of jurisdiction or power in the court to 
make a foreign personal representative a valid party 
plaintiff. The external limitations on any legal system 
can come from only two sources.8 The law of any nation 
may be limited by clearly recognized rules of inter-
national law. In addition, the states of the United 
States are limited in their power to make legal rules and 
to adjudicate cases by certain constitutional provisions9 • 
Neither of these prohibits a legal system from permitting 
a foreign personal representative to sue in its courts. 
Certainly, a foreign administrator may be allowed to 
sue as a matter of comity.10 Therefore, any restrictions 
on suits by foreign personal representatives must be 
imposed by a rule of the positive municipal law of the 
jurisdiction. Our question is why this law and the courts 
which apply it generally refuse to allow such an action. 
The real explanation lies in a public policy which is 
probably as old as the rule itself. The forum, having 
control over property within its jurisdiction, insists 
that the property be administered under its direction in 
order to protect local creditors. Such a policy saves 
local creditors the expense of going to a distant jurisdic-
tion to present and prove their claims. It saves them 
from litigating their rights in a forum where the rules 
determining such rights may be different from those of 
their home state. If the estate is insolvent, it guarantees 
8 W. W. Cook, THE LoGICAL AND LEGAL BAsEs OF THE CoNFLICT OF 
LAWS, 4I (I942). 
9 Chiefly the Fourteenth Amendment (the due process clause) and 
Article IV, sec. I (the full faith and credit clause). 
10 Vaughan v. Northrup, I5 Pet. I, IO L.Ed. 639 (U.S. I84I); Kirk-
bride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E. (2d) 852 (I937). "An exception 
to the prevailing view that foreign administrators have no standing in our 
courts is sometimes made as a matter of comity in the interests of justice." 
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that local creditors will be paid to the extent to which 
assets in the forum will cover the local debts. By 
applying the general rule then, the forum is preferring 
the claims of its citizens over the interest of the foreign 
administrator in having a unified administration. This 
explanation for the rule has been used by modern 
courts. In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
said: 
"The underlying reason for this rule is that a state will not· 
allow property within its jurisdiction to be so taken by a 
foreign administrator as to deprive its own citizens of op-
portunity to enforce their claims against it. The rule does 
not arise from any want of legal right in the foreign adminis-
trator or lack of inherent authority in the court to accord 
him recognition.' '11 
The discussion in this chapter on the capacity of 
foreign administrators and executors to sue will pre-
suppose that there has been no ancillary administration. 
A jurisdiction may refuse to allow a foreign personal 
representative to sue to recover property of the decedent 
within its territory. Instead it will require that an 
ancillary administrator be appointed in its courts who 
will administer the estate of the decedent under its 
supervision. If there is an ancillary administration, the 
proper party . to bring such an action would be the 
ancillary administrator. 12 A foreign personal represent-
ative, who wishes to sue in another state, may always 
11 Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 294, 51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952). 
Accord: Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, ·s3 
N.E. (2d) 673 (1949); North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 135 (1946). . 
Contra: Warren v. Globe Indemnity Co., 216 La. 107, 43 So. (2d) 234 · 
(1949). 
12 In re Chisholm's Will, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 182 (1951). 
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qualify in that state as ancillary administrator13 if the 
laws of the state permit him to do so. One third of the 
states hold by statute,14 decision, 15 or court order16 that 
only residents are entitled to be appointed administra-
tors in their jurisdictions. Thus a foreign personal 
representative, who is not a resident, is not eligible to 
serve as ancillary administrator in those states. If he 
can qualify as ancillary administrator, he becomes 
administrator of the estate in that jurisdiction and will 
always be permitted to sue. If he brings an action as a 
foreign personal representative and then qualifies as 
ancillary administrator after the suit has been filed and 
before there has been an objection to his lack of capacity 
to sue, he will be permitted to continue the suitY 
There have been three general classes of exceptions 
which the courts have made to the general rule pro-
hibiting suits by foreign personal representatives. Each 
of these will be considered separately. 
13 Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at 1533; Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 291, 
51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952); Thomas v. Richards, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 640 (1950); 
Hicks v. Shively, 137 S.W. (2d) 102 (Tex. 1940). 
14 Ark. Stat., sec. 62-208 (1947); Deering's Cal. Code, Probate sec. 420; 
Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 732:47; 113 Ga. Code Ann. 1204; Idaho Code, sec. I 5-
317; Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 229; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.005 
(1953); Mich. Comp. Laws, sec. 704.27 (1948); Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat., 
sec. 46uoo; Neb. Rev. Stat., sec. 3o-315 (1943); Baldwin's Ohio Rev. 
Code, sec. 2n3.o6; Ore. Rev. Stat., sec. II5.4Io; Utah Code, sec. 75-4-4 
(1953); Wash. Rev. Code, sec. I 1.36.oiO; Wyo. Comp. Stat, sec. 6-903 
(1945). 
15 Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, IO S.E. (2d) 673 (1940). "A 
foreign administrator has no authority in this state and cannot sue nor be 
sued as such; and since a nonresident cannot be appointed administrator, 
there should be an ancillary administration by a proper person in this 
State." 
16 Probate Court Rule 20, Minn. Stat. Ann., Vol. 31, p. 889. 
17 Leahy v. Haworth, 141 F. 669 (8th Cir. 1905); Gross v. Hocker, 243 
Iowa 291, 51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952). 
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(a) Waiver by defendant of the objection to capacity of a 
foreign personal representative to sue 
The first general exception deals with the problem 
whether the objection to the capacity of the foreign 
administrator to sue may be waived by the other party 
to the action. It is a curious thing, but those courts that 
for the most part cling persistently to the theory that a 
foreign administrator because of his terri toriallimi ta tion 
does not have the capacity to sue, will allow the other 
party to the suit to waive this objection.18 This is allowed 
because the courts speak of the administrator's dis-
ability as a lack of capacity to sue. Then based on the 
analogy to the rule applied to other parties who lack 
capacity to sue, such as minors and mental incompe-
tents, they say that this objection may be waived if the 
other party to the suit does not bring timely objection. 
Naturally this has led, particularly in the older cases, 
to rather complicated procedural debates on what 
constitutes a timely and proper objection. 19 Some courts 
require that the objection be raised by a plea in abate-
ment,20 others say that it may be done by a plea in bar,21 
and still others by a special demurrer if the incapacity 
is apparent on the face of the complaint.22 Pleading to 
18 Jolley v. Sloan, 6I Ga. App. 747, 7 S.E. (2d) 325 (I940); Anthes v. 
Anthes, 2I Idaho 305, I2I P. 553 (I912); Fort Fairfield Nash Co. v. 
Noltemier, I35 Me. 84, I89 A. 4I5, 108 A.L.R. I276 (I937); Wikoff v. 
Hirschell, 258 N.Y. 28, I79 N.E. 249 (I932); Wilson v. Wilson, 26 Ore. 
25I' 38 P. I 85 (I 894). 
19 See discussion of this problem in the annotation at 108 A.L.R. I282. 
2° Kane v. Paul, I4 Pet. 33, IO L.Ed. 34I (U.S. I84o); Fort Fairfield 
Nash Co. v. Noltemier, I35 Me. 84, I89 A. 4I5, 108 A.L.R. I276 (I937); 
see cases cited in the opinion. 
21 Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394 (U.S. I869). 
22 Funk v. Funk, 76 Colo. 45, 230 P. 6n (I924); Wilson v. Wilson, 26 
Ore. 25I, 38 P. I85 (I894). 
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the merits constitutes such a waiver. 23 All these courts 
would agree that the objection may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Modern courts operating under 
code systems of procedure would not be so concerned 
with the technicalities of raising the objection. Still 
they would require that a seasonable objection to the 
plaintiff's capacity to sue be made. Pleading to the 
merits24 or filing a counterclaim would be a waiver. 25 
The courts which have refused to follow the rule 
allowing waiver of the objection have done so on a 
different theory of the disability. 26 They say that a 
foreign administrator appears in their courts only as an 
individual, not in his capacity as representative of the 
estate. Yet it is only as a representative that he can show 
any interest in the subject matter of the cause of action 
belonging to the estate. Since he fails to show any 
interest in himself as plaintiff, he fails to state a cause of 
action. The objection that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish a cause of action in his favor may be raised at 
any time during the proceedings and even on appeal. 
Therefore, these courts say that the other party can 
never waive his right to object to suit by the plaintiff as 
foreign administrator. 
The reasoning of either position does not seem sound. 
The real reason for the general rule against suits by 
foreign personal representatives is the policy of protect-
ing local creditors. In any such suit, there are three 
interests involved. One is the interest of the foreign 
personal representative as plaintiff, another is that of 
23 Brown v. Nourse, 55 Me. 230 (I867); Farmers Trust Co. v. Bradshaw, 
242 N.Y.S. 598 (I93o). 
24 Wikoff v. Hirschell, 258 N.Y. 28, I79 N.E. 249 (I932). 
25 Jolley v. Sloan, 6I Ga. App. 747, 7 S.E. (2d) 325 (I940). 
26 Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Brantley's Adm'r., 96 Ky. 297, 28 
S.W. 477 (I894); Lefebure v. Baker, 69 Mont. I93, 220 P. I II I (I923). 
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the defendant, and the third is that oflocal creditors. It 
is not consistent with the underlying reason for the 
general rule to allow the defendant by his consent or 
carelessness to bar the interest of the local creditors in 
this action. While the majority of cases allow such a 
waiver, the preferable result from the common-law 
point of view would be that such action on the part of 
the defendant would not constitute a waiver as long as 
local creditors might be harmed. 
There is an interesting side question which arises out 
of the waiver cases. If the defendant fails to answer the 
petition, may the foreign administrator as plaintiff take 
a valid judgment by default? The foregoing cases which 
require affirmative action by the defendant in making a 
timely plea to plaintiff's lack of capacity would seem to 
imply that such a default judgment would be granted. 
Authority on the question is slight. The problem was 
discussed in a case decided by a Federal District 
Court. 27 The plaintiff, who was an administratrix 
appointed in Indiana, sued two defendants in Kentucky 
for conversion. One of the defendants failed to answer, 
but the other defendant made proper objection to 
plaintiff's capacity to sue. The court refused to grant a 
judgment by default against the defendant who did not 
answer, saymg: 
"The defendant United Distillers has failed to answer the 
petition, and except for the fact that its co-defendant has 
raised the foregoing defense in its behalf a judgment by 
default might be given. However, the defense raised is of such 
a character as to inure to the benefit of all defendants, even 
though not specifically pleaded by each defendant."28 
27 Ballard v. United Distillers Co., 28 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. Ky. 1939). 
28 28 F. Supp. at 635. 
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Apparently default judgments would be granted in 
favor of foreign personal representatives. However, it 
seems that granting a judgment by default would be 
unsound for the same reason that allowing a waiver of 
the objection to suit by the other party is unsound. If 
the court either from the face of the petition or sur-
rounding circumstances has knowledge that the plaintiff 
is a foreign administrator, it should refuse to grant a 
judgment by default. By its refusal, it would thereby 
give effect to the public policy of protecting local 
creditors by not permitting assets of the estate to be 
taken out of the jurisdiction. 
(b) Suit by the foreign personal representative 
as an individual 
The second exception to the general rule concerns 
those cases where the foreign administrator is said to be 
suing not in his representative capacity, but as an in-
dividual. Since the cause of action arises out of plaintiff's 
representative capacity, and since any recovery will be 
treated as assets of the estate,29 the distinction may not 
be an easy one to draw, nor may it be an intrinsically 
sound one. Yet it is a line which the courts have drawn 
and must be considered. Under this exception, the 
courts have decided several rather different fact situa-
tions which will be discussed separately. 
The first of these concerns the case where the foreign 
administrator is suing on a judgment he obtained in the 
state of his appointment. Almost without exception the 
cases permit such a suit.30 The theory is that the old 
29 Reed v. Hollister, 95 Ore. 656, 188 P. 170 (1920). 
30 Moore v. Kraft, 179 F. 685 (7th Cir. 1910); Turner v. Alton Banking 
& Trust Co., 166 F. (2d) 305 (8th Cir. 1948); Schlorer v. Mangin, 39 F. 
Supp. 65 (E.D. N.Y. 1941); McCraw v. Simpson, 2o8 Ark. 471, 187 S.W. 
(2d) 536 (1945); Reed v. Hollister, 95 Ore. 656, 188 P. 170 (1920). 
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cause of action which the personal representative had to 
sue on in his representative capacity is merged in the 
judgment. The judgment represents a new cause of 
action which never belonged to the decedent. Therefore, 
the personal representative need not sue as a representa-
tive of the estate of the decedent, but may sue as an 
individual who owns the claim based on the judgment. 
Consequently, the general rule concerning suits by 
foreign administrators is said to be inapplicable. 
In all the cases supporting the exception as applied to 
judgments, the administrator obtained the judgment 
in the state of his appointment. There are, however, 
many instances where a personal representative may sue 
in a state other than the one in which he was appointed 
and he will be granted a valid judgment.31 May he then 
sue on this judgment in a third state? This would seem 
to follow from the reasoning employed in the above 
cases. If it is said that the cause of action merges in the 
judgment and the judgment becomes a new cause of 
action which the administrator may sue on as an in-
dividual, then it should be immaterial where the 
judgment was obtained as long as it was a valid one. 
Suits on judgments raise an interesting constitutional 
question in the United States. Must a court give effect to 
the judgment of a sister state in favor of a personal 
representative appointed in that state under Article 
IV, Section I of the United States Constitution?32 Since 
courts, as a matter of fact, always do give such effect 
under the theory discussed in the two preceding para-
31 He may sue on a cause of action in a representative capacity, but the 
defendant will waive his objection to such suit and a valid judgment will 
be granted, see supra pp. 35-38, or he may sue under a statute permitting 
such suit and recover a valid judgment, see infra pp. 67-75. 
32 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State ... " 
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graphs, the question is largely academic. There is no 
authoritative decision because there is no United 
States Supreme Court case deciding the question. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in deciding a case 
where an administratrix appointed in Oklahoma sued 
on an Oklahoma judgment, first rested the decision on 
the theory of merger of the cause of action in the 
judgment and suit on that judgment in an individual 
capacity. Then it said: 
"We must and do give full faith and credit to this foreign 
Judgment (art. 4, sec. I, Const. of United States) where, as 
here, there is no contention that such judgment was fraud-
ulently obtained or that the court where it was obtained was 
without jurisdiction."33 
This may be treated as dictum. Certainly it does not 
represent a binding authority on a federal constitu-
tional question. This is because a state may always 
accord a judgment from a sister state more credit than 
it would be entitled to under the ''full faith and credit" 
clause. There really can be no reliable decision on this 
constitutional question until the state court holds that 
the judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit and 
the United States Supreme Court holds that it should 
have been given effect. Still the above case reaches what 
seems to be the correct result on the constitutional 
issue. The sister state has granted a valid judgment as to 
parties over which it had jurisdiction, and the fact that 
the successful plaintiff was a personal representative 
should not alter his constitutional right to sue on that 
judgment in other states. This argument should apply 
not only to judments granted in the state of appoint-
ment, but also judgments in favor of personal represent-
33 McCraw v. Simpson, 208 Ark. 476, 187 S.W. (2d) 536 (1945). 
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atives who secure them in states other than the one in 
which they qualify. 
The second situation concerns cases where the foreign 
personal representative is suing on a negotiable instru-
ment which is part of the assets of the estate in his 
possession. The Restatement adopts the "mercantile" 
theory on this question. According to Section 509 of 
the Restatement, Conflict of Laws: 
"An administrator in possession of a negotiable instru-
ment, share certificate, or negotiable warehouse receipt or 
bill of lading belonging to the decedent, and only such 
administrator, can sue upon the duty represented by such 
document wherever jurisdiction can be secured over the 
debtor or his property."34 
The "mercantile" theory on which this rule is based 
adopts the position that the property exists at the place 
where the negotiable instrument is located rather than 
at the place where the debtor may be found. 
The cases decided under common-law rules do not 
fully support the Restatement in this position. Some of 
the older cases adopt a rule completely contrary to 
Section 509, based on the concept that debts are bona 
notabilia in the state where the debtor resides and a 
foreign administrator, even though he may have the 
"evidence" of the debt, is not entitled to collect the 
debt. 36 The majority of cases hold that an administrator 
who has in his possession a negotiable instrument made 
34 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws. § 509 (I934). Reprinted by per-
mission of the American Law Institute. For the cases which support the 
Restatement position, see Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at I547; Michigan 
Trust Co. v. Chafee, 73 N.D. 86, I I N.W. (2d) 108, I49 A.L.R. I078 
~I943). This case is a good discussion of the problem from the "mercan-
tile" point of view which it adopts. 
35 Mason v. Nutt's Ex'rs, I9 La. Ann. 4I (I867); McCarty v. Hall, I9 
Mo. 480 (I85o). 
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payable to bearer may sue on it in any jurisdiction.3 
The reason given is that the administrator as rightful 
holder of the note is the "bearer" and may thus sue in 
his individual capacity. However, if the note is payable 
to order or is nonnegotiable, the foreign administrator 
would not be allowed to sue on a note given to his 
decedent during his lifetimeY A foreign administrator 
would generally not be permitted to sue to recover 
funds represented by a certificate of deposit in his 
possession. 38 Contrary to the opinion of the Restate-
ment, there is also authority which holds that a foreign 
administrator in possession of share certificates of stock 
would not be able to bring an action on that stock as 
the basis for suit in the jurisdiction of incorporation. 39 
Of course, if a note were given to the foreign administra-
tor after the death of the decedent as payee, the foreign 
administrator could sue on that note in any jurisdiction 
in his individual capacity.40 
While the cases do not clearly support the Restate-
ment in most of the rules of law laid down in section 
509, that does not mean that such rules based on the 
"mercantile" theory are not desirable. The tendency of 
the commercial world is to treat negotiable paper and 
stock certificates as property where they are found 
36 Knapp v. Lee, 42 Mich. 41, 3 N.W. 244 (1879); Sanford v. Mc-
Creedy, 28 Wise. 103 (1871). 
37 Lefebure v. Baker, 69 Mont. 193, 220 P. II II (1923); Thompson v. 
Wilson, 2 N.H. 291 (1820); Cannon v. Cannon, 228 N.C. 2II, 45 S.E. (2d) 
34 (1947); Terrel v. Crane, 55 Tex. 81 (1881); Hicks v. Shively, 137 S.W. 
(2d) 102 (Tex. 1940); Knapp v. Lee, 42 Mich. 41, 3 N.W. 244 (1879) 
(dictum). 
38 McCully v. Cooper, I 14 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 (1 896); Burbank v. Payne 
& Harrison, 17 La. Ann. 15, 87 Am. Dec. 513 (1865). 
39 Ewing v. Warren, 144 Miss. 233, 109 So. 6or (1926); Matter of Fitch, 
16o N.Y. 87, 54 N.E. 701 (1899) (dictum). 
40 Trotter v. White, 10 Smedes & Marshal16o7 (Miss. 1848); Robinson 
· v. City Nat. Bank, 56 F. (2d) 225 (N.D. Tex. 1931). 
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rather than at the domicile of the debtor or the corpora-
tion. It is clearly more convenient for business people to 
deal with such pieces of paper as property because they 
are so easily transferable. The legal problem involved in 
this area is to determine the situs of the property for the 
purposes of administration. There is no inherent 
necessity or virtue in treating such interests evidenced 
by documents as property at the domicile of the debtor 
or corporation. Instead, it seems a good policy to have 
our rules of law and their practical application conform 
as closely as possible to business practice and the mental 
attitude of business people. If businessmen and the 
courts treat these pieces of paper as property for other 
purposes, they should be so treated for administration 
purposes. Then the administrator who gets possession of 
the notes or share certificates will have title to them and 
may sue on them anywhere in his individual capacity. 
A third situation which arises under this general 
exception concerns a suit to recover insurance proceeds. 
A foreign personal representative who has an insurance 
policy payable to the estate of deceased or to his 
executor or administrator may sue to recover the 
proceeds in any state where the insurer can be sued.41 A 
leading case on this question is Cramer v. Phoenix Life 
Insurance Co. 42 This was an interpleader action filed in 
Iowa by the insurance company. One claimant was the 
domiciliary administrator appointed in Iowa and the 
other was an ancillary administrator appointed in 
Connecticut. The Connecticut administrator contended 
that he was immune from process outside the state of 
41 Holyoke v. Union Mutual Life Insurance Co., '2'2 Hun. 75 (N.Y. 1881) 
affirmed without opinion, 84 N.Y. 648. 
42 91 F. (2d) 141 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 739, 58 S.Ct. 141, 8'2 
L.Ed. 571. 
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his appointment. The court rejected this contention and 
decided that he was a proper claimant in an interpleader 
proceeding outside of Connecticut, saying, 
" ... But the cause of action which Cramer [Connecticut 
administrator] sought to assert had never vested in the 
intestate. The contract of life insurance did not become a 
debt until the death of the insured, and it was not collectible 
in the right of the insured .... The want of power in a personal 
representative to sue or be sued in any sovereignty other than 
that under whose laws he was appointed, unless authorized 
by statute of the appropriate jurisdiction, does not apply to a 
cause of action involving a right which did not belong to the 
deceased .... " 43 
The same reasoning is applied to transactions entered 
into by the personal representative himself. If the right 
is acquired after decedent's death, the administrator 
may sue on it in his individual capacity in a state other 
than the one of his appointment. 44 This has been 
applied where a foreign administrator sued on a note 
given to him as payee,45 where he sued for an over-
payment of estate taxes made by him,46 where he sued 
on a con tract to which he was an original party, 47 where 
he sued to compel contribution by a coguarantor after 
paying the obligation of his decedent who was the other 
guarantor, 48 and also where a foreign executor sued 
43 91 F. (2d) at 147. 
44 Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at I 545. 
45 Trotter v. White, 10 Smedes & Marshall 6o7 (Miss. 1848); Robinson 
v. City Nat. Bank, 56 F. (2d) 225 (N.D. Tex. 1931). 
46 Kruskal v. U.S., 178 F. (2d) 738 (2d Cir. 1950). 
47 Von Lingen v. Field, 154 Md. 638, 141 A. 390 (1928). 
48 Mowry v. Adams, 14 Mass. 327 (1817). In De Paris v. Wilmington 
Trust Co., 7 Boyce 178, 104 A. 691, I A.L.R. 1352 (Del. 1918), the dom-
iciliary representative of a deceased guarantor paid when the obligor de-
faulted. An ancillary administrator sued to compel contribution from the 
co-guarantor. The court dismissed the suit saying," ... the right to enforce 
contribution to Schemel [the deceased guarantor] in his life, and the pay-
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to recover proceeds of a sale of real estate made by his 
agent. 49 
The case where the personal representative is suing 
on a con tract to which he was an original party repre-
sents one of the two situations where it can realistically 
be said that he is suing in an individual capacity. A 
contract made by a personal representative on behalf of 
the estate is his own individual contract, and he is 
personally liable on it. 5° Certainly, if the contract is the 
individual one of the personal representative when an 
action is brought against him, it should be the same 
when he is suing the other party to the con tract. The 
result reached can also be explained from the point of 
view of the defendant in the action. Since he dealt with 
the personal representative rather than the decedent as 
the original contracting party, he should have the right 
to expect only that personal representative to enforce 
the obligation. 
If the foreign personal representative has reduced 
personal property to his possession in the state of his 
appointment, he thereby acquires legal title to that 
ment of the principal debt having been made by the widow and the children 
of Schemel, they could enforce payment, either in their own names or 
as administrators of Schemel; and further, that this excluded a right of 
action to the plaintiff .... " 
49 Moore v. Petty, 135 F. 668 (8th Cir. 1905), cert. den. 197 U.S. 623, 
25 S.Ct. 8oo, 49 L.Ed. 91 I. This case involved an executor who qualified in 
Pennsylvania under a will which gave him a general power of sale of the 
real property of testatrix. This included land in Iowa. As is pointed out 
infra Chapter IV, the foreign executor under these conditions may 
make a valid conveyance of the realty. The executor hired D as his agent 
to sell the Iowa land. This was an action brought in Iowa by the executor 
to recover proceeds from the sale. The court permitted the action on the 
theory that this was a right accruing personally to the executor from his 
own transaction and was not a right of the decedent. 
5° Corner v. Shew, 3 M. & W. 350, 150 Eng. Rep. II79 (1838); Car-
penter v. Hazel, 128 Ark. 416, 194 S.W. 225 (1917); Wilton v. Eaton, 127 
Mass. 174 (1879). 
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property. This title will be good as against any other 
administrator. If he then takes the property outside the 
state and it is there converted by a third party, he may 
sue for its recovery. 61 Since he has title to the property 
for the purposes of administration, he is said to be suing 
to, vindicate that right rather than any right in the 
property he secured as a representative. This is the 
other instance where the executor or administrator is 
actually suing as an individual. While he may be called 
by the court which appointed him to account as a 
fiduciary, his title to the property is good as against 
anyone else until the administration has been completed. 
Actually, the result in this case is a necessity in modern 
administrations. The personal representative who is 
attempting to conserve assets of the estate may well 
have to transport them into or through other jurisdic-
tions to obtain more advantageous sales or safer storage 
places. While doing this, he ought to be protected from 
interference with his property to the same extent that 
other rightful holders of property are. However, there is 
one old case in which it was held that the property must 
have been taken outside the state against the will of the 
administrator before he will be allowed to sue. 62 
The exception that a foreign personal representative 
can sue on a cause of action in his individual capacity is 
recognized in English law. The case authority is limited 
but clear on this point. The cases deal with the problem 
of suit by a foreign administrator on a judgment 
51 Clark v. Holt, 16 Ark. 2.57 (1855) (Suit to recover slaves who had 
been removed from Tennessee by the bailee of the Tennessee administra-
tor); Beckham v. Wittkowski & Rintels, 64 N.C. 464 (1870) (Suit by a 
South Carolina executor to recover cotton which he had taken to North 
Carolina to market and which had been there taken from him). 
52 Kilpatrick v. Bush, 2.3 Miss. 199 (1851). 
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obtained in the jurisdiction of appointment. 53 The 
English courts allow such a suit on the theory that the 
judgment obtained by the personal representative was 
a right that did not belong to the deceased. Conse-
quently, the personal representative who recovered the 
judgment sues in his individual capacity. The English 
cases have not considered most of the fact situations 
decided by American courts under this exception, so 
that it is not possible to say that they would reach the 
same result in all similar cases. However, one Canadian 
court has decided that a foreign administrator may sue 
on a negotiable instrument in his possession without 
being required to take out ancillary administration. 54 
This is based on the theory that the debt was reduced 
to possession by possession of the negotiable instru-
ment. Thus the foreign administrator had title to the debt 
and could sue to recover it as an individual. 
Some writers have contended that this class of cases 
does not constitute a real exception to the common-law 
rule. 55 It is said that the personal representative acquires 
only the claims of the decedent by the statute which 
makes him representative of the estate. Any rights 
acquired thereafter are owned personally by the per-
sonal representative because rights must vest in a living 
man. Therefore, he may sue on rights acquired after the 
death of the decedent in any jurisdiction as an individual. 
Since the general rule only applies to actions where the 
foreign administrator or executor sues in a representa-
53 Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (1863); In re Macnichol, 
L.R. 19 Eq. 81 (1874). 
64 Prescott v. Crosby, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 937· 
55 Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at 1545; Buchanan & Myers, "The 
Administration of Intangibles in View of First National Bank v. Maine," 
48 HARV. L. REv. 911 at 918 (1935). 
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tive capacity, all these cases are said to be completely 
outside the rule. 
The cases seem to me to be true exceptions. The rule 
as stated by Story and in the numerous cases which have 
followed him is broad enough to prevent all suits by 
foreign personal representatives when they are brought 
to collect assets of the estate. In all these cases, the 
recovery will become assets of the estate in the hands of 
the successful foreign personal representative. If the 
policy of the rule is to protect local creditors by pro-
hibiting foreign administrators or executors from with-
drawing assets of the decedent from the jurisdiction, 
these cases violate that policy. A legal order certainly 
has the power to prevent a foreign personal rep res en ta-
tive from suing in its jurisdiction regardless of the 
nature of the claim he is suing on. If such as is discussed 
above is permitted, it must be explained as an exception 
to the general rule of exclusion. 
Actually, this general exception seems to cover two 
classes of actions. The first concerns suits brought by a 
foreign personal representative on a contract which he 
made himself or to recover property which he brought 
into the state. In each of these, it is unquestionably the 
individual right of the personal representative on which 
he is suing. Therefore the traditional explanation is 
satisfactory in explaining the result. The second type of 
suit involves actions on a judgment obtained by the 
personal representative or on a negotiable instrument 
in his possession. These are really not individual rights 
of the personal representative, but rather grow out of 
his representative character and are based on original 
rights which the decedent had. An explanation of this 
exception on the basis of suit as an individual obscures 
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what seems to me to be the true explanation for all the 
actions coming within this general exception. 
Regardless of the explanation given, these exceptions 
would have to be made on considerations of convenience 
and practicality. If an ancillary administrator were 
allowed to recover on a claim established by a judgment 
obtained by another administrator, by a contract 
entered into by another administrator, or by a nego-
tiable instrument in the possession of another admin-
istrator, some difficult problems would be raised. The 
court granting the judgment in favor of the ancillary 
administrator would have to foreclose the interest ot a 
person not within its jurisdiction, th~ administrator 
possessing the claim, who would not have the oppor-
tunity to appear and be heard. There would be the 
possibility that the Supreme Court of the United States 
would adopt the "mercantile" position that the property 
of the note, contract right, or judgment would be in the 
administrator who originally held them and not in the 
ancillary administrator. This would mean that there had 
been a deprivation of property without due', process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Also, the court 
rendering the judgment would have to consider the 
possibility of the defendant being sued in another juris-
diction by the administrator having the claim. This 
would raise the problem of the extent to which such a 
judgment would be res judicata under the "full faith and 
credit" clause of the United States Constitution. The 
serious nature of these problems is even more obvious 
when the foreign administrator who possesses the claim 
was appointed in a foreign country. Should the debtor 
enter that country, he may be sued a second time on the 
note, contract, or judgment. The foreign court may well 
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treat the claim as property in the hands of that admin-
istrator. Then it would refuse to recognize the recovery 
against the debtor by the ancillary administrator and 
would give a second recovery against him. There is no 
way that the forum can bar such an action. Rather than 
trying to solve these problems satisfactorily, it is sim-
pler and safer to hold that the administrator possessing 
the claim is the only person who will be permitted to 
recover on that claim regardless of the jurisdiction in 
which the action is brought. 
(c) Suit as a matter of comity to prevent injustice 
The third general exception to the common-law rule 
prohibiting suits by a foreign personal representative is 
made when he is allowed to sue "as a matter of comity in 
the interests of justice." 56 Naturally, these cases involve 
rather rare fact situations. In each one, however, the 
decision is rested on the broad generalization that the 
suit will be permitted in order to prevent Injustice. 
Therefore, the cases should be considered not as a 
definitive statement of a legal rule, but rather as 
examples of the application of a very general principle 
of equity and justice. 
The leading case in this area is Kirkbride v. Van 
Note. 67 A husband and wife were divorced in New York 
and the wife was awarded monthly alimony payments. 
She thereafter remarried. Later, the husband died 
domiciled in New Jersey and an administrator was 
appointed in that state. The wife brought suit in New 
Jersey for back alimony from the date of her remarriage. 
The administrator sought to be substituted as defendant 
56 Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. '244, 9 N.E. (2d) 852 (1937). 
57 Ibid. 
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in the New York divorce action and to apply for a 
modification of the decree awarding alimony. The New 
York Court of Appeals held that this application should 
be granted: 
"To deny [the foreign administrator] permission to appear 
and apply for modification of the judgment of divorce in so 
far as it directs the payment of alimony after the remarriage 
of the plaintiff, would work a gross injustice, and the courts, 
as a matter of comity, should permit him to make such appli-
cation."58 
There is another situation illustrating the application 
of this principle. One individual was ancillary adminis-
trator of two English estates and domiciliary executor 
of a domestic estate. Each of the estates had claims un-
der the will in a probate proceeding in New York. 
As domestic executor, this person sought a construction 
of the will which was prejudicial to the interests of the 
foreign estates. The English domiciliary executor sought 
to intervene on behalf of the English estates. The court 
permitted this intervention on the ground that "the 
interests of justice will best be preserved by allowing 
the petitioner to intervene." 59 
Still another application of the principle occurs when 
the foreign administrator sues to recover assets of the 
estate, but the assets are not such as will allow an 
ancillary administration. There was such a case arising 
in Missouri in which the foreign executor sued to enforce 
a con tract for the sale of stock. This was not such an 
asset as would entitle the executor under the law of 
Missouri to take out an ancillary administration. The 
Federal Court of Appeals decided that the foreign 
68 275 N.Y. at 251. 
59 In re Chisholm's Will, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 182 at 184 (1951). 
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executor should be permitted to sue to enforce the 
contract. 60 However, it must be emphasized that in-
ability to secure ancillary administration is not suffi-
cient in and of itself to permit suit by a foreign admin-
istrator. It must be shown in addition that there is no 
other forum in which the right can be enforced or that 
great injustice will follow refusal to allow suit. 61 
These cases represent an encouraging trend displayed 
by the courts. A rigid application of the common-law 
rules will often cause great harm and injustice in the 
administration of a decedent's estate. Since the courts 
certainly have the power to permit such suits, whenever 
a foreign administrator can show that refusal to permit 
suit will cause more harm to the estate than it will 
produce benefit to local creditors, he should be allowed 
to sue. One example which may occur is this. The asset 
in the state may be a debt owed to the decedent by a 
resident. This debt may be so small that it would not 
justify the expense of an ancillary administration to 
recover it. It may well be that the debtor will not 
voluntarily pay it to the foreign administrator, and if 
he does not, this asset is virtually uncollectible. The 
local creditors are not protected by the common-law 
rule, since no ancillary administrator will collect the 
60 Buder v. Becker, 185 F. (2d) 311 (8th Cir. 1950). "To deny the 
domiciliary administrator a forum to enforce his rights in the assets, in 
Missouri, of the non-resident decedent, and at the same time deny right of 
ancillary administration on those assets in Missouri, would lead to taking 
property without due process of law. That conclusion we avoid if possible." 
61 Moses v. Wood & Selick, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 829 (1949). "Of course if 
ancillary letters might be obtained, then plaintiff would be obligated to 
secure them. Assuming, however, that they may not be obtained in this 
case, that in and of itself is not sufficient reason for allowing suit by a 
foreign executrix without them .... There is no showing in the present 
case that a gross injustice will result if plaintiff is not allowed to sue in 
our courts, or that plaintiff will be able '"'l P.nforce hP.r rights elsewhere." 
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asset for them. On the other hand, their interests as well 
as the interests of the whole estate will be better served 
if the foreign administrator is permitted to sue to collect 
the asset because they can participate in those assets by 
filing a claim in the probate court which appointed the 
foreign administrator. The court should have little 
difficulty in an action brought on such a debt in deter-
mining as a jurisdictional fact whether the usual 
expenses of an ancillary administration in costs and 
fees plus the inconvenience of the long delay will exceed 
in value the amount of the debt. If it so finds, I feel such 
a suit should be permitted. A more liberal application 
of the rule in Kirkbride v. Van Note to such cases would 
alleviate some of the most unsatisfactory results of the 
common-law rule. 
(d) Miscellaneous exceptions 
The three general classes of exceptions are not all-
inclusive of suits which may be brought by foreign 
personal representatives. For example, an executor may 
by the will be given authority to sell the real property 
of the testator wherever located. Such an executor has 
the power to make a valid conveyance to land in a state 
other than the one in which he qualified as executor. 62 
This is based on the theory that he is acting under a 
common-law power created by the testator in the will 
rather than as a statutory representative. Reasoning 
from this, it has been held that a foreign executor 
having such a power of sale may maintain ejectment for 
the land as against a wrongful possessor. 63 This result 
seems a practical necessity. The heir or devisee who 
62 See infra Chapter IV, pp. 125-129. 
63 Doe v. McFarland, 9 Cranch 151 (U.S. 1815); Bradley v. Burke, 67 
D. & C. 239 (Pa. 1948). 
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normally receives title to the land immediately on death 
has no interest in this land which will enable him to 
maintain an ejectment action. An ancillary administra-
tor might be appointed in the state where the land lies 
to maintain the action, but the courts of that forum 
would generally say that they have no right to deal 
with the land when the testator gives a power of sale 
to the executor. Besides, the right to maintain eject-
ment might not be a sufficient asset to serve as the 
foundation for an ancillary administration. The best 
solution is to treat the executor who has been given a 
power of sale as the devisee of the land for the purpose of 
sale and consequently as entitled to maintain ejectment 
against a wrongful possessor. 
Another type of miscellaneous exception concerns a 
stockholder's derivative action. A foreign personal 
representative holding stock as an asset in the estate 
may sue on that stock as the basis for a stockholder's 
derivative action. 64 This rule is unquestionably sound. 
Any recovery in the action will be for the benefit of the 
corporation, rather than that of the estate. Such a 
recovery could not be reached by local creditors of the 
estate. Therefore, there is no reason for not allowing 
suit by the foreign personal representative. 
There is another interesting situation in this area 
arising out of a New York case. 66 A Turkish citizen died 
domiciled in New York leaving a considerable legacy to 
his mother, a Turkish national. Thereafter the mother 
died domiciled in Turkey. Under the law of Turkey, 
the Sultan of Turkey became universal successor of the 
estate. He sued in New York to recover from the admin-
istrator the legacy due to the mother. The New York 
64 North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 135 (1946). 
65 The Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213 N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (191 5). 
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Court of Appeals in a four to three decision permitted 
the suit. It is well established that the forum in deter-
mining the succession to movable property will look to 
the law of the domicile at the date of death. 66 Under the 
law of the domicile, the Sultan as universal successor 
received the legal title to the claims of the decedent, 
rather than occupying the position of personal repre-
sentative. The forum permitted him to sue on the claim 
as legal owner in the same manner as it would have 
permitted a legatee to do so. This is apparently the only 
case which has considered the problem of suit by a 
foreign universal successor in an American jurisdiction. 
The English courts have been faced with the same 
problem of suit by a foreign universal successor and have 
reached the same result as did the New York Court of 
Appeals. 67 Such a case does not theoretically represent 
an exception to the general proposition stated at the 
beginning of the chapter, because the party seeking 
relief was not a personal representative, but was the 
legal owner. 
This represents a very important problem in conflict 
of laws. In civil-law systems, the administration of 
estates is done by a universal successor. 68 The important 
thing to remember is that immediately after the death 
he is vested with legal title to decedent's property. With 
the increasing mobility of population in the world 
through improved transportation, and with more wide-
spread business investment in foreign countries, there is 
a growing possibility that a decedent dying domiciled in 
a civil-law country will leave property in a common-law 
country and his universal successor will sue for its 
66 Beale, op. cit., supra note 2 at 1030. 
67 Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (1863). 
68 See supra Chapter I, pp. 3-7. 
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recovery. This presents an interesting problem for the 
common-law court. It is committed to the rule that 
title to movable property will be determined by the law 
of the domicile, and under that law the universal 
successor would have legal title and should be in the 
same position as a legatee suing for his legacy. This was 
the position taken by the New York Court. On the 
other hand, the common-law court operating under 
common-law rules is committed to the policy of local 
administration of a foreign decedent's property to 
protect domestic creditors. From the point of view of 
common-law policy, the decision in the New York case 
seems incorrect. The universal successor may be re-
garded as in a position of a legatee or owner of the 
property or else he may be treated as a foreign admin-
istrator. Neither of these would generally be permitted 
to sue to recover property of the decedent until there 
has been a local administration and payment of domes-
tic creditors. Even though the universal successor has 
legal title to the property, the common-law court can 
require that the property be subject to local administra-
tion and the payment of decedent's debts according to 
the law of the forum before the foreign universal 
successor will be entitled to recover it. While, however, 
as a matter of legal logic proceeding from the basic 
premise of the common-law policy requiring separate 
administrations, the decision allowing the universal 
successor to sue seems wrong, there is much to be said 
for it. As will be discussed later, 69 the trend is away 
from requiring unnecessary ancillary administrations, 
and there has been much advocacy of a system of uni-
fied administration. The doctrine of universal succes-
sion was designed to establish a single administration 
69 See infra Chapter VI, pp. 17o-179· 
CAPACITY TO SUE 57 
by providing that the heir would continue the per-
sonality of the decedent by taking legal title to all of 
his property and by being liable for all his debts. If the 
civil-law countries have the policy of treating the uni-
versal successor as in the same legal position as the 
decedent, the common-law courts should treat him on 
the same basis, particularly since creditors residing in 
common-law countries will probably receive more 
protection when the decedent is represented by a uni-
versal successor personally liable for all his debts than 
they would if there were a personal representative 
liable only to the extent of decedent's property in his 
possesswn. 
2. EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE oF LocAL CREDITORS 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was explained that 
the real reason for prohibiting suits by foreign personal 
representatives was the policy of protecting domestic 
creditors. In accordance with the maxim "when the 
reason ceases so does the rule itself," it would seem to 
follow that when there are no local creditors, the foreign 
administrator should be permitted to sue as a matter of 
comity. Of course, the problem raised is how to establish 
that there are no local creditors. This may be done in 
more than one way. The foreign administrator may 
allege and offer evidence that there are no domestic 
creditors. The cases generally refuse to recognize that 
such an allegation and offer of proof is sufficient.70 This is 
because such a procedure might foreclose a creditor who 
had dealt privately with the deceased and has no knowl-
edge of his death. Such a possibility is more likely when 
there is no local administration to notify him. The other 
70 McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 (1896); Warren v. Globe 
Indemnity Co., 216 La. 107, 43 So. (2d) 234 (1949); Petersen v. Chemical 
Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 at 48 (1865). 
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possible solution is to give local notice of the death and 
then provide a period durin:g which the creditors may 
come forward and file claims. This is, of course, the 
accepted probate practice of the states in requiring 
ancillary administration. Until this ancillary admin-
istration is completed, the court would have no proof 
that there are no local creditors. If it is assumed that the 
state is primarily interested in protecting domestic 
creditors, an ancillary administration would always be 
required in order to establish the existence or non-
existence of local creditors. Those cases which seem to 
stand for the proposition that a foreign administrator 
may sue if there are no local creditors are those where 
the recovery would not be available to creditors if they 
did exist, such as wrongful death actions71 and stock-
holder's derivative actions. 72 
3· SuiT FOR WRoNGFUL DEATH 
There is a situation somewhat analogous to the cases 
discussed in the preceding portions of this chapter. This 
involves a suit by a foreign personal representative to 
recover damages for the wrongful death of the decedent. 
In the United States, with its forty-eight state juris-
dictions, its highly mobile population, and its alarming 
record of traffic fatalities, such a problem is a common 
one. 
To make the problem clear, we will consider a hy-
pothetical case. A, a resident of Idaho, is killed in an 
automobile accident in Oregon by the negligence of B, 
a resident of California. C is appointed administrator 
of the estate of A in Idaho. Now C sues Bin California 
71 Gross v. Hocker, 243 Iowa 291, 51 N.W. (2d) 466 (1952); Wiener v. 
Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. (2d) 673 (1949). 
72 North v. Ringling, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 135 (1946). 
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to recover for the wrongful death of A. Will the Cali-
fornia court permit a foreign personal representative to 
sue to recover for the wrongful death? 
The answer to the question posed depends on an 
additional factor. Under the accepted choice of law rule 
applicable to an action for wrongful death, the law of 
the place of the wrong to decedent governs. 73 Thus the 
California court will look to the wrongful death statute 
of Oregon. What that statute provides will determine 
whether our foreign administrator in the hypothetical 
case will be permitted to sue or not. 
If the statute provides that any recovery will become 
part of the general assets of the estate, the foreign 
administrator would not be permitted to sue.74 He 
would be suing in a representative capacity on behalf 
of the estate. Thus the rule discussed in the first portion 
of this chapter which prohibits suits brought by foreign 
personal representatives would apply. This result is 
consistent with the reason for the common-law rule. 
Such recovery, if part of the general assets of the estate, 
would be subject to the payment of decedent's debts. 
In order to protect the interests of local creditors in this 
recovery, an ancillary administration would be re-
quired. 
Many wrongful death statutes in the United States 
contain different provisions. They provide that the 
personal representative is the proper party to bring 
the action, but that any recovery will go to certain 
named beneficiaries without being subject to the claims 
of the decedent's creditors. A typical statute of this 
type has been enacted in the State of Oregon. 
73 REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 391 (1934). 
74 Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E. (2d) 412 (1945). 
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"Action by personal representative for wrongful death. 
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or 
omission of another, the personal representatives of the 
decedent, for the benefit of the surviving spouse and depend-
ents and in case there is no surviving spouse or dependents 
then for the benefit of the estate of the decedent, may main-
tain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might 
have maintained an action, had he lived, against the wrong-
doer for an injury done by the same act or omission ... "75 
This statute has been construed to mean that while the 
named beneficiaries are in existence, the recovery of 
damages in an action by the personal representative 
goes personally to them rather than to the general 
estate.76 Thus creditors have no claim to the recovery. 
Under this statute or a similar one, the majority of 
modern cases would permit the foreign personal repre-
sentative to recover in our hypothetical case.77 
If the beneficiaries named in the statute do not exist 
so that the recovery goes to the general estate, the 
foreign administrator would not be permitted to sue.78 
Also, if the foreign personal representative sues to 
recover on two causes of action, one for wrongful death 
under such a statute and the other for injuries to 
decedent during his lifetime, he will be permitted to 
sue on the first, but not on the second because such 
recovery would go to the general estate.79 
75 Oregon Rev. Stat., sec. 30.020 (1953). 
76 Ross v. Robbins, 169 Ore. 293, 128 P. (2d) 956 (1942). 
77 Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F. (2d) 488 (9th Cir. 1949); Cooper v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 149 F. (2d) 355, 162 A.L.R. 318 (2d Cir. 1952); LeMay 
v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Va. 1946); Carter v. Pennsylvania R. 
Co., 9 F.R.D. 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1949); Demattei v. M-K-T Railroad Co., 
282 Ky. 625, 139 S.W. (2d) 430 (1940); Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. (2d) 673 (1949). 
78 Thomas v. Richards, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 640 (1950). 
79 Carter v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 9 F.R.D. 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). 
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The distinction must be made clear between the 
action for wrongful death and the cases of suit by a 
foreign personal representative discussed in the pre-
ceding parts of this chapter. Here the fund recovered 
in the action will not become part of the assets of the 
estate, but is the property of the named beneficiaries 
who are the actual parties in interest. The foreign 
administrator is really a different legal personality here. 
The statute which confers the right of action also pro-
vides that the same person who is personal representa-
tive of the decedent will be the proper party to bring 
the action. He is for the purposes of this action not a 
personal representative, but rather a statutory trustee 
for the specified beneficiaries. 8° Consequently, this is 
not a case involving a foreign personal representative in 
the strict sense of the term. 
There is an interesting question which occurs when 
the defendant in a suit by a foreign personal repre-
sentative in a wrongful death action counterclaims for 
damages done to him by the decedent. He will not be 
permitted to recover on the counterclaim. 81 This is 
based on the reasoning explained above. The personal 
representative is merely a trustee, and the real party in 
interest would be the named beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries. Since these named beneficiaries are in no way 
liable for the damages caused by decedent, a counter-
claim should not be permitted in an action brought for 
their benefit. 
There is a problem what personal representative can 
80 Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. (2d) 
673 (1949). "Suing under such a statute, plaintiff acts, not as an officer of 
the foreign court appointed by it as alter ego for the estate, but as a trustee 
for the designated beneficiaries, the actual and real parties in interest." 
81 Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Ore. 486, 163 P. (2d) 936 (1942). 
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sue to recover for wrongful death. This will depend on 
the wording and construction of the applicable wrongful 
death statute. If the statute permits a foreign personal 
representative to recover as the statutory trustee, then 
in our hypothetical case, the administrator appointed in 
Idaho could sue in California to recover for the wrongful 
death occurring in Oregon. If, on the other hand, the 
statutory trustee is limited to a local representative, 
then there must be an ancillary administrator ap-
pointed in Oregon who could sue in California to re-
cover for wrongful death to the decedent. An ancillary 
administrator may be appointed for a nonresident 
decedent's estate in the state where the wrongful death 
occurred even though the right of action is the only 
asset on which the ancillary administration can be 
based. 82 Then such ancillary administrator could sue 
in any other state as a statutory trustee. 
In several cases where a foreign personal repre-
sentative was suing for wrongful death, the court 
refused to permit the suit based on the general proposi-
tion that foreign personal representatives will not be 
allowed to sue. 83 The language is broad enough to 
indicate that the courts do not agree with the theory 
of permitting a foreign personal representative to sue 
as a statutory trustee. Examined closely, however, the 
cases do not stand for so broad a generalization. In each 
case, suit was brought by the foreign administrator in 
the state where the wrong was committed. The court 
sitting in that state held that their wrongful death 
82 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 183 Ky. 428, 209 S.W. 538 
(1919); McCarron v. New York Central Ry. Co., 239 Mass. 64, 131 N.E. 
478 (1921). 
83 Coburn v. Coleman, 75 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. S.C. 1947); Heath v. 
Smyther, 19 F. Supp. ro2o (E.D. S.C. 1937). 
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statute required that the proper plaintiff must be a 
local administrator. Thus the result turned on the 
fact that the plaintiff was not the person designated by 
the wrongful death statute as statutory trustee. It 
must be understood that the right of action is created 
by the applicable statute, and the party to whom it 
gives the right to sue is the only one who may do so. 
If the statute and its construing cases hold that a local 
administrator is the only proper party, then a foreign 
administrator cannot sue. 
4- SuiT BY AssiGNEE oF FoREIGN 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The common-law rule which prohibits an administra-
tor appointed in one state from suing in another state 
may not prevent him from effectively collecting assets 
through the courts of a second state. If the adminis-
trator has in his possession an assignable chose in 
action such as a promissory note, a mortgage, or a policy 
of insurance, he may assign it to some third party. 
The consideration for the assignment will be included 
in the assets of the estate. The assignee will then try 
to sue the debtor in the second state to collect the chose 
in action. By this procedure, assets which might other-
wise be available for local creditors would be drained 
off into another state. Our question is whether the 
courts will permit the assignee of a foreign adminis-
trator to sue on a claim on which the foreign ad-
ministrator himself could not sue. 
The older cases definitely hold that such an assignee 
could not sue. 84 The theory of these cases is that the 
84 Stearns v. Burnham, 5 Green!. 261 (Me. 1828) (Action on promissory 
note by assignee); Cutter v. Davenport, 1 Pick. 81 (Mass. 1822) (Action on 
mortgage by assignee); Thompson v. Wilson, 2 N.H. 291 (182o) (Action on 
negotiable instrument by assignee). 
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debts sued on are bona notabilia at the residence of the 
debtor. The foreign administrator who held the evi-
dence of the chose in action had no title to convey to 
the assignee. The title would have to be assigned by a 
personal representative appointed in the state where 
the debtor resides. It is easy to see that such reasoning 
was the product of a time when people remained rela-
tively stationary and the court felt that it could be 
fairly certain of where the debtor resided in order to 
treat the situs of the property as located there. 
The first break in the line of authority on this ques-
tion occurred in a case decided by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in 1829. 86 This involved a suit in 
Mississippi by the assignee of a Kentucky executor on a 
promissory note. The defendant was unrepresented in 
the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall delivered a 
rather summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
which failed to consider the real issue involved. 
The leading decision in favor of permitting suit by the 
assignee of a foreign personal representative is Petersen 
v. Chemical Bank. 86 This was a suit by the assignee of a 
Connecticut administrator in a New York court to 
recover the bank account of decedent. The New York 
Court of Appeals rested its decision in favor of the 
plaintiff on two propositions. First, it decided that the 
rule preventing a foreign personal representative from 
suing "does not attach to the subject of the action, but 
is confined to the person of the plaintiff." 87 Secondly, 
the title to the personal property of decedent was to be 
determined by the law of the domicile of the decedent 
at the date of death, which was Connecticut. Under the 
85 Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. 239 (U.S. 1829). 
86 32 N.Y. 21 (1865). 
87 32 N.Y. at 46. 
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law of Connecticut, this assignment was sufficient to 
pass a valid legal title in the bank account to the 
assignee. Therefore, the assignee was entitled to sue in 
New York as owner of the debt. 
The majority of modern cases have followed the 
holding of Petersen v. Chemical Bank and permit an 
assignee of a foreign personal representative to sue. 88 
However, the courts will not permit an assignee for 
collection only to bring an action. 89 In such cases, the 
recovery would be transmitted to the foreign personal 
representative. Since this procedure is obviously de-
signed to circumvent the prohibition against suit by the 
foreign administrator, the courts say that the assignee is 
merely the agent of the foreign administrator and will be 
subject to the same disability as his principal. 
When the problem is first considered, it seems very 
illogical and unjust to permit an assignee to sue when 
his assignor cannot. It certainly seems an easy way to 
circumvent the common-law rule. It must be re-
membered that the disability on the assignor or foreign 
administrator and, therefore, on the assignee is the 
policy which attempts to retain assets in the jurisdic-
tion in order to protect domestic creditors. The opera-
tion of the majority rule on this question does not seem 
designed to protect them. 
88 Vogel v. New York Life Insurance Co., 55 F. (2d) 205 (5th Cir. 
1932) (policy of insurance); McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82, 35 
L.R.A. 492 (1896) (dictum); Campbell v. Brown, 64 Iowa 425, 20 N.W. 
745 (1884) (note); Owen v. Moody, 29 Miss. 79 (1855) (non-negotiable 
note); Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 (1865) (bank deposit); 
Grigon v. Shope, 1oo Ore. 6u, 197 P. 317 (1921) (promissory note); 
Solinsky v. Fourth Nat'! Bank, 82 Tex. 244, 17 S.W. 1050 (1891) (promis-
sory note). 
Contra: McCarty v. Hall, 19 Mo. 480 (185o); Hayward v. Williams, 
57 S.C. 235, 35 S.E. 503 (1899). 
89 Riddle v. Slack, 96 N.J.L. 412, II 5 A. 741 (1921); Thacker v. Lindahl, 
48 S.W. (2d) 588 (Tex. 1932). 
66 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
On the other hand, there are strong reasons for 
sustaining the majority rule. The compelling reason is 
the pressure of the business world for the attributes of 
negotiability of commercial paper. Such pressure has 
created a strong policy in our system toward extending 
the qualities of negotiability. One of the vital aspects of 
this concept is the reliability of the chain of title. 
Persons who obtain a piece of commercial paper from 
a bona fide assignor who was in rightful possession 
should be confident that they possess title to the 
property. Another reason is the difficulty of founding 
an ancillary administration on a single chose in action. 
If it is relatively small in value, the expense and delay 
of an ancillary administration would not be justified 
and the asset would be virtually uncollectible unless 
the debtor entered the state in which the personal 
representative was appointed. The adoption of the 
"mercantile" theory for chases in action evidenced by 
an instrument enables the personal representative to 
assign the chose in action, and the assignee can locate 
the debtor and collect the amount due wherever he 
may be found. It seems that the policy of protecting 
local creditors does not outweigh the desirable features 
of the majority rule. 
The argument against the majority position to the 
effect that the foreign administrator does not have any 
title to pass is not persuasive. The forum can always 
permit the assignee who has possession of the note to 
sue as a matter of comity. The judgment in favor of the 
assignee on the note would be res judicata under the 
"full faith and credit" clause and would thus bar any 
further action against the debtor by a local adminis-
trator. 
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5· STATUTORY PERMISSION To SuE 
The common-law rules regarding suits by foreign 
personal representatives leave much to be desired from 
the point of view of efficient administration of estates. 
Often there will be several administrations, each 
completely independent of the others, attempting to 
deal with the assets of one man. The results will be 
duplication of effort by the several administrators, 
inevitable delay in integrating the results of the separate 
administrations, and increased expense in the form of 
court costs, attorney's fees, and administrator's fees. 
It would be possible that the assets in one jurisdiction 
will be too small to justify the expense and difficulty 
of an ancillary administration. Since the common-law 
rules make it difficult, if not impossible, for the domi-
ciliary personal representative to collect such assets 
unless they are voluntarily handed over, they might 
not be included in the estate. The unsatisfactory results 
of multiple administrations early prompted many states 
to adopt legislation to remedy the situation. 
There is no question of the power of the state to pass 
legislation which will permit a foreign personal repre-
sentative to sue in the state. It has been pointed out 
previously that no external limitations prevent a legal 
system from permitting personal representatives ap-
pointed in one state from suing in another. 90 Any rules 
excluding personal representatives from the courts are 
merely matters of municipal law. Since each state may 
permit foreign executors and administrators to sue as a 
matter of comity, 91 the legislature of the state may 
90 See supra p. 32. 
91 See supra p. 32. 
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extend this comity to all situations in which a foreign 
personal representative might want to sue. By so 
doing, the statute merely puts the foreign personal 
representative on the same footing as the domestic 
personal representative. 
The states began passing such statutes in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, and enactments have 
continued down to the most recent New York statute 
on this subject passed in 1951. About half the states 
have adopted these statutes. 92 They vary considerably 
in their provisions and effects, but the main purpose 
of each one is to permit foreign personal representatives 
to sue in the state. A good example of such a statute is 
that of Ohio: 
"An executor or administrator appointed in any other 
state or country may commence and prosecute an action or 
proceeding in any court in this state, in his capacity as 
executor or administrator, in like manner and under like re-
strictions as a nonresident is permitted to sue."93 
This statute is as broad in its provisions and contains as 
few restrictions as any of those which have been adopted. 
In those states which have not enacted such legisla-
tion, the common-law rules discussed in the preceding 
portions of this chapter are still in force. As a matter of 
92 62 Ala. I 5I-I 52 (I940); Ark. Stat. Ann., sec. 27-805 (I947); Colo. 
Rev. Stat., sees. I sz-6-7, I 52-6-8 (1953); D.C. Code, sec. 20--505 (1951); 
12 Del. Code 1561; Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 734·30i II3 Ga. Code Ann. 240; 
Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 419; Burns Ind. Stat., sec. 7-753 (1953); 
Kan. Gen. Stat., sec. 5~I7o8; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.I7o; Minn. Stat. 
Ann., sec. 573.05; Miss. Code Ann., sec. 6zz; Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat., 
sec. 507.020; Neb. Rev. Stat., sec. 3o--8o7; N.J. Stat. Ann. 3A:12-7; 
N.M. Stat. Ann., sec. 31-2-9 (1953); McKinley's Laws of N.Y., Decedent 
Estate Law, sec. 16o; Page's Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2II3·75i 58 Okla. Stat. 
Ann. 262; Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, sec. 26-27 (1938); S.D. Code of 1939, 
sec. 35.IIo3; Wise. Stat., sec. 287.16 (1945). 
93 Page's Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2II3·75· 
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fact, at least two states have by statute expressly 
adopted the general common-law rule as stated by 
Story. 94 
The right to sue given to foreign personal repre-
sentatives by these statutes may be conditioned on 
fulfilling certain requirements. About half of the 
statutes expressly require that the authority of the 
foreign personal representative, an authenticated or 
certified copy of the letters testamentary or letters of 
administration, be filed in the probate court of the 
county in which the action is filed. 96 Under some 
statutes, the letters must be filed prior to the com-
mencement of the action. 96 In other states, they may be 
filed at any time before the hearing ;97 while in still other 
jurisdictions, filing the letters at any time before judg-
ment is sufficient. 98 Even in those states where the 
statute is silent about filing letters, the foreign personal 
representative would have to present an authenticated 
copy during trial as proof of his right to the claim. 
A half dozen of the statutes also require that the 
foreign personal representative post bond before he 
will be allowed to sue. If the statute requires that a 
94 Deering's Cal. Code, Civil Procedure, sec. 1913; Ore. Rev. Stat., 
sec. 43.180. 
9• A typical provision is found in Minn. Stat. Ann., sec. 573.05. " ... 
Before commencing such action, he shall file an authenticated copy of 
his appointment as executor or administrator with the probate court of 
the county in which such action is to be commenced." 
96 Ibid. 
97 Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 27 F. Supp. 219 (D. N.J. 1939). 
98 E.g., 62 Ala. 151 (1940). "Any executor or administrator ... may 
maintain suits and recover or receive property in this state: 
"By recording at any time before judgment, or the receipt of property, 
a copy of his letters, duly authenticated according to the laws of the United 
States, in the office of the judge of probate of the country in which such 
suit is brought or property received .... " 
Campbell v. Hughes, 155 Ala. 591,47 So. 45 (1908). 
70 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
bond be posted, this must be done as a condition 
precedent to suit. 99 The amount of the bond may be 
only enough to cover costs100 or it may be an amount 
equal to the value of the assets recovered by the foreign 
administrator.l 01 The statute may make the posting of 
the bond mandatory,102 or it may rest in the discretion 
of the court.l 03 The bond, if it is in the amount of the 
assets which the foreign administrator recovers, will be 
available to local creditors who are prejudiced by the 
removal of assets from the jurisdiction. Presumably, as 
long as these creditors are permitted to participate 
equally with all other creditors in the payment of 
claims in the jurisdiction where the personal repre-
sentative was appointed, they are not sufficiently 
harmed so that they could recover on the bond. 
One problem raised by such statutes is which foreign 
personal representative will be permitted to sue. Under 
a statute like the Ohio statute quoted supra, apparently 
any foreign personal representative can sue. However, 
about half of the statutes limit the right to sue to 
personal representatives appointed in some state or 
territory of the United States.104 Where such a statute is 
in effect, a personal representative who was appointed 
in a foreign country would be subject to the common-
99 Ballard v. United Distillers, 28 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. Ky. I939). 
100 Burns Ind. Stat., sec. 7-753 (I953); Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, 
sec. 4I9. 
101 62 Ala. I 5I (I94o). 
102 Ark. Stat. Ann., sec. 27-805 (I947); Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, 
sec. 26-27 (I938). 
103 Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 4I9. 
104 62 Ala. I5I (I94o); Ark. Stat. Ann., sec. 27-805 (I947); Colo. Rev. 
Stat., sec. I52-6-7, I52-6-8; D.C. Code, sec. 2o-5o5 (I95I); I2 Del. Code 
I 56 I; Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 734·30i II3 Ga. Code Ann. 240j Smith Hurd 
Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 4I9; Vernon's Ann. Mo. Stat., sec. 507.020; Mc-
Kinley's Laws of New York, Decedent Estate Law, sec. I6o; 58 Okla. 
Stat. Ann. 262; Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, sec. 26-27 (I938). 
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law rules concerning suits. Several statutes permit 
foreign personal representatives to sue only when the 
decedent was a nonresident of the state.l 05 Some of the 
states either by statute106 or by construing decisionsl 07 
limit the personal representatives who may sue to 
domiciliary representatives. 
The function of such statutes must obviously be to 
eliminate as far as possible unnecessary multiplicity of 
administrations and to secure a unified administration. 
Therefore, a statute which permits suits by foreign 
personal representatives may well designate one per-
sonal representative who will be entitled to collect 
assets of the estate which are in the jurisdiction. If 
there is more than one personal representative, a 
provision which permits only the domiciliary or prin-
cipal personal representative to sue would seem to 
accomplish the purpose of unifying the administration. 
On the other hand, there is less reason for limiting 
personal representatives who may sue to those ap-
pointed in the United States or its territories. The only 
conceivable reason for making such a distinction is to 
prevent local creditors from having to go to distant 
lands with diverse legal systems in order to present 
their claims. That such a policy argument is not too 
persuasive is shown by the fact that a number of 
statutes permit suit by an executor or administrator 
from a foreign country.l 08 Whether the policy of pro-
106 Colo. Rev. Stat., sec. I 52-6-7, I 52-6-8 (I953); Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 
395.170 (1953); Gen. Laws of R.I., Ch. 575, sec. 26-27 (1938). 
106 II3 Ga. Code Ann. 240. 
107 Harrison v. Mahorner, I4 Ala. 829 (I848); New York Trust Co. v. 
Riley, 24 Del. Ch. 354, I6 A.(2d) 722 (I941), ajf. 315 U.S. 343, 62 S.Ct. 
508,86 L.Ed. 855, rehearing den. 315 U.S. 829,62 S.Ct. 903,86 L.Ed. 1223. 
108 Miss. Code Ann., sec. 622; N.M. Stat. Ann., sec. 31-2-9 (1953); 
Page's Ohio Rev. Code. sec. 2II3·75· 
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tecting local creditors by separate administrations 
should outweigh the policy of a unified administration 
will be considered later.109 
A second problem is raised by these statutes in con-
nection with the existence of locally appointed ad-
ministrators. Should the foreign personal representative 
be allowed to sue if a local administrator has already 
been appointed? A few statutes provide expressly that 
no such suit will be permitted if a local administrator is 
already in existence.l1° Colorado requires a foreign 
personal representative who wants to sue to give notice 
to the local administrator. If the local administrator 
then does not sue, the foreign personal representative 
may. 111 The rest of the statutes are silent on this prob-
lem. 
Another question arises when an ancillary adminis-
trator is appointed after a suit has been begun by a 
foreign personal representative. A few statutes provide 
a solution for this problem. They say either that the 
local administrator will automatically be substituted 
as plain tiff in the action 112 or else that the local ad-
ministrator may intervene if creditors will be harmed 
by the removal of assets from the state. 113 
The purpose of these statutes is to eliminate the 
necessity for an ancillary administration in the state. 
If there is an ancillary administration, there will be 
all the expense, delay, and duplication which the 
statute sought to avoid. Therefore, since the purpose of 
109 See infra Chapter VI, pp. 17o-179· 
110 Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. J, sec. 419; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.170 
(1953); Neb. Rev. Stat., sec. 3o-8o7; S.D. Code of 1939, sec. J5.IIOJ. 
111 Colo. Rev. Stat., sec. 152-6-8 (1953). 
112 Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 419; La Salle Nat'! Bank v. Penn. 
R. Co., 8 F.R.D. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1948). 
113 62 Ala. I 52 (1940). 
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the act cannot be accomplished, there is no reason not 
to provide that, in the event of a local administration, 
the assets should be collected and administered by the 
administrator appointed in the jurisdiction. 
There is a question as to the value of the statutes 
which have been passed in the United States. They 
are designed to achieve a unified administration. How-
ever, since only about half the states have enacted 
such legislation, any estate of much size and consisting 
of widely scattered property interests cannot have a 
single administration. There will still have to be 
ancillary proceedings in order to collect assets in those 
states which retain the common law. Therefore, the 
piecemeal legislation in this country has not accom-
plished its purpose. Nonetheless, the statutes serve a 
valuable function of saving expense by providing a 
relatively quick, easy, and inexpensive way to collect 
assets in a foreign jurisdiction when the assistance of 
the courts is needed. 
The English have handled this problem of a legisla-
tive remedy for the common-law rules in regard to 
foreign personal representatives in a somewhat different 
manner. In the Colonial Probates Act of 1892,114 a 
mechanism allowing foreign personal representatives to 
sue was set up. The act is a reciprocal one and only 
applies to those British colonies which give the same 
effect to English administrators acting in their jurisdic-
tions.116 Any personal representative from one of the 
complying colonies may apply to a probate court in 
the United Kingdom to have his letters resealed by 
114 55 & 56 Viet. c. 6. 
116 The Colonies which have complied with the act may be found listed 
in the 1954 Cumulative Supplement to Halsbury's LAws OF ENGLAND, 
paragraph 371. 
74 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
that court and thereafter the letters "shall be of like 
force and effect, and have the same operation in the 
United Kingdom, as if granted by that court."116 
The court may require that adequate security be given 
to insure the payment of debts due to creditors of 
decedent residing in the United Kingdom. 
The English statute is in some respects preferable to 
the statutes passed in the United States which were 
designed to have the same effect. After complying with 
the English Act, the foreign representative is in exactly 
the same position as a local administrator. This means 
that not only may he sue to recover assets in the 
English courts, but that debtors of the decedent residing 
in England may safely turn over assets to him without 
fear of possible consequences.l17 The interests of local 
creditors can be as effectively protected under this 
statute as they can by a rigid application of the com-
mon-law rule. However, this legislation is subject to 
certain criticisms. First, it applies only to personal 
representatives from British colonies and not to those 
from foreign countries. Thus in the case of a decedent 
whose principal administration is in a foreign country 
and who also has property in England, no unified 
administration is possible for his estate under this act. 
Secondly, the act does not make it clear that the 
principal or domiciliary administrator is to be the only 
personal representative who can take advantage of 
this provision. It seems to me that the achievement of a 
unified administration requires that the legislation 
specify a certain foreign personal representative who 
will be entitled to act in the jurisdiction. The English 
tt6 55 & 56 Viet. c. 6, sec. 2. 
117 For discussion of this problem, see infra Chapter V. 
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scheme still seems better adapted to achieving a unified 
administration than the statutes which merely give the 
foreign personal representative the power to sue. 
6. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
Nearly any analysis of conflict of laws problems in 
the United States must take into account not only the 
separate legal orders of the various states, but the 
dualism that results from imposition of a federal 
judiciary on top of the state court systems. Since one 
of the main sources of jurisdiction in the federal courts 
is the case involving diversity of citizenship where the 
amount involved exceeds $J,ooo,118 many of the actions 
which are brought by foreign personal representatives 
will be tried in the federal courts. A typical case would 
be that in which an administrator appointed in New 
York sues a debtor of the decedent residing in Michigan 
on a negotiable instrument in his possession. If the 
amount of the note is in excess of $3 ,ooo, the action 
will probably be filed in one of the Federal District 
Courts for Michigan. In such cases, what rules of law 
will the federal court apply in regard to actions brought 
by foreign personal representatives? 
The early federal cases decided on this point refuse to 
permit suit on the general statement that in the absence 
of statute the common law does not allow a personal 
representative to sue outside the state of his appoint-
ment.119 It is not clear what statutory or common law 
is to govern or what should be the effect of a statute 
passed in the state where the federal court was sitting 
118 28 U.S.C.A. 1332. 
119 Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394 (U.S. 1869); Johnson v. Powers, 
139 u.s. 156, II S.Ct. 525, 35 L.Ed. 161 (1891). 
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which permitted such suits. However, in the case of 
Hayes v. Pratt, 120 an executor who had qualified in 
Pennsylvania brought suit in a federal court in New 
Jersey to compel a local administrator to account. The 
Supreme Court of the United States permitted the suit 
and rested its decision on the New Jersey statute which 
gave foreign personal representatives the right to sue. 
Apparently this decision meant that the capacity of a 
foreign personal representative to sue would be deter-
mined by the law of the state in which the federal 
court sits. 
Any uncertainty which may have existed as regards 
the law applicable in the federal courts on this question 
has been cleared up by Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.121 
"(b) Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an in-
dividual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, 
to sue or be sued, shall be determined by the law of his 
domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall 
be determined by the law under which it was organized. In 
all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined 
by the law of the state in which the district court is held .... " 
This rule means that the capacity of the foreign per-
sonal representative to sue will be determined by 
reference to the law of the state where the federal 
court is located.t22 If that law retains the common-law 
rule, he will be permitted to sue in a federal court only 
when he comes within one of the recognized exceptions. 
If, on the other hand, that law has a statute which 
120 147 u.s. 557, 13 S.Ct. 503, 37 L.Ed. '279 (1893). 
121 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 17 (b). 
122 Cooper v. American Airlines, 149 F.(2d) 355, 16'2 A.L.R. 318 (2nd 
Cir. 1952); Buder v. Becker, 185 F.(2d) 3II (8th Cir. 1950); Turner v. 
Alton Banking & Trust Co., 166 F.(2d) 305 (8th Cir. 1948); Reynolds v. 
Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 7 F.R.D. 165 (E.D. Ky. 1945). 
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permits foreign personal representatives to sue, he may 
do so in the federal as well as in the state courts by 
complying with the conditions of the statute. 
7· SuMMARY 
The law in regard to capacity of foreign personal 
representatives to sue is in an unsatisfactory state. 
This arises both from uncertainty in many instances as 
to possible results and from lack of uniformity which 
makes the rules very complex. Not quite half of the 
states have adopted legislative remedies for the situa-
tion and now permit foreign personal representatives 
to sue. This simplifies the situation a good deal. If 
a decedent leaves assets in such a jurisdiction, his 
personal representative should have no difficulty in 
collecting the assets there, and to that extent an ancil-
lary administration can be avoided. In the remaining 
states, the common-law rules are still in force. This is 
where the uncertainty arises because so many exceptions 
have been engrafted upon the rule. The foreign personal 
representative will be permitted to sue in those cases 
(I) where the defendant fails to object to his lack of 
capacity, (2) where he sues on a cause of action as an 
individual, such as on a judgment, a negotiable instru-
ment, a contract made by him, or to recover property 
which he has reduced to possession, and (3) in the 
limited cases where he can show that failure to permit 
him to sue will cause gross injustice. Certainly these 
exceptions completely discredit the explanation for the 
common-law rule that a personal representative is an 
artificial creature who can have no existence outside 
the legal system under which he was appointed. The 
other explanation which has been given to support the 
common-law rule is the policy of protecting local 
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creditors. However, in view of the exceptions which 
have been made and the legislation which had been 
adopted, it is doubtful whether in even a majority of 
the instances, creditors in the United States are pro-
tected against removal of decedent's assets from the 
jurisdiction. If a rule is based on a policy which is 
effectuated less than half the time, the question is 
raised whether the policy is strong enough to support the 
rule. 
CHAPTER III 
Liability of a Foreign Personal 
Representative to be Sued 
I. GENERAL RuLE AT CoMMON LAw 
I T IS unquestionably the general common-law rule that a personal representative cannot be sued out-side the state of his appointment.l This is recog-
nized in the United States,2 England,3 and the majority 
of the Commonwealth countries.4 
The cases in the United States abound with state-
ments that "a foreign executor or administrator can 
neither sue nor be sued outside the state of his ap-
pointment." This connection between the capacity of a 
foreign personal representative to sue and his liability 
to be sued indicates the feeling of many courts that the 
1 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, I552 (I9r6). See 
cases cited in note 3· 
2 Vaughan v. Northrup, I5 Pet. I, Io L.Ed. 639 (U.S. I84I); Burrowes 
v. Goodman, 50 F.(2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2d Cir. I93I), cert den. 284 
U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 55 I; Feldman v. Gross, Io6 F. Supp. 308 
(N.D. Ohio I952); Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., I94 La. 287, I93 
So. 648 (I94o); McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, I48 N.E. 556, 40 
A.L.R. 792 (I925); Driscoll v. Loeb, 59 N.Y.S.(2d) 82 (I945). 
3 Jauncy v. Sealey, I Vern. 397, 23 Eng. Rep. 54I (I686); Currie v. 
Bircham, I D. & R. 35 (I822); Beavan v. Lord Hastings, 2 K. & J. 724, 
69 Eng. Rep. 973 (I856); Cheshire, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5I7. 
4 Dorsay v. Connell, 22 New Brunswick Rep. 564 (I883); In re Voet, 
[I949] New Zealand L. R. 742. 
Contra: Armstrong v. Newey, I7 Viet. L. R. 734 (I89I). "In my opinion, 
where a foreign administrator is within the jurisdiction of this Court, he 
is liable to be sued by one the next-of-kin for an account and administra-
tion, and the rule is not confined to the case where part of the estate is 
also in the colony .... " 
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rules are corollaries based on the same reasoning. 5 This 
reasoning represents the traditional explanation that a 
personal representative is the creature of the legal 
order of a state and thus cannot have the power to act 
outside its boundaries. That this was not a satisfactory 
explanation of the capacity of a foreign administrator 
to sue was seen in the preceding chapter. 6 Is it any more 
satisfactory in regard to the rule respecting liability to 
suit? 
In order to appreciate the difference between suits by 
foreign administrators and suits against them, it must 
be remembered that in regard to suits by a foreign 
administrator, he is the party seeking relief. The party 
whom the court must compel to furnish the relief is an 
ordinary defendant within the jurisdiction of the court. 
The court thus has the power to give a valid judgment, 
and the only question to be decided is whether the 
foreign administrator is the proper party to seek the 
relief. Generally, the courts have decided that he is 
not in order to effectuate the policy of protecting local 
creditors. This is a very different problem from the 
one with which this chapter is concerned, i.e., where the 
relief must come from the foreign administrator. 
The problem of analysis in regard to suits brought 
against foreign administrators and executors is a 
difficult and complex one. One of the factors which is 
largely responsible for this is the fact that the individual 
who is the personal representative may be treated as 
5 Typical of such thinking is the statement in Melius v. Thompson, 
Fed. Cas. No. 9,405 (C.C. Mass. 1858): "He cannot sue for the personal 
estate of the testator out of the jurisdiction of the power by which the 
letters of administration were granted, and upon the same principle and 
tor the same reason he cannot be sued or compelled to defend a suit in 
any jurisdiction to which his authority as executor does Lot extend." 
6 See supra Chapter II, pp. 31-32. 
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two legal persons. First, he is the ordinary legal per-
sonality which always attaches to a human being. In 
this personality, if he is present in any jurisdiction, he 
may be personally served, and the court will then 
have jurisdiction to render a valid personal judgment 
against him.7 Secondly, when he qualifies as personal 
representative of a decedent's estate, he may be said 
to be the legal person whom we designate as the per-
sonal representative. Thus, we have the apparent 
phenomenon of two legal persons attached to one 
biological person. The problem here considered arises 
when the biological person enters a foreign state and is 
personally served in an action based on his representa-
tive character. May the court in that jurisdiction render 
a valid judgment against him as a personal representa-
tive? The courts have uniformly held that they may 
not and have explained the result by the foregoing 
legal schizophrenia. 8 They say that the representative 
personality cannot exist outside the jurisdiction in 
which he was appointed. 9 Since the person as repre-
sentative was not within the jurisdiction, the court did 
not obtain jurisdiction by personal service. 
Actually, the division of legal personality made in 
these cases is neither necessary nor valuable in analyzing 
7 Beale, op. cit., supra note I at 339· 
8 Hargrave v. Turner Lumber Co., 194 La. 287, 193 So. 648 (1940). 
"While Alcus, one of the executors of the estate of Charles B. Box [who 
qualified in Mississippi], is present in the State of Louisiana, he is present 
here as an individual, but is not present in his official capacity as executor. 
It is well settled that an executor as an individual and as an official is, 
in the eyes of the law, two separate and distinct persons ... ";McMaster 
v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556, 40 A.L.R. 792 (1925). 
9 McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556,40 A.L.R. 792 (1925). 
"The foreign administrator as the official of another sovereignty exists 
only by virtue of the statute of another state and has no legal existence in 
this State." 
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the problems in this area. The individual has certain 
legal qualities as an ordinary human being. With these 
we are familiar. When he is appointed as personal 
representative, certain other legal properties are added. 
Our concern is to determine what these latter legal 
qualities are by an examination of how the courts 
actually treat the foreign personal representative in 
various fact situations. When we have obtained a 
general picture of these legal properties peculiar to the 
personal representative, there is no need to personify 
them. These qualities will be determined by the decision 
of two courts, the first being the foreign forum which 
does or does not entertain jurisdiction over the personal 
representative, and the second being the home forum 
or court of appointment which may be asked to give 
effect to action in the foreign forum. 
Theoretically, a legal order can authorize its courts to 
try actions and render judgments against any person it 
chooses without complying with any of the notions of 
jurisdiction with which we are familiar. Such a judg-
ment would be a valid one in the forum in which it was 
rendered. 10 Thus, a state could provide that foreign 
personal representatives are subject to the jurisdiction 
of its courts and that valid judgments can be rendered 
against them. The exceptional cases permitting such 
suits indicate that such a power exists. However, the 
states have not generally authorized the courts to 
exercise this power, and our question is why they have 
not done so. 
In order to understand the problems involved, it must 
10 In the United States, the "due process" clauses of the United States 
Constitution would require certain minimum standards of jurisdictional 
procedures such as notice reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant 
of the action and an opportunity to appear and be heard. 
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be understood that the administration of an estate is 
essentially an in rem proceeding.11 Its purpose is to 
collect the property of the decedent, pay his debts, and 
then distribute the remaining property among his 
successors. The property of the decedent is the subject 
matter of the administration, and the personal repre-
sentative is merely the conservator of that property. 
Since the personal representative in Anglo-American 
law, unlike the Roman heres12 and the universal suc-
cessor in the civillaw,13 is not personally liable for the 
debts of the decedent, any liability must be satisfied 
out of decedent's property.14 Thus even actions brought 
against the foreign personal representative on personal 
obligations owed to the plaintiff by the decedent partake 
of the nature of an in rem proceeding because they 
11 Carey, "A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special 
Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedent's Estates," 24 ILL. 
L. REv. 44 at 49 (1929); Lilienkamp v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 293, 
93 P.(2d) 1008 (1939); Torrey v. Bruner, 6o Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (1910). 
The statements that a probate proceeding is a proceeding in rem are 
usually made in connection with certain constitutional problems such as 
the requirement of notice in a probate proceeding and the question of the 
extent to which parties are bound by determinations in such a proceeding. 
For this purpose, the probate proceeding may be both in rem and in per-
sonam. It is in rem to the extent that all interested parties will be fore-
closed from relitigating certain issues such as the validity of the will and 
its admission to probate when notice is given by publication. It is in 
personam to the extent that all parties who are within the personal 
jurisdiction of the probate court will be bound by the decision made by 
that court on any issues raised in the proceeding. Torrey v. Bruner, supra. 
The discussion in the text concerning the in rem nature of an adminis-
tration is not concerned with these problems, but is merely used to point 
up certain problems of enforcement of judgments against a personal 
representative when he is sued in his representative character and when 
the object of the suit is to reach property of the estate. 
12 See supra Chapter I, p. 4· 
1s See supra Chapter I, p. 6. 
14 Segar v. Atkinson, I H. Bl. IOJ, 126 Eng. Rep. 62 (1789); Bridgman 
v. Lightfoot, Cro. Jac. 671, 79 Eng. Rep. 581 (1623); Vaughn's Ex'r v. 
Gardner, 7 B. Mon. 326 (Ky. 1847); Gillet v. Hutchinson's Adm'rs, 24 
Wend. 184 (N.Y. 1840). 
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must be satisfied, if at all, out of some property of the 
decedent. 
The problems in this chapter can best be made clear 
by asking what makes a judgment a valuable thing. 
From a practical point of view, the creditor of a dece-
dent who sues a personal representative in a foreign 
jurisdiction is not in teres ted in securing a judgment in 
and of itself, but he is vitally concerned in getting his 
debt paid. In other words, he wants to know whether 
the judgment can be satisfied. Therefore, our first 
question in attempting to understand the rules de-
veloped in this area is whether the forum can enforce a 
judgment which it renders against a foreign personal 
representative. 
There is no problem as to the effect of a judgment in 
rem as against a foreign personal representative. The 
court has the property of decedent in its jurisdiction, 
and any judgment it renders as to that property will 
bind interested parties, including the foreign personal 
representative. 
The real problem arises in cases of what would have 
been an action for a personal judgment for money if 
brought against the decedent in his lifetime. This is 
the common action brought against an administrator 
by creditors of the decedent or persons who have tort 
claims against the decedent. One of the reasons for not 
granting a judgment in such a case against a foreign 
personal representative is the difficulty of enforce-
ment.16 If the decedent has property in the jurisdiction, 
that property might be executed on to satisfy the 
judgment. However, the decedent usually has little or 
no property in the jurisdiction where a suit is brought 
16 Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A.(2d) 499 (1939). 
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against a foreign personal representative. Instead, most 
of the assets of the estate will be in the state where he 
was appointed and where he will have collected them. 
Thus, though the forum may render a judgment against 
a foreign administrator on a personal obligation of the 
decedent, that judgment would be worthless unless 
given effect in the state of principal administration. 
Such effect will not be given.16 The second forum is not 
required to give effect to such a judgment under the 
"full faith and credit" clause, because it is said that the 
first court was without jurisdiction over the foreign 
personal representative. 17 Since there is this practical 
difficulty of enforcing the judgment, the courts, being 
reluctant to grant worthless judgments, have refused 
to entertain actions against foreign executors and ad-
ministrators.18 
This points up the fact that the analysis of cases in 
this area has a dual aspect. The first is the question of 
the positive law of the forum. Will it permit a suit 
against a foreign personal representative? The second 
aspect is that if the forum renders a judgment for 
money against a foreign personal representative, will 
that judgment be given effect in other states? If no 
16 In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.(2d) 93 (1936). 
17 See cases cited supra note 2. 
18 In the interesting New Zealand case, In re Voet, [1949] New Zealand 
L.R. 742, the court based its refusal to permit an action against a foreign 
personal representative on the following statement, which it said was based 
on Cheshire: "In any event, it does not seem to me that a judgment of 
this Court, in such circumstances would have the essential quality of 
effectiveness, and effectiveness is a paramount element of jurisdiction .... " 
The statement does not seem entirely correct, because the forum may 
authorize its courts to render a judgment even though it will not be 
effective outside its territory. The lack of effectiveness will not defeat the 
jurisdiction, but it is a strong reason why the legal system will not au-
thorize its courts to take jurisdiction. 
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such effect is given, then the judgment is, as a practical 
matter, generally worthless. 
There is a second reason for refusing to allow suits 
against foreign personal representatives. This is a policy 
consideration. A personal representative is an official of 
the probate court which appointed him. His function is 
to collect and conserve the assets of the decedent. He 
works under the close supervision of that probate court, 
and he must account to it for all assets collected. If the 
forum renders a judgment against a foreign adminis-
trator, it will affect assets for which he must account 
to the court which appointed him. The courts refrain 
from granting such judgments because they would be 
an interference with the activities of another tribunal. 
Such a judgment might start a dangerous precedent 
whereby several courts would be assuming jurisdiction 
over a personal representative and telling him how to 
dispose of the assets in his possession. The represen ta-
tive would be placed in an impossible position of trying 
to decide which court to obey. This would cause havoc 
in efficient estate administration. Rather than face the 
likelihood of such consequences, the courts refuse to 
entertain actions against foreign personal representa-
tives and thus leave the plaintiff to his remedy in the 
court which appointed the personal representative. 
The reasoning behind this policy is clearly brought out 
in the leading case on the subject, Vaughan v. North-
rup.19 In that case, a debt due to the decedent from the 
United States was paid in the District of Columbia to 
his administrator appointed in. Kentucky. Heirs of the 
decedent secured personal service on the administrator 
in the District of Columbia and sued him for their 
distributive shares of the estate. This suit was not 
19 15 Pet. I, 10 L.Ed. 639 (U.S. 1841). 
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permitted, and Mr. Justice Story speaking for the 
court said: 
" ... the administrator is exclusively bound to account for 
all the assets which he receives under and in virtue of his 
administration to the proper tribunals of the government 
from which he derives his authority; and the tribunals of 
other states have no right to interfere with or to control the 
application of those assets .... " 20 
An administrator or executor can always be sued in 
the state which appoints him. 21 Therefore, if a personal 
representative appointed in one state qualifies in 
another state as ancillary administrator, he will always 
be liable to suit in the second state.22 The extent of his 
liability as ancillary administrator in the second state 
will be limited to the assets being administered in the 
ancillary administration. The common-law rules apply 
only when the personal representative appointed in 
one state is sued in another in which he has not qualified 
as ancillary administrator. 
While the general common-law proposition has been 
laid down quite broadly and applied rather rigidly, there 
are exceptional cases which hold that a foreign ad-
ministrator or executor can be sued. While these ex-
ceptions are not so important as the ones which have 
been made to the rule regarding capacity to sue, they 
are still of sufficient importance to merit detailed con-
sideration. 
(a) 'Jurisdiction in rem 
One of the recognized bases of jurisdiction is property 
within the jurisdiction of the court. The court which has 
20 I 5 Pet. at 5. 
21 Beale, op. cit., supra note I at I 529. 
22 Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.(2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2nd Cir. 1931), 
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 551. 
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control over the property may determine the interests of 
claimants in this property. If the decedent owned 
property in the jurisdiction and his personal repre-
sentative was appointed in another jurisdiction, may 
the court determine the interests of the estate as repre-
sented by the foreign personal representative in that 
property? 
Clearly there is no problem if the property of the 
decedent had its situs in the jurisdiction at the time of 
his death. The court has jurisdiction to determine title 
to that property. 23 Thus, in a true proceeding in rem 
such as a libel in admiralty or a confiscation of contra-
band, the interest of the estate could be foreclosed 
even though its only representative were a foreign 
appointed executor or administrator. Likewise, a 
mortgage given on land owned by the decedent could 
be foreclosed by the courts where the land lies and the 
interests of the estate as represented by the foreign 
executor or administrator cut off. 24 Also, it has been 
held that the forum will assume jurisdiction in an 
action brought against a foreign personal representative 
to rescind a sale of stock in a domestic corporation. 25 
The result in this situation is based on the theory that 
the stock had its situs as property in the state of 
incorporation, and the court may base its jurisdiction 
on its control over this property. Such cases do not 
represent situations where jurisdiction is being sought 
directly or personally over the foreign personal repre-
23 Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Lilienfield, 132 F.(2d) 887), 145 A.L.R. 
612 (4th Cir. 1943); Feldman v. Gross, 106 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ohio 1952); 
Piper v. Hayward, 127 N.Y.S. 240 (19II). 
24 Bowery Sav. Bank v. Meadowdale Co., 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 22 (1942); 
Callanan v. Keenan, 142 N.Y.S. 561 (1913). 
25 Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Lilienfield, 132 F.(2d) 887, 145 A.L.R. 
612 (4th Cir. 1943); Holmes v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 359, II4 N.E. 841 (1916). 
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sentative. The only basis needed for jurisdiction is 
control over the property, and any control exercised 
over the interests of the foreign personal representative 
is only incidental. The only requirement related to 
foreign personal representatives would be that the 
requirements of procedural due process are complied 
with. 26 
One interesting problem concerning the jurisdiction 
of the court to entertain an action in rem in regard to 
movable property arises where the property is brought 
into the state by a foreign personal representative after 
the date of the decedent's death. Most cases permit the 
court to take jurisdiction based on this property. 27 This 
result seems incorrect. The court unquestionably has 
the power to make the adjudication, but it should 
refrain from doing so. The foreign personal representa-
tive got title to the property when he took possession 
of it in the state of his appointment, and he will be 
required to account for it in the probate court of that 
26 The foreign administrator should have an opportunity to appear 
and be heard so that the estate can be represented at the trial. Also, 
there should be a means of notice reasonably designed to inform him of 
the action. The ordinary service by publication should be sufficient. It 
has uniformly been held that such notice is adequate in the normal pro-
ceeding in rem, and it has been held a number of times that such notice 
is sufficient in a probate proceeding. See supra note I I. Some doubt as 
to the adequacy of this notice is raised by the case of Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1949). This involved an 
accounting of a common trust fund composed of a number of small trusts. 
The Supreme Court held that notice by publication was not sufficient as 
to the beneficiaries of the trust to constitute due processs. Such notice 
was adequate to beneficiaries with unknown addresses, but those whose 
place of residence was known would have to be notified by mail. This 
requirement might possibly be extended to actions involving a decedent's 
property when there is an attempt to cut off the interests of heirs and 
beneficiaries under a will. 
27 In re Paine's Estate, 128 Fla. 151, I74 So. 430 (I937); Baker v. 
Smith, 3 Metcalf 264 (Ky. I86o); Fugate v. Moore, 86 Va. I045 (I89o). 
Contra: Brownlee v. Lockwood, 20 N.J.Eq. 239 (I869). 
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state. If the forum does adjudicate as to this property, 
it will interfere with the activities of the tribunal to 
which the foreign personal representative must account. 
The policy of not interfering with the probate court 
that appointed the foreign personal representative, 
which is responsible in part for the rule prohibiting 
suits brought against foreign executors and adminis-
trators, should apply here. Once a personal representa-
tive has reduced property of the decedent to his pos-
session and has become obligated to account for it, 
that property should have the same immunity from 
suit outside the state as is enjoyed by the foreign ex-
ecutor or administrator. 
Another interesting problem is raised in connection 
with actions quasi-in-rem. May a person who has a 
personal cause of action against a decedent attach 
property of the decedent in a state where there has been 
no administration and recover a valid judgment to be 
satisfied out of that property? It would seem that the 
state has that power under the doctrine developed in 
Pennoyer v. Ne.ff. 28 There is some American authority 
which seems to permit such a suit. 29 However, in the 
case of Courtney v. Pradt,30 which was a garnishment 
action to satisfy a judgment for money against the 
decedent where the defendant in the garnishment 
action was a foreign executor, the court refused to 
permit the action. It said that since defendant, who 
was a foreign executor, could not be sued in the jurisdic-
tion, debtors of the estate could not be garnished. This 
28 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (I 877). 
29 Gribbel v. Henderson, 151 Fla. 712, 10 So.(2d) 734 (1942), a.ff. 
153 Fla. 397, 14 So.(2d) 8o9; Allen v. Wilhoit, 122 Kan. 387, 252 P. 226 
(1927). 
ao 160 F. 561 (6th Cir. 1908). 
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seems to me to be the correct result in all attachment 
and garnishment proceedings brought against a foreign 
personal representative. The purpose of such claims is 
in reality to collect personal obligations. They are not, 
despite the language of the courts to that effect,31 to 
determine interests in property. The property is 
actually to satisfy a personal judgment whether it is 
attached at the commencement of the action or ex-
ecuted on after judgment. If the estate as represented 
by the foreign administrator is not subject to suit in 
the jurisdiction even if he is personally present, it 
seems to me improper to subject any property or debts 
of the estate to the payment of such obligations without 
an ancillary administration in the state and the ap-
pointment of a local administrator to administer the 
assets. 
There is another argument against the quasi-in-rem 
procedure against a foreign personal representative. 
Most states will not permit an attachment or levy of 
execution to be made against a decedent's property 
when the estate is a domestic one,32 but instead will 
require that the claimant present his claim to the 
probate court and receive equal payment with other 
creditors. It is very probable that the forum will con-
strue its attachment statute as not permitting the 
attachment of a decedent's property, even when the 
only administration on the estate is in a foreign juris-
diction. The purpose of the accepted probate practice 
in each state of requiring local administrators to collect 
all the assets of decedent and then pay all the claims 
against the estate is to carry out the policy of paying 
all decedent's creditors equally. To permit an action 
31 E.g., see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). 
32 See cases cited Chapter I, note 74· 
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quasi-in-rem by attachment or garnishment gives the 
creditor or tort claimant a preference over other 
creditors. It would seem preferable to require that the 
plaintiff file his claim in the court which appointed the 
personal representative and thus share equally with 
decedent's other creditors, or if the state insists on 
retaining decedent's property in the state to protect 
local creditors, the claimant should be required to have 
an ancillary administration taken out and present his 
claim to the ancillary administrator along with any 
other local creditors. 
One argument may be raised in favor of the quasi-in-
rem procedure, and, for that matter, it might justify 
any action against a foreign personal representative. A 
plaintiff who has a tort claim which must be tried or a 
contract claim which has to be proved may find it 
inconvenient to establish his claim in the state of 
administration. It may be impossible for him to trans-
port his witnesses or other evidence to the place of 
domiciliary administration, but he can establish his 
claim conveniently in the forum if he can get jurisdic-
tion by attaching property or garnisheeing a resident 
debtor of decedent. This sort of forum non conveniens 
contention is not too convincing, since some incon-
venience in establishing claims against an estate must 
accrue to all parties who have dealt with a person who 
dies. Henceforward, the problem is to find property 
of the decedent to satisfy claims and on which to base 
jurisdiction. If there is no property in the convenient 
state, jurisdiction cannot be obtained by attachment 
or garnishment. If there is property there, an ancillary 
administration can be obtained by the claimant, and he 
can then present his claim to the ancillary adminis-
trator. 
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From the foregoing discussion, it should be apparent 
that the state has the power to subject any of the 
decedent's property within its territory to the payment 
of any claims against the decedent. However, this power 
should not be exercised. The only jurisdiction in rem 
which the forum should assume in the absence of an 
administration in the state would be when it is necessary 
to determine the title to some res in the jurisdiction. 
This will always have to occur in the case of real 
property in the state, because no other forum can 
determine that question. It will also occasionally be 
necessary in regard to personal property in replevin 
actions. In such cases the foreign personal representative 
is only a party to the extent that the estate has some 
claim in the property which may be foreclosed. 
(b) Fraudulent removal of assets from the state 
of administration 
In certain situations, foreign personal representatives 
have been held subject to the jurisdiction of the forum 
in proceedings which partake both of the nature of the 
proceeding in rem and the action in personam. When a 
personal representative is appointed in a foreign juris-
diction, he may collect the assets there, and if they are 
movables, such as cash, securities, or jewelry, he may 
take them into another state. This possibility seems to 
occur more often when the personal representative is 
not a resident of the state which appointed him, which 
is probably one of the major reasons why so many 
states have passed statutes which require the personal 
representative to be a resident. 33 As long as the foreign 
personal representative remains in another state, the 
probate court which appointed him as personal repre-
33 See supra Chapter II, p. 34· 
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sentative will not have any effective control over him 
as regards the assets of the estate. Under the doctrine 
of Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry/4 the court which ap-
pointed him may retain personal jurisdiction over the 
personal representative and thus could render a per-
sonal judgment against him which would have to be 
given effect in the state where the personal repre-
sentative now resides. However, the court of appoint-
ment would have difficulty in determining the personal 
liability of a nonresident executor or administrator 
without having an accounting and a finding as to the 
extent to which the assets have been dissipated. In 
many situations, the heirs, beneficiaries, or creditors 
will require quicker relief in order that the assets are 
not wasted, and the only court which can furnish that 
relief would be those of the state into which the per-
sonal representative had removed the assets. In such 
cases, a court of equity may require the foreign personal 
representative to account. 36 It certainly has the power 
to do this. There are the assets within the jurisdiction 
on which the court can impress a trust. More par-
ticularly, the court will have personal jurisdiction over 
the individual who is personal representative. It will 
treat him as a trustee who has mismanaged trust funds, 
and he will be required to account as a trustee. This 
individual can be forced to perform the required acts 
by the contempt power of the equity court. 
There are limitations on the exercise of this jurisdic-
tion. The foreign personal representative must have 
removed the assets of the estate from the state of 
34 228 U.S. 346, 33 S.Ct. 550, 57 L.Ed. 867 (1913). 
35 Falke v. Terry, 32 Colo. 85, 75 P. 425 (1903); In re Paine's Estate, 
128 Fla. 151, 174 So. 430 (1937); In re Appleton's Estate, 81 D. & C. 
85 (Pa. 1951); Tunstall v. Pollard's Adm'r, 2 Leigh I (Va. 1840). 
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administration into the forum. If the assets are still in 
the control of the original probate court, it can remove 
the recalcitrant personal representative and appoint a 
new administrator. This is an adequate remedy, and the 
equitable remedy which is extraordinary will be re-
fused.36 Also, there must be evidence of some fraudulent 
conduct on the part of the personal representative. 
Even though he has removed the assets from the state 
of administration, there is no danger to heirs and 
creditors as long as he is willing to obey the instruc-
tions of the court which appointed him. Conversion of 
the assets to his own use or waste of the assets would 
certainly be sufficient grounds to secure this equitable 
remedy. In such events the court of equity in the forum 
will treat the personal representative as the holder of 
trust funds who has violated the trust and will require 
him to account for those funds. 
(c) 7urisdiction by consent 
There is no question that an ordinary individual by 
making a general appearance in an action brought 
against him confers jurisdiction on the court by consent. 
May a foreign personal representative by a general ap-
pearance confer jurisdiction on the forum to render a 
judgment against him? The majority of cases say that 
he cannot, 37 although there is respectable authority 
which will permit the foreign executor or administrator 
36 Falke v. Terry, 32 Colo. 85, 75 P. 425 (1903). 
37 Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.(zd) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2nd Cir. 1931), 
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. 30, 76 L.Ed. 551; Jefferson v. Beall, II7 
Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (1897); Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324, 19 S.W. 966 
(1892);Sloan v. Sloan, 21 Fla. 589 (1885);Judyv. Kelley, II Ill.2II (1849); 
In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.(2d) 93 (1936); Shrader v. 
Petty, 91 N.Y.S.(zd) 864 (1949) 
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to appear and thereby waive his objection to the juris-
diction.38 
The reasoning which supports the rule as regards 
jurisdiction based on appearance by an individual is 
this. The defendant had the opportunity to stay outside 
the state or to object to the jurisdiction of the court by a 
special appearance at the beginning of the action. If he 
elects to try the action on its merits, has a fair trial, and 
judgment goes against him, he should be estopped from 
denying the jurisdiction of the court. To hold otherwise 
would allow him to speculate on the outcome of the 
trial, and this would be unfair to the plaintiff. Does this 
reasoning apply with equal force to an appearance made 
by a foreign personal representative? 
It must be remembered that the foreign personal 
representative as a representative personality is far 
different from an individual as such. He represents the 
estate which is under the control of the foreign tribunal 
which appointed him. The consent of the representative 
when he appears in court is not to bind himself in-
dividually, but is an attempt to bind the estate so that 
the judgment may be satisfied out of property in the 
control of the appointing court. Thus, the important 
consent to obtain is that of the court which controls the 
assets of the estate. This must be obtained when the 
judgment entered against a consenting foreign ad-
ministrator is presented in the state of administration 
as a claim against the estate. It is extremely significant 
that every case which has treated appearance by a 
foreign administrator or executor as conferring juris-
diction has been in the forum where the action was 
38 Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 12 S.Ct. 440, 36 L.Ed. 130 (1892); 
The Newark Sav. Inst. v. Jones Ex'rs, 35 N.J.Eq. 406 (1882); Giampalo 
v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A.(2d) 499 (1939). 
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originally brought,39 whereas in every case where the 
judgment rendered against a consenting foreign repre-
sentative has been presented in the state of administra-
tion, that court has refused to give effect to it. 40 
The majority rule is the preferable one. This is for the 
same reasons for which judgments against foreign 
personal representatives generally are not granted, i.e., 
the ineffectiveness of the judgment outside the forum 
and the potential interference with the activities of the 
tribunal which is administering the estate. The forum 
should refuse to entertain such a suit and instead leave 
the plaintiff to his remedies in the courts of the state 
where the administration is being had. 
This type of case frequently arises when a personal 
action has been begun against a nonresident defendant, 
and the defendant dies before the court can render 
judgment in the case. A personal representative is ap-
pointed in the state where the decedent was domiciled 
when he died, and it is sought to substitute him as 
defendant in the action. The personal jurisdiction which 
the forum had over the decedent ceases at his death, and 
it is necessary to substitute the personal representative 
before a valid judgment can be rendered which will be 
satisfied out of the decedent's property. Therefore, the 
court must secure jurisdiction over the personal repre-
sentative who was appointed in another jurisdiction. 
An effort to do so by service by publication is not ade-
quate,41 nor would personal service in the state confer 
jurisdiction.42 One alternative would be for the personal 
39 See cases cited supra note 38. 
40 Jefferson v. Beall, II7 Ala. 436, 23 So. 44 (I897); Judy v. Kelley, II 
Ill. 2I I (I 849); In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 4Io, 97 S.W.(zd) 93 
(I936). 
41 Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. I2I, 6 A.(2d) 499 (I939). 
42 See cases cited supra note 8. 
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representative to appear and defend the action, but it 
has generally been held that an appearance in the action 
is not sufficient to bind the foreign administrator in a 
suit begun against his decedent. 43 
Thus far, we have been considering the case where 
judgment has been rendered against the defendant 
foreign representative when he appears in the forum, 
and the effects of such a judgment. Will the result be 
the same when the plain tiff sues a foreign personal 
representative who makes a general appearance, and 
then judgment is rendered for the defendant repre-
sentative? Will this judgment serve as a bar in the 
state of administration on the same cause of action? 
In the case of 'Jasper v. Batt, 44 the Supreme Court of 
Arizona held that the plaintiff was bound by a judg-
ment in favor of the defendant who was a foreign 
executrix. At first blush, this result seems highly 
illogical. The defendant would not generally be bound 
by the judgment, but the plaintiff is. It must be re-
membered that the foreign representative is appearing 
as the representative of the foreign tribunal ad-
ministering the estate, while the plaintiff appears as an 
individual. Although the defendant cannot bind the 
estate, that is no reason why the plaintiff cannot bind 
himself. The plaintiff knew that the defendant was a 
foreign administrator and thus was not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court even if the action were de-
fended. If he insisted on trying the action in the forum, 
had a fair trial, and the verdict was against him, he 
should be estopped from denying that the court he chose 
was without jurisdiction. This is the principle on which 
43 Greer v. Ferguson, 56 Ark. 324, 19 S.W. 966 (1892); Judy v. Kelley, 
II Ill. 211 (1849). 
44 76 Ariz. 328, 264 P.(2d) 409 (1953). 
LIABILITY TO BE SUED 99 
res judicata is founded. A party who has had a fair 
adjudication of his rights should not be entitled to have 
the matter relitigated if he is dissatisfied with the result. 
There is another type of consent problem involved 
in actions against a foreign personal representative. If 
the personal representative brings an action in a foreign 
jurisdiction under one of the common-law exceptions 
discussed in the previous chapter45 or under a statute 
which permits such a suit, 46 is he subject to a counter-
claim filed by the defendant? It has been held that both 
when he sues for a partnership accounting47 and when he 
sues on ajudgment,48 the foreign personal representative 
is subject to counterclaims filed against him.49 This 
is because by filing suit he has consented to all the 
procedure of the forum in connection with that pro-
ceeding, which may include counterclaims. 50 If the 
forum is going to force the defendant to give relief to a 
foreign administrator suing on behalf of the estate, the 
defendant ought to be entitled to have his rights as 
against the estate determined in the same action, if 
consistent with the procedure of the forum. There is no 
4
• See supra Chapter II, pp. 35-54· 
46 See statutes listed supra Chapter II, note 92. 
47 Lacker v. McKechney, 252 F. 403 (7th Cir. 1918). 
48 Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 166 F.(2d) 305 (8th Cir. 
1948). 
49 The permitting of recovery on a counterclaim in an action brought 
by a foreign personal representative in this situation must be distinguished 
from the result when the defendant counterclaimed in the action brought 
for wrongful death discussed supra p. 61. In the cases discussed in this 
chapter, the action is brought by the foreign administrator in his repre-
sentative capacity and it is proper to permit any claims by the defendant 
against the estate to be the basis of a counterclaim. In the action for 
wrongful death, the real party in interest is not the estate represented by 
the foreign administrator, but rather the specified beneficiaries, and 
they are not responsible for the damages done by decedent so as to be 
liable on a counterclaim. 
50 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 38 S.Ct. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649 (1938). 
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authority which has considered the case where a counter-
claim was so large that it could not be offset against the 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff administrator and 
then that counterclaim was sued on in the state of 
administration as a judgment against the personal 
representative. It seems that effect should be given to 
such a judgment based on a counterclaim. The personal 
representative works under the close supervision of the 
court which appointed him, and if that court authorizes 
him to collect assets by bringing actions in the courts of 
other jurisdictions, it ought to be prepared to recognize 
any judgment rendered in that proceeding against the 
personal representative. 
(d) Statutory Consent 
There is another type of consent problem which is 
quite interesting. This arises under the nonresident 
motorist acts. These acts, which have been passed in 
all the states of the United States, 51 provide that any 
nonresident motorist who uses the highways of a state 
will be deemed to have appointed a specified state 
official to be his process agent in any action brought 
against him arising out of an accident which occurred 
while using the highways of the state. 52 Service on the 
51 See annotation at 18 A.L.R.(2d) 544· 
52 An example of such a statute appears in the Annotated Laws of 
Massachusetts, Ch. go, sec. 3B: 
"The operation by any person, by himself or his agent, of any motor 
vehicle, whether registered or unregistered, and with or without a license 
to operate, on any way, or private way if entrance thereto was made from 
a way, or in any place to which the public has a right of access, in this 
commonwealth, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such 
person of the registrar, or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful 
attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or 
proceeding against him, or his executor or administrator, growing out of 
any accident or collision in which he or his agent may be involved while 
operating a motor vehicle on any way, or private way if entrance thereto 
LIABILITY TO BE SUED IOI 
designated agent plus actual notice by registered mail 
to the nonresident defendant is sufficient to give 
personal jurisdiction in a tort action arising from an 
automobile accident. This type of statute was held 
constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United 
States as it relates to individuals. 53 
In the United States, with its highly mobile popula-
tion and high rate of traffic fatalities, there will be many 
automobile accidents in which a nonresident driver, 
who dies as a result of the accident, is at fault. His 
personal representative will be appointed in the state 
of his domicile. Some of the nonresident motorist acts 
provide that the appointment of a service agent arising 
out of the use of the highways of the state binds not 
only the nonresident motorist, but his personal repre-
sentative as wel1. 54 Can a state, on the basis of service 
under such a statute, entertain an action against the 
foreign personal representative of the deceased motor-
ist? The cases are split rather evenly on this question. 66 
The leading case which has held that a foreign 
was made from a way, or in any place to which the public has a right of 
access, in this commonwealth, and such operation shall be a signification 
of an agreement by such person that any such process against him, or his 
executor or administrator, which is served upon the registrar or his suc-
cessor in office shall be of the same force and validity as if served upon 
him personally .... " 
53 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927). 
54 See language in Mass. statute, quoted supra note 52. 
55 Those cases which hold that a foreign personal representative is not 
subject to jurisdiction under such a statute are: Knoop v. Anderson, 71 
F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947); Rigutto v. Italian Terrazzo Mosaic Co., 
93 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Buttson v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492 (E.D. 
Pa. 1945); Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.(2d) 522 (1943). 
Those cases which hold that a foreign personal representative is subject 
to jurisdiction under such a statute are: Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 
171 S.W.(2d) 287 (1943); Plopa v. Du Pre, 327 Mich. 66o, 42 N.W.(2d) 
777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.(2d) 876, 18 A.L.R. 
(2d) 537 (1950). 
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personal representative was subject to jurisdiction 
under a nonresident motorist act was a decision by the 
New York Court of Appeals in Leighton v. Roper. 66 
This case involved an automobile accident occurring in 
New York in which plain tiff was seriously injured. 
The driver at fault was an Indiana resident. Plaintiff 
filed an action for damages and served the Indiana 
administrator of the deceased driver in compliance with 
the Nonresident Motorist Act of New York, part of 
which provided: 
"A nonresident operator or owner of a motor vehicle or 
motor cycle which is involved in an accident or collision in 
this state shall be deemed to have consented that the ap-
pointment of the secretary of state as his true and lawful 
attorney for the receipt of service of process shall be ir-
revocable and binding upon his executor or administrator. 
Where the nonresident motorist has died prior to the com-
mencement of an action brought pursuant to this section, serv-
ice of process shall be made on the executor or administrator 
of such nonresident motorist in the same manner and on the 
same notice as is provided in the case of a nonresident 
motorist .... "57 
The personal representative appointed in Indiana ap-
peared specially and moved to vacate the service. The 
court held that the service was valid and that the 
foreign personal representative was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the New York courts. It based its 
decision first on the proposition that a foreign ad-
ministrator can consent to be sued, which is not a 
generally accepted principle. 68 Then it argued that the 
agency created by the decedent did not die with him, 
56 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.(zd) 876, 18 A.L.R.(zd) 537 (1950). 
•7 McKinley's Laws of N.Y., Vehicle and Traffic Law, sec. 52. 
68 See supra pp. 95-98. 
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because it was for the benefit of third persons and 
because the legislature had made the agency irrevocable 
under the state police power. Therefore the agency, 
even after the death of the principal, continued to bind 
the personal representative. Whatever the quality of 
this argument may be, it must be conceded that New 
York has the power to entertain such a proceeding 
against a foreign administrator. 
In the opinion, the New York Court of Appeals 
recognized the limitations on this jurisdiction when it 
said: 
"What effects the Indiana courts will be required to give 
any judgment rendered in this action under the 'full faith and 
credit' clause of the Federal Constitution, we need not now 
consider.' '59 
However, this question which they "need not now 
consider" represents the crux of the matter. If there 
were property of the decedent in the state, this type of 
proceeding would probably be unnecessary. It is only 
when a state seeks to impose on a nonresident personal 
liability which must be enforced elsewhere that the 
service on an agent based on statutory consent is im-
portant. Therefore, the vital question is what effect such 
a judgment would have in the state of administration 
where it can be enforced. Since all the cases which have 
considered the question of the effect to be given to a 
foreign judgment based on consent by a personal 
representative appointed in the forum have refused to 
give any such effect, 60 a fortiori, no effect would be 
given to a judgment based on statutory consent. There 
is no decision on this question under the "full faith 
59 300 N.Y. 443· 
60 See supra p. 97· 
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and credit" clause, so that the Supreme Court of the 
United States might say that the state of administration 
is required to give effect to such a judgment. The real 
question to be decided there would be whether the 
forum obtained jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment against the foreign personal representative 
by such service in order to bind the estate. It would 
seem that the decision should be that no such jurisdic-
tion was obtained and consequently that thejudgment 
is not entitled to full faith and credit. If personal 
service on the representative in the jurisdiction or 
actual consent by the representative is not sufficient to 
give personal jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how this 
type of service is adequate to do so. 
(e) Effect of revival statues 
In connection with a previous section in this chapter 
which discussed actions brought against a foreign 
personal representative with his consent, the problem 
was raised as to cases where a personal action was com-
menced against the decedent, he died during the trial, 
and it was sought to substitute his foreign personal 
representative as a defendant. It was seen that the 
foreign administrator could not consent to such a sub-
stitution.61 The same problem is raised in connection 
with revival statutes. A typical one is the following: 
"No cause or right of action shall be lost or destroyed by 
the death of any person, but it shall survive in favor of or 
against the executor or administrator of any such deceased 
person. No civil action or proceeding shall abate by reason of 
the death of any party thereto, but it may be continued by or 
against the executor or administrator of such decedent ... in 
case of the death of any party defendant, the plaintiff, within 
61 See supra pp. 97-98. 
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one year thereafter, may have a writ of scire facias against 
such decedent's executor or administrator to show cause why 
judgment should not be rendered against him .... "62 
To make the problem clear, a hypothetical case will 
be posed. A, a resident of Connecticut, is injured in an 
automobile accident occurring in New York by the 
negligence of B, a resident of Rhode Island. A secures 
personal service on B in Connecticut and commences 
a personal action for damages against him. Before the 
case can come to trial and judgment, B dies and C is 
appointed his administrator in Rhode Island. Under the 
law of New York, such a cause of action does not survive 
the death of the defendant, but the Connecticut survival 
statute provides that in such suits, the cause of action 
survives the death of the defendant and may be con-
tinued against his personal representative. May the 
Connecticut court substitute C, the Rhode Island 
administrator, as defendant in this action and render a 
valid judgment against him? 
There are two issues raised by this fact situation. The 
first is a choice of law problem. Which law should 
govern the survival of this cause of action, New York 
or Connecticut? There is no decision which squarely 
decides the question, but the dictum in Orr v. Ahern 63 is 
helpful. That case involved a fact situation like the 
hypothetical case posed, except that the death of the 
wrongdoer occurred before the action was commenced: 
also it is not clear where the personal representative was 
appointed, so presumably it was in Connecticut. The 
actual decision in the case held, first, that the cause of 
action was created by the law of the place of the wrong 
62 Gen. Stat. of Conn., sec. 8337 (1949). 
63 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691 (1928). 
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to the plaintiff, which is a well-established proposi-
tion.64 Then it said that this law, the law of New 
York, provided that in the event of the death of the 
wrongdoer, the cause of action ceased to exist. Thus 
when the action was filed in Connecticut, there was no 
cause of action to sue upon. 
In the opinion, however, the court indulged in some 
dicta which touch on our problem. It said that if the 
action had been commenced against the wrongdoer 
prior to his death, the Connecticut revival statute 
would control instead of the New York law, and the 
personal representative could be substituted as de-
fendant. This was based on two arguments. First, the 
revival of an action once it is commenced is a question 
of remedies rather than a question of substantive rights, 
and consequently it is determined by the law of the 
forum. 65 Secondly, it was said that once the action was 
commenced in the Connecticut courts, a right was 
created in the forum which could not be destroyed by 
the law of another state. 66 Thus, it would appear that 
the Connecticut court would construe its revival 
statute to apply to the hypothetical case posed and 
would permit substitution of the personal representa-
tive as party defendant. Although the court was prob-
64 REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT oF LAws, sec. 384 (1934). 
66 107 Conn. at 176. "The locus delicti determined the existence of the 
cause of action. The locus fori determined the remedy. The place of the 
injury could not, by legislative or judicial action taken subsequent to our 
acquiring jurisdiction, take away our jurisdiction over the cause of action 
which was good when we assumed it .... " 
66 107 Conn. at 178. "A statute of revivial ... does not revive a right of 
action which has ceased in its place of origin; it revives an action for a 
right which arose in a foreign jurisdiction, but while the right still existed 
in that jurisdiction the action to secure the right was begun in another 
forum. The right which the action thus sought to secure became a right 
in the jurisdiction of the forum as soon as its courts had assumed jurisdic-
tion of it .... It then existed by force of the law of the forum." 
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ably treating the problem of a domestic personal 
representative, nothing in its languge would indicate 
that it would not apply the same rules in the case of a 
foreign personal representative. 
It seems to me that the dicta in Orr v. Ahern are 
incorrect as to the choice of law problem. In regard to 
the actual issue in the case, the survival of the cause 
of action prior to the commencement of the action, the 
court decided that survival is a question not of remedy 
but of the substantive right, and applied the foreign 
law. The Connecticut court seems to feel that the 
mere commencing of the action changes the situation. 
Still the question of revival of a suit as well as survival 
of a cause of actions as necessary a part of the cause of 
action as any element necessary to establish it. The 
plaintiff must have a cause of action at the time of 
judgment as well as when the action is commenced. 
This cause of action depends for its existence on New 
York law, since the Connecticut court never con-
tended that Connecticut law would create a cause of 
action on an automobile accident occurring in New 
York. If the New York law creates the cause of action, 
that law should determine when the cause of action 
ceases to exist. It seems to me that the question of 
revival of a cause of action should be determined by the 
same law that determines whether there is originally a 
cause of action. 
The dicta in the case of Orr v. Ahern may be treated 
as applying their revival statute only to domestic 
representatives. There is no question of their power to 
do this. The more serious problem is whether the court 
should construe such a revival statute to apply to 
foreign personal representatives. There is a fairly 
strong argument which can be made in favor of such a 
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construction. After the commencing of the action, the 
plaintiff may have spent a great deal of time and money 
in prosecuting his claim. It seems highly unfair that 
due to the death of the defendant domiciled in another 
state, he should lose the money and effort already 
expended and have to relitigate the matter completely 
in a foreign forum. Also, it may be inconvenient or 
even impossible for him to transport his witnesses and 
other evidence to that forum for the trial against the 
personal representative. However, the uniformity of 
the cases applying the general common-law prohibition 
against suing foreign administrators plus the decisions 
holding that a foreign personal representative cannot 
consent to jurisdiction in an action begun against the 
decedent 67 would indicate that the probabilities are 
very great that a court would construe its revival 
statute so as not to permit reviving an action against 
a foreign personal representative. 
Assuming that the court does construe its revival 
statute so as to permit the substitution of a foreign 
personal representative and the rendering of a judg-
ment against him, this raises the second problem of 
what effect this judgment will have in the state of ad-
ministration, Rhode Island. That court would not have 
to treat it as a judgment against its personal representa-
tive because it would consider the Connecticut court 
as being without jurisdiction over him. 68 Therefore, it 
would not be required to give full faith and credit to 
this adjudication. Should it, however, permit the 
judgment to be presented as a claim in the probate 
proceeding? There seems to be no serious objection to 
67 See supra pp. 95-97. 
68 In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.(2d) 93 (1936). 
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allowing it as a claim. If the Connecticut court has 
properly notified the personal representative, given 
him an opportunity to appear and defend the action, 
and the trial has been a fair one, there is no reason for 
requiring the plaintiff to relitigate these same issues in 
a Rhode Island court before his tort claim can be pres-
ented as a claim against the estate. It would seem that 
the Rhode Island court cannot be required to give 
any effect to this adjudication, but as a matter of con-
venience such effect should be given once the matter 
has been adjudicated. 
(f) Obligations incurred after decedent's death 
In the preceding chapter, it was seen that a foreign 
personal representative who acquired a right after the 
death of decedent could sue on that right in any juris-
diction, based on the theory that he was suing as an 
individual rather than as a representative. 69 Now the 
question is whether the reverse of this proposition is 
true. Is a personal representative, who by contract 
acquires obligations after the death of decedent, liable 
to be sued in any jurisdiction on such obligations? The 
case authority, which is scanty, holds that he is liable 
in any jurisdiction.70 
The only case which has squarely decided the ques-
tion is the old New York case of Johnson v. Wallis. 71 
A judgment had been rendered in New York. That 
judgment was assigned to decedent, who was domiciled 
in New Jersey at the date of his death. His executors 
69 See supra Chapter II, pp. 44-45. 
70 Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 91 F.(2d) 141 (8th 
Cir. 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 739, 58 S.Ct. 141, 82 L.Ed. 571; Gates v. 
McClenahan, 124 Iowa 593, 100 N.W. 479 (1904) (dictum); Johnson v. 
Wallis, II2 N.Y. 230, 19 N.E. 653, 2 L.R.A. 828 (1889). 
71 II2 N. Y. 23o, 19 N.E. 653 , 2 L.R.A. s2s (1889). 
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qualified in New Jersey and then contracted to sell the 
judgment to plaintiffs. This was an equity action in 
New York to compel the New Jersey executors spe-
cificially to perform the contract to sell the judgment. 
The New York Court of Appeals granted this remedy 
saymg: 
"In this case, therefore, the defendants [New Jersey 
executors] were owners of the judgment and could lawfully 
contract for its sale. Having done so they were liable on that 
contract which could be enforced against them because they 
made it, and it did not derive its existence from any act or 
dealing of their testator."72 
The suit was brought in equity to compel the foreign 
executor to do a physical act, namely the assigning of 
the judgment. Since the forum had personal jurisdiction 
over the executor, it had the power to compel him to 
do the act by its contempt powers. In addition, the 
action really concerned title to a res in the jurisdiction 
of the forum, the New York judgment, and the forum 
could determine the parties to the judgment without 
interfering with assets in the control of a foreign tri-
bunal. 
The more important problem occurs in the action 
brought for a money judgment. If the foreign executor 
or administrator creates a con tract obligation after the 
death of his decedent, may he be sued on that obligation 
to recover a money judgment? The answer to this 
question should depend in large measure on whether the 
judgment in such an action will be satisfied out of 
property of the estate or out of the representative's own 
property? It is uniformly held that a personal repre-
sentative who contracts on behalf of the estate after 
72 II2 N.Y. at 2JJ· 
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the death of decedent is individually liable on that 
contract.73 Since the liability is against the personal 
representative as an individual and it will be satisfied 
out of his own individual property,74 then there is no 
objection whatever to permitting an action against 
him in any court which has personal jurisdiction over 
him. This does not really represent an action against a 
foreign personal representative as such, but is an action 
against the individual who happens also to be the 
personal representative. It is only in those actions for a 
money judgment where some liability must be enforced 
out of property of the estate under control of the probate 
court administering the estate that it can be said to be 
improper to allow an action against a foreign ad-
ministrator. 
Thus it will be seen that actions by a foreign ad-
ministrator on a right acquired after decedent's death 
and an action against a foreign administrator on an 
obligation created after the death present analytically 
different problems. The first is merely an action to 
73 Christian v. Morris, 50 Ala. 584 (1874) (Suit against executor on a 
promissory note he gave plaintiff); Taunton v. Taylor, 37 Ga. App. 695, 
141 S.E. 511 (1928) (Action to recover money loaned to administrator); 
Phelps v. Exchange Bank of Commerce, I8I Okla. 145, 73 P. (2d) 137 
(1937) (Action on lease made to administrator); Allen v. Armfield, 190 
N.C. 870, 129 S.E. 8or (1925) (Action on lease made by administrator); 
Dahlberg v. Brown, 16 S.E.(2d) 284, 198 S.C. I (1941) (Action by certified 
public accountant against administratrix for services performed in con-
nection with estate taxes. 
74 If the claim is a legitimate one because the contract was necessary 
in the administration of the estate, the personal representative will be 
reimbursed when he makes his final account from estate funds. Permitting 
the personal representative to be sued on such a contract in a forum other 
than the one in which he was appointed does not interfere with the control 
of the appointing tribunal over him. That court still has complete control 
over all estate funds in the hands of the personal representative and has 
the opportunity to pass on the legitimacy of the claim when it decides 
whether to reimburse the personal representative or not. 
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collect an asset of the estate, and the problem is whether 
the asset should be collected by a foreign or a local ad-
ministrator. In the second situation, the solution is 
determined by the nature of the liability. Since the 
action is to impose individual liability on the foreign 
personal representative, he can be sued in any state 
which has personal jurisdiction over him. It is only in 
the latter situation that it can accurately be said that 
a foreign personal representative appears as a party to 
an action in the forum in an individual rather than in a 
representative capacity. 
(g) Executor de son tort 
The concept of executor de son tort as developed in 
the ecclesiastical and common-law courts of England 
was defined as follows: 
"If one, who is neither executor nor administrator, inter-
meddles with the goods of the deceased, or does any other act 
characteristic of the office of executor, he thereby makes him-
self what is called in the law, an executor of his own wrong, or 
more usually an executor de son tort."15 
The executor de son tort will be required to account 
for all the assets of decedent which come into his pos-
session, and he will be personally liable for all damages 
which result to the heirs from his intermeddling.76 This 
concept was developed to deal with the situation of a 
relative or friend of the decedent who had possession of 
his property and who would attempt to administer 
that property without securing authority from a probate 
court. 
75 Williams, THE LAw OF ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, IJth Ed., 
27 (1953). 
76 Roggenkamp v. ggenkamp, 68 F. 6o5 (C.C. Neb. 1895). 
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A couple of cases, however, have applied the doctrine 
to suits brought against foreign personal representa-
tives.77 The fact situation involved in these cases was 
that in which the foreign personal representative was 
being sued in a jurisdiction other than the one in which 
he was appointed, and he appeared and defended the 
action. The judgment against him was not based on 
consent, but rather on the theory that since he was 
acting outside his authority by defending the action and 
thereby intermeddling in the local affairs of decedent, 
he would be treated as an executor de son tort. As-
suming that the liability this judgment creates is an 
individual one to be satisfied out of the representative's 
own property, the result is not an improper one from 
the conflicts point of view. However, one of the cases 
held that a judgment granted in a foreign court against 
an executor qualified in the forum based on the theory 
of an executor de son tort could be satisfied out of the 
assets of the estate in the hands of the executor.78 
This holding seems incorrect. The assets of the estate 
should not be subject to satisfying a judgment based on 
the personal representative's individual wrongdoing. 
The doctrine of executor de son tort has largely gone 
out of favor in American jurisdictions. This is because 
the doctrine is a harsh one which punishes close rela-
tives and friends who have possession of decedent's 
property and who attempt to care for it and to handle 
decedent's affairs in the period between his death 
and the time that probate can be obtained. Some states 
have abolished it by statute79 or decision. 80 It has also 
77 Jasper v. Batt, 76 Ariz. 328, 264 P. (2d) 409 (1953); Davis v. Con-
nelly's Ex'rs, 4 B. Mon. 136 (Ky. 1843). 
78 Davis v. Connelly's Ex'rs, 4 B. Mon. 136 (Ky. 1834). 
79 An example of such a statute is 61 Ala. Code IIJ: "Executor de son 
114 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
been somewhat limited by the proposition that a later 
grant of letters of administration to the person will 
ratify any actions done by him as executor de son tort 
which would be proper if they had been done by a 
properly appointed personal representative. 81 It is very 
unlikely that the doctrine will play an important role 
in future decisions in this area. 
2. STATUTORY LIABILITY To SuiT 
The rule prohibiting suits brought by foreign per-
sonal representatives and the rule refusing to permit 
suits against foreign personal representatives are 
entirely different analytical problems. However, many 
legal thinkers and judges have treated them as corol-
laries or reverse statements of the same proposition. 
With this attitude therefore, it is not surprising that 
in those states which adopted statutes permitting 
foreign personal rep res en ta tives to sue, 82 there would be 
some attempts to pass statutes which made foreign 
personal representatives liable to suit. A very interesting 
and instructive example of this occurred in New York. 
New York first adopted this statute as an amendment 
tort only liable to representative; exception.-No person is liable to an 
action, as executor of his own wrong, for having taken, received or inter-
fered with the property of a deceased person, but is liable to the executor 
or administrator for the value of all the property so taken or received, and 
for all damages caused by his act to the estate of the deceased; but the 
provisions of this section must not be construed so as to prevent any 
creditor from maintaining a suit against any one in possession of property 
fraudulently transferred by such deceased person." 
80 Barasion v. Odum, 17 Ark. 122 (1856); Bowden v. Pierce, 73 Cal. 
459, 14 P. 302 (1887); Ansley v. Baker, 14 Tex. 6o7 (1855). 
81 Roggenkamp v. Roggenkamp, 68 F. 6o5 (C.C. Neb. 1895); Nance v. 
Gray, 143 Ala. 234, 38 So. 916 (1904); Shawnee Nat. Bank v. VanZant, 
84 Okla. 107, 202 P. 285, 26 A.L.R. 1349 (1921). 
82 See supra Chapter II, note 92. 
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to the Code of Civil Procedure in 191 I. 83 It was twice 
amended in 1925. 84 In its final form, in the well-known 
Decedent Estate Law, sec. r6o, it was as follows: 
"Foreign executor or administrator may sue or be sued. An 
executor or administrator duly appointed in any other state, 
territory or district of the United States or in any foreign 
country may sue or be sued in any court in this state in his 
capacity of executor or administrator in like manner and 
under like restrictions as a nonresident may sue or be sued, if 
within twenty days after any such executor or administrator 
shall commence, or appear in, any action or proceeding in any 
court in this state or within twenty days after he shall be 
required or directed by summons or otherwise to appear 
therein, there shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the 
court, in which such action or proceeding shall be brought or 
pending, a copy of the letters testamentary or letters of 
administration issued to such executor or administrator duly 
authenticated as prescribed by section forty-five of this chap-
ter; in default whereof all proceedings in such action or pro-
ceedings may be stayed until such duly authenticated copy 
of such letters shall be so filed .... " 
This section first came before the New York Court of 
Appeals in Helme v. Buckelew. 85 Judge Cardozo wrote 
the opinion, which is a good discussion of the general 
rules concerning suits by and against foreign personal 
representatives and of the problems which such a 
statute raises. It was his conclusion that the statute 
"removes disabilities, but does not terminate im-
munities."86 This construction meant that the statute 
as regards suits against foreign executors and ad-
ministrators merely adopted the legal and equitable 
83 Laws of New York, 134th Session (191 1), Chapter 631. 
84 Laws of New York, 148th Session (1925), chapters 253 and 603. 
85 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920). 
86 '2'29 N.Y. at 37'2. 
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rules then in force with some minor changes in modes 
and effects of proof. Therefore, no suit would be per-
mitted under this construction against a foreign per-
sonal representative, with the exception that equity 
might take jurisdiction to dispose of some res within the 
jurisdiction. 87 If one feels that the legislature intended 
what its words clearly indicate, then the opinion ap-
pears as an interesting and important example of 
judicial legislation. 
This statute had been construed earlier in a case 
decided in a Federal District Court by Judge Learned 
Hand. 88 He had come to the conclusion that the 
statute should be "read only as opening the courts of 
New York to suits against executors in those cases 
where the law of the domiciliary state allows it." 89 
He also intimated. that a sweeping construction which 
permitted any suit against a foreign personal repre-
sentative would be unconstitutional under the four-
teenth amendment. Thus two of the ablest judges ever 
to sit on an American bench refused to give any but 
the narrowest construction to what appears to be very 
clear language. This indicates that they both felt the 
statute would be unconstitutional unless construed 
narrowly as Judge Hand indicated, or that there were 
strong policy reasons which prevented them from 
widening the scope of the forum's control over foreign 
personal representatives. 
The constitutionality of the statute finally came up 
for review before the New York Court of Appeals in 
McMaster v. Gould. 90 The case involved an attempt to 
87 229 N.Y. at 371-372. 
88 Thorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 191 5). 
89 225 F. at 617. 
90 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556, 40 A.L.R. 792 (1925), affirming judg-
ment on rehearing 239 N.Y. 6o6, 137 N.E. 214, 40 A.L.R. 792. 
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substitute a foreign executor as defendant in a personal 
action brought against the decedent. The court held 
that the statute in its wording would apply to such a 
case where the foreign executor or administrator was 
sued in personam and there was no res in New York. 
This application was held to be unconstitutional under 
the fourteenth amendment. The court argued that a 
foreign personal representative is not present within 
the state so that jurisdiction can be obtained over him 
unless he is acting within the state in his fiduciary 
capacity in connection with some res. If the foreign 
personal representative were not present in the state, 
then a judgment in personam rendered against him 
would be without jurisdiction, and the rendition of a 
judgment against a defendant without jurisdiction 
over him deprives him of property without due process 
of law. This decision was responsible for the action 
of the New York legislature which, shortly after it was 
handed down, repealed Decedent Estate Law, sec. 
160. 91 This not only excluded suits against foreign 
personal representatives, but also actions brought by 
them. Thus New York returned to the common-law 
rules regarding actions which involved foreign personal 
representatives until 1951, when it re-enacted that 
portion of the statute which permitted them to sue. 92 
The history of the experience of New York with this 
statute raises two problems. The first is whether such a 
statute is unconstitutional. The second is whether such a 
statute is desirable, assuming that it is constitutional. 
The constitutional issue is a complex one. The problem 
raised in the McMaster case was whether the forum 
can render a judgment in personam against a foreign 
91 Laws of New York, 149th Session (1926), chapter 66o. 
92 Laws of New York, 174th Session (I95I), chapter 522, sec. I. 
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personal representative without violating the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The 
decision on this question turns on whether the forum 
has secured jurisdiction over the foreign personal 
representative. If a judgment is rendered without 
jurisdiction over the defendant, it will presumably 
violate the due process clause.93 Assuming that the 
forum does render such a judgment and that such judg-
ment does not violate the fourteenth amendment, then 
there is the problem whether the state which appointed 
the personal representative is required to give full faith 
and credit to such a judgment. This question will also 
turn on the decision as to whether the forum rendering 
the judgment had jurisdiction over the foreign per-
sonal representative. Therefore, the pivotal question 
on both issues would seem to be whether the forum 
had jurisdiction. The determination that the court 
rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction so 
that the judgment was without due process to the 
defendant would solve the problem, because no court 
could be required to give that judgment full faith and 
credit. If, however, the court is treated as having 
jurisdiction so that the judgment does not violate the 
due process clause, this does not necessarily mean that 
the court which appointed the administrator or ex-
ecutor must give that judgment full faith and credit, 
98 The Supreme Court of the United States decided in York v. Texas, 
137 U.S. 15, II S.Ct. g, 34 L.Ed. 6o4 (18go), that the rendition of a judg-
ment without having jurisdiction did not violate the due process clause un-
til an attempt was made to levy an execution on defendant's property. 
In a later case, Riverside & Dan River Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 
35 S.Ct. 579, 59 L.Ed. 910 (1915), the Supreme Court decided that the 
mere rendition of a money judgment without jurisdiction violated the 
due process clause. In this decision, the holding in York v. Texas was not 
mentioned. 
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because the jurisdiction required under each clause 
need not be the same. 94 
The first problem is whether a judgment against a 
foreign personal representative under such a statute 
as that of New York violates the due process clause. 
The answer to this question turns on whether the rule 
prohibiting suits against foreign personal representa-
tives is regarded as the result of a lack of jurisdiction95 
or whether it is considered a rule based on policy and 
convenience. 96 The fact that the equity court will 
compel a foreign personal representative to account, 97 
that some states permit service on foreign representa-
tives under nonresident motorist acts, 98 and that some 
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United 
States,99 will permit foreign personal representatives to 
consent to suit would argue that this rule is not based on 
lack of jurisdiction. It is difficult to say that a court can 
never obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
executor or administrator and still permit these ex-
ceptions. Thus it would seem to follow that the New 
York Court of Appeals was wrong because courts do 
have jurisdictional power to render a judgment against 
a foreign personal representative, and this means that 
94 Carey, "A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special 
Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedent's Estates," 24 
ILL. LAw REv. 44 at 83 (1929). 
95 This position was adopted in: Thorburn v. Gates, 225 F. 613 (S.D. 
N.Y. 191 5); McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556, 40 A.L.R. 
792 (1925), affirming judgment on rehearing 239 N.Y. 6o6, 137 N.E. 214, 
40 A.L.R. 792. 
96 This approach was taken by the lower court in Helme v. Buckelew, 
181 N.Y.S. 104 at uo (1920). Also in Craig v. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. 
Co., 2 Ohio N. P. 64 (1895), and by Carey, supra note 94 at 88. 
97 See supra pp. 93-95. 
98 See supra pp. 1o0-104-
99 Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 12 S.Ct. 440,36 L.Ed. 130 (1892). 
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such judgment would not violate the due process clause. 
There will be no definite answer to this problem until 
the Supreme Court of the United States has an op-
portunity to pass on it. But the writer feels that the 
only limitations the fourteenth amendment places on 
this type of action would be the requirements of pro-
cedural due process. 
The other constitutional question seems to be the 
more important one. That is whether a judgment in 
personam rendered against a foreign personal repre-
sentative under a statute like that passed in New York 
is entitled to full faith and credit in the state of ap-
pointment. Once again, we cannot be positive about the 
decision in such a fact situation until the Supreme 
Court of the United States passes on the question. 
As has been seen, the courts with few exceptions refuse 
to entertain an action against a foreign personal repre-
sentative. While they may be said as a matter of 
abstract theory to have the jurisdictional power to 
entertain these actions, they have uniformly refused to 
do so. As will be discussed below, there are strong 
reasons why this jurisdiction should not be exercised. 
Therefore, the full faith and credit clause should not be 
extended to force courts who themselves refuse to 
exercise jurisdiction over foreign personal represen ta-
tives to give effect to judgments rendered in another 
state against an executor or administrator appointed in 
the forum. This may be explained on the ground that the 
foreign tribunal was without jurisdiction to render such 
a judgment, since as a matter of fact all courts refuse to 
take jurisdiction in the case of an action for a money 
judgment against a foreign personal representative. 
The fact that the forum is not required to give full faith 
and credit to such a judgment does not mean that it 
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may not do so. Presumably, the claim of the plaintiff is 
a legitimate one. If the trial resulting in the judgment 
had been a fair one and the foreign representative had 
an opportunity to present any defense on behalf of the 
estate, permitting that judgment to be a claim in the 
administration of the estate would eliminate the 
necessity of relitigating the question. 
Assuming that such legislation is constitutional, 
there is another and actually more basic problem raised 
by the New York legislation. That is whether such 
legislation is wise from a policy point of view. There 
seem to me to be two reasons opposed to the adoption 
of such a statute. 
The purpose of the adoption of statutes permitting 
suits brought by foreign administrators, which pro-
vision appeared in the same section as the New York 
legislation under discussion, was to achieve a more 
unified administration. Yet the statute passed in New 
York permitting suits against foreign administrators 
has quite the opposite effect. A unified administration 
requires not only the elimination of multiple ad-
ministrations, but the supervision of a single court. 
When other courts enter judgments which must be 
satisfied out of the assets of the decedent, they interfere 
to that extent with the administration of the estate by 
the one court; this tends to make the administrator 
subject to the direction and supervision of more than 
one court. Such a situation is not at all satisfactory 
when the purpose of the suit could be achieved by 
sending the creditor to the court of administration to 
present his claim and have it satisfied. 
The other argument against such a statute is that it 
tends to give the plaintiff a preference over other 
creditors of the decedent. If he is awarded a judgment, 
he may be able to satisfy that judgment out of property 
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in the state100 even though this conflicts with the 
established probate practice of permitting all creditors 
to participate equally in decedent's property. This 
problem seemed to disturb Judge Cardozo in Helme v. 
Buckelew and was in part responsible for the result in 
that case.101 In order to insure this equality of payment, 
the forum should tell the plaintiff that he must present 
his claim in the court which is administering the assets 
and has appointed the personal representative or, if the 
state insists on a local administration, that he must 
cause an ancillary administration to be had in the forum 
and then present his claim to the ancillary administra-
tor. 
3· SuMMARY 
In short, on the general problem discussed in this 
chapter, it seems that the general rule which prohibits 
suits against foreign personal representatives is quite 
satisfactory in achieving the most efficient administra-
tion. Any necessary relief can be given to a person 
having a claim against the estate by sending him to the 
state of administration to present his claim or by re-
quiring an ancillary administration in the forum. The 
only exceptions which should be made are ( r) when the 
forum is determining title to a res in the jurisdiction, 
(2) when it is causing a fraudulent personal represen-
tative to account for assets removed into the forum, or 
(3) when it is enforcing the individual liability of the 
representative. There is no worthwhile purpose to be 
achieved by changing these rules by statute, but, on the 
contrary, such statutory changes tend to decentralize 
and hamper efficient administration. 
100 When a decedent's estate is being administered locally, the cases 
do not permit a claimant to attach or levy an execution on decedent's 
property, supra Chapter I, note 74· 
101 229 N.Y. at 37!. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Foreign Personal Representa-
tive and Immovable Property 
I N ANGLO-AMERICAN law, decedents' estates are subject to the "split system of succession." This means that the rules determining the succession to 
immovable or real property are different from those re-
lating to personal property. This distinction between 
movable and immovable property is also vital in prob-
lems of administration. The rules governing control of 
real property by a foreign personal representative are 
quite different from those dealing with the personal 
property of the decedent. This is the result of two gen-
eral legal propositions. The first relates to succession. 
The succession to real property is determined by the 
law of the place where the land lies. 1 The second is that 
title to land cannot be transferred except in accordance 
with the law of its situs.2 Since these questions can best 
be determined by a court sitting in the same jurisdic-
tion as the land, and since courts are more jealous of 
their control over real property within the jurisdiction 
than over movable property, the general rule is that 
real property can be administered and sold only by a 
personal representative appointed in the state where it 
is situated. Any exception to this proposition must be 
made by the law where the land lies. 3 If that legal sys-
tem refuses to recognize the validity of the acts of a 
foreign personal representative in attempting to ad-
1 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 245 (I934). 
2 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 220 (I934). 
3 Clarke v. Clarke, 278 U.S. I86, 20 S.Ct. 873, 44 L.Ed. I028 (I899). 
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minister the land, neither heir nor purchaser can rely 
with confidence on any transactions with him. 
It must be remembered that at common law title to 
real property passes immediately on death to the heirs 
or devisees, and the only time that the administrator or 
executor deals with the realty of decedent is when it is 
necessary to sell it in order to pay claims against the 
estate.4 Thus, the only problem with which we are con-
cerned is whether the foreign personal representative 
can make a conveyance of immovable property lying 
in the forum. If he can make such a conveyance, the 
consideration will be included in the estate and he will 
have effectively collected the asset. Naturally, the de-
termination of the validity of such a transfer will arise 
after the transaction has taken place. Usually, there 
will be an ejectment action brought by or against a 
person claiming under the foreign personal represen ta-
tive. Then the problem is how the forum will treat the 
conveyance. It it is held to be void, the purchaser does 
not receive any title, since the law of the forum is the 
only one which can determine title to immovables 
within its jurisdiction. This result causes the innocent 
purchaser to suffer. However, that suffering is not 
such as should cause the legal order to change its rules 
in this situation. Today purchasers of real property, or 
at least the business institutions which finance such 
purchases, insist almost uniformly that legal advice be 
obtained as to the validity of the title held by the 
vendor. Such advice should make it abundantly clear 
what limitations there are on the power of a foreign 
personal representative to make a conveyance of im-
movables in the jurisdiction. 
4 See supra Chapter I, p. 20. 
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
I. SALE oF LAND BY A FoREIGN ExECUTOR WHo HAs A 
PowER oF SALE 
Only one exception has been made at common law to 
the requirement of a local administration in respect to 
land. It is generally held that an executor appointed in 
a will which gives him the power to sell decedent's real 
property and who qualifies as an executor in another 
state may make a valid conveyance to land lying in the 
forum.• It is said that the power an executor has to 
convey foreign lands was not given by the court which 
appointed him, but was created by the testator in the 
will. This is treated as a common-law power given to 
the executor. The only function of the qualification as 
executor is to determine the person who has the power, 
and the exercise of that power is completely independent 
of the administration in the foreign state. This is one 
of the few remaining situations where it is important to 
distinguish between the executor and the administrator 
as regards applicable legal rules. The only personal 
representative who can exercise this power to convey 
foreign lands is the executor, and then only when he has 
been given in the will itself the power to sell the real 
property owned by decedent. 
Before the foreign executor can exercise the power of 
sale given to him in the will, that instrument must be 
established as the valid will of the testator in the state 
where the land lies. This may mean that the will must 
5 Bacharach v. Spriggs, I73 Ark. 2so, 292 S.W. I so (I927); McMillen 
v. Bliley, I I 5 Colo. 575, I77 P.(2d) S47 (I947); Niquette v. Green, 8I Kan. 
569, 106 P. 270 (I9Io); Plenderleith v. Edwards, 328 Ill. 43I, I 59 N.E. 
780 (I928); Green v. Alden, 92 Me. I77, 42 A. 358 (I898); Crusoe v. 
Butler, 36 Miss. ISO (I858); Newton v. Bronson, IJ N.Y. 587, 67 Am. 
Dec. 89 (1856); Hoysradt v. Tionesta Gas Co., I94 Pa. 25I, 45 A. 62 
(I899); Illinois Steel Co. v. Konkel, q6 Wise. 556, IJI N.W. 842 (I9II). 
Contra: Keith v. Proctor, II4 Ala. 676, 21 So. 502 (I896). 
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be probated in that jurisdiction. However, it is very 
common now for a state to have a statute providing that 
a will which has been probated in a foreign state may 
be filed in the county in which the land lies and that 
after this has been done, it can affect title to the realty. 6 
While one case held that a deed from a foreign executor 
conveys a good title to local land which will be pro-
tected by a subsequent recording/ the majority of cases 
construe such statutes to mean that a deed from a for-
eign executor is not a valid conveyance unless, prior to 
its execution, the foreign will is recorded pursuant to 
such a statute. 8 
These decisions point up one of the most important 
inroads on the traditional attitude of the requirement 
of ancillary administrations. Land, by virtue of its fixed 
location in the jurisdiction, should represent the article 
of property which is most likely to require a local ad-
ministration. The common-law approach is that land 
descends to the heir or devisee without being subject to 
an administration unless it is necessary to subject the 
realty to payment of decedent's debt. The procedure 
by which this would be done normally is a local adminis-
tration at the situs of the land. Yet these decisions make 
it possible for a testator, by appointing an executor and 
giving him a general power of sale, to provide an oppor-
6 Such a statute is found in Gen. Stat. of Kansas (1949), sec. 59-801: 
"Authenticated copies of wills, proved outside of this state according to 
the laws in force in the place where proved, relative to any property in 
this state, may be admitted to probate and record in the probate court of 
any county in this state where any part of such property may be situated; 
and such authenticated copies so admitted and recorded shall have the 
same validity as wills proved in this state in conformity with the laws 
thereof .... " 
7 Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150 (1858). 
8 Plenderleith v. Edwards, 328 Ill. 431, 159 N.E. 780 (1928); Niquette 
v. Green, 81 Kan. 569, 106 P. 270 (1910). 
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tunity for the domiciliary executor to collect all the 
assets of real property owned by him wherever they 
may be located. The modern view is that the executor 
derives his authority from the appointment by the 
probate court, just as does the administrator. 9 There-
fore, his power over any property located in other juris-
dictions should generally be as limited as is that of the 
administrator. The authority which the executor exer-
cises over the foreign land may come from the will. It is 
possible to say, as the courts have done, that the 
executor with a power of sale is in the same position as 
the devisee for the purposes of sale, and he will be able 
to sell the real property without having a local adminis-
tration. However, it must be remembered that the 
forum can subject this realty to a local administration 
to insure that decedent's local creditors are paid before 
any heir or devisee is entitled to the enjoyment and 
control of the land. Since the forum permits a foreign 
executor having a power of sale to sell the realty with-
out an administration at the situs, it must be regarded 
as an exception and indeed an important one to the 
general requirement of a local administration on all of 
decedent's property left within the jurisdiction. 
An executor having the power of sale may make a 
contract to sell real property located in another state. 
That contract will be specifically enforced in the court 
in which the executor qualified. He will be compelled to 
execute a deed, just as equity has always compelled a 
defendant over whom it has jurisdiction in personam 
to perform specifically a contract for sale of foreign 
9 Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F. (2d) 92, 77 A.L.R. 249 (2nd Cir. 1931), 
cert. den. 284 U.S. 65o, 52 S.Ct. JO, 76 L.Ed. 551; In re Van Vleck's Estate, 
123 Iowa 89, 98 N.W. 557 (1904). 
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land.10 The efficacy of such a conveyance in passing title 
will have to be determined by the law of the state where 
the land lies. Generally, the state will treat the deed by 
a foreign executor as valid. 11 
There is a question as to who can exercise the power 
of sale conferred in the will. If the executor appointed 
in the will does not qualify, or qualifies and later dies 
before making a conveyance, can the administrator ap-
pointed as his successor exercise the power and make a 
valid conveyance to foreign land? An interesting 
Pennsylvania case is the only one which has considered 
the precise problem. That case held that a successor ap-
pointed in New York to an executor with power of sale 
could make a valid conveyance to Pennsylvania land. 12 
It based the decision on the argument that the New 
York appointment was merely to fix the person who had 
the power of sale conferred in the will, and that the 
New York decree itself did not affect tide to Pennsyl-
vania realty. In deciding this question from a conflicts 
point of view, those cases which have determined 
whether the successor to an executor having a power of 
sale could make a valid conveyance to land located in 
the state wherein he was appointed should be helpful. 
These cases generally hold in the situation where a 
power of sale is coupled with an interest, such as 
managing the property, or if the power of sale amounts 
to a direction to sell, then the successor to an executor 
may exercise the power.13 However, if the power of sale 
is a mere naked power, or if the power is one of personal 
10 Bacharach v. Spriggs, 173 Ark. 250, 292 S.W. I 50 (1927); Newton v. 
Bronson, IJ N.Y. 587, 67 Am. Dec. 89 (1856). 
11 See cases cited supra note 5· 
12 Hoysradt v. Tionesta Gas Co., 194 Pa. 251, 45 A. 62 (1899). 
13 Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 2JJ, 12 L.Ed. IJO (U.S. 1847); Ex parte 
White, 118 Miss. 15, 78 So. 949, L.R.A. 1918E 1065 (1918). 
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confidence and trust, the general common-law rule is 
that the successor cannot exercise the power.l4 Many 
states have adopted legislation which permits the ad-
ministrator appointed as successor to an executor hav-
ing a power of sale to exercise the power .15 It is very 
likely that the decision in a case where an administra-
tor appointed in a foreign jurisdiction attempts to ex-
ercise a power of sale given by the testator to an ex-
ecutor named in the will by conveying lands located in 
the forum will turn on the same factors. Since this is a 
question relating to the transfer of title to land, the law 
which determines the right of the successor to make 
a conveyance will be that of the forum in which the 
land lies, rather than of the place of his appointment. 
If that law so provides, the foreign administrator will 
be permitted to give a valid deed if the power is coupled 
with an interest, is a direction to sell, or there is a statute 
which permits his exercise of the power. Otherwise, the 
land will have to be conveyed by an ancillary adminis-
trator appointed locally. It has also been held that the 
power of sale given to a foreign executor may be of such 
a personal nature that it can be exercised by that for-
eign executor to the exclusion of a locally appointed 
ancillary administrator. 16 
14 Keel v. First Nat. Bank of Pikeville, 271 Ky. 745, 113 S.W.(2d) 33 
(1938); McMillen v. Bliley, II5 Colo. 575, 177 P.(2d) 547 (1947). 
15 A typical one is the following: 47 Ala. 90 (1940). "Where lands are 
devised to one or more executors, or a naked power given by the will to 
sell, the survivor or survivors, where there are more than one named in 
the will, and the acting executor or executors, when any one or more of 
them dies, resigns, or refuses to act, or is removed by a court of competent 
authority, and also an administrator with the will annexed, has the same 
interest in, and power over such lands for the purpose of making sale 
thereof, as the executors named in such will might have had. Unless the 
contrary clearly appear by the terms of the will it shall be presumed that 
the power or trust imposed is not a personal trust or confidence." 
16 McMillen v. Bliley, II5 Colo. 575, 177 P.(2d) 547 (1947). 
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2. STATUTES AFFECTING SALE oF LAND BY A FoREIGN 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
Nearly a third of the states have passed statutes 
which deal directly with the problem of sale of real 
property in the forum by a personal representative ap-
pointed in another jurisdiction. These statutes take 
one of two general forms. The first is merely an adoption 
of the common-law rule by the legislature. Typical of 
this type of legislation is the following: 
"When by any foreign will, filed and recorded in this State, 
as authorized by the four preceding articles, power is given 
an executor or trustee to sell any real or personal property 
situated in this State, no order of court shall be necessary to 
authorize such executor or trustee to make such sale and 
execute proper conveyance, and whenever any particular 
directions are given by a testator in any such will respecting 
the sale of any such property situated in this State, belonging 
to his estate, the same shall be followed unless such directions 
have been annulled or suspended by order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction."17 
Such a statute would require that the personal represen-
tative making the conveyance must be an executor or 
trustee named in the will and must have been given a 
power of sale in the instrument itself. This is nothing 
more than a restatement of the rule at common law and 
adds little to our picture. 
Some states have adopted statutes which represent a 
rather radical departure from the common-law rules 
relating to a sale of real property by a foreign personal 
representative. The changes made by such legislation 
17 Vernon's Tex. Civil Stat., Art. 8305. The following are similar stat-
utes: Colo. Rev. Stat., sec. I 52-6-4; Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 429i 
Iowa Code Ann., sec. 633·35; Gen. Stat. of N.C., Ch. zS, sec. 37; Code of 
Va., sec. 64-139, 64-140 (1950). 
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IJI 
can best be made clear by giving an illustrative statute. 
The enactment in Ohio is a good example: 
"When an executor or administrator is appointed in any 
other state, territory, or foreign country for the estate of a 
person dying out of this state, and no executor or administra-
tor thereon is appointed in this state, the foreign executor or 
administrator may file an authenticated copy of his appoint-
ment in the probate court of any county in which there is real 
estate of the deceased, together with an authenticated copy 
of the will. After filing such copies, he may be authorized, 
under an order of the court, to sell real estate for the payment 
of debts or legacies and charges of administration, in the 
manner prescribed in sections 2127.01 to 2127.43, inclusive 
of the Revised Code."18 
It will be noticed that this authority is given not only to 
foreign executors, but to foreign administrators as well. 
Also, it does not require a power of sale to be conferred 
in the will. Nevertheless, such statutes contain rather 
important restrictions on the power of sale of local lands 
by a foreign personal representative. It is generally re-
quired that the domiciliary administration be elsewhere, 
since the normal provision is that the decedent not be 
domiciled in the jurisdiction when he died. In order to 
sell the land, a court order or license must be obtained. 
Usually, such authority can be given only when it is 
necessary to sell the land to pay debts of the decedent 
or the expenses of administration. 
Such statutes as these mark an extremely important 
trend away from the rather rigid common-law theory. 
Actually, this type of statute is fairly well drafted to 
provide a unified administration of decedent's real 
18 Page's Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 2129.25. The following are similar 
statutes: II3 Ga. Code Ann. 2404; Burns Ind. Stat., sec. 7-951; Ann. 
Laws of Mass., Ch. 202, sec. 32; Rev. Stat. of Neb., sec. 3o-II34 (1943); 
Rev. Laws of N.H., Ch. 358, sec. 12 (1942). 
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property. The limitation on sale for debts and adminis-
tration expenses only is not at all harmful, because the 
only reason an administration needs control of the 
property is to satisfy claims against the decedent. It is 
not nearly so necessary actually to collect real property 
as it is movable property, since land will always be 
available if it is needed for the payment of claims. Title 
to the land passes automatically to the heirs or devisees 
without having to pass through a personal representa-
tive, so that an administrator has no need to deal with 
realty in a foreign jurisdiction unless there are debts and 
expenses to be paid. Although most statutes are not 
clear on this, they should permit only the domiciliary 
personal representative to administer the local realty in 
order to specify a single administrator for all the prop-
erty. If this type of statute were adopted in each of the 
forty-eight states, the problem of multiple administra-
tions of real property would be solved. 
3· AssETS ARISING FROM AN OIL AND GAs LEASE 
The large-scale development of the oil and gas in-
dustry in the last hundred years has created a host of 
legal problems. The property interest in oil and gas is an 
anomaly. Because of this, much confusion has developed 
in regard to applicable legal rules. A brief discussion of 
the problems a foreign personal representative will have 
in collecting the assets arising from oil and gas interests 
will indicate this difficulty. 
Oil and gas are minerals found below the surface of 
the earth. Because of the propensity of these minerals to 
move while underground and the difficulty involved in 
locating their situs as property until they have been re-
duced to posession by removal from the ground, there 
has been a serious theoretical dispute whether the 
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interest in oil and gas should be classified as realty or 
personalty. 19 It is, however, generally treated as an 
interest in land. 20 This mineral interest can be separated 
from the surface ownership and may itself be divided 
into a number of fractional interests. 21 The almost uni-
versal method of utilizing this mineral interest, because 
of the expense involved in drilling wells and setting up 
transportation systems, is for the owner to lease his 
mineral interest to an oil company which does the ac-
tual developing.22 
The oil and gas industry in its early days experi-
mented with a number of different types ofleases, but in 
recent years the lease has become fairly well stand-
ardized, with a few variations in form. 23 The lease will 
have a definite primary term, normally of five years, 
during which the lessee or oil company may extend the 
lease from year to year by paying delay rentals. The 
clause may be of the "drill or pay" variety, under which 
the lessee must drill during the primary term or pay 
rentals during that term until production starts. If the 
lessee fails to pay the delay rentals or to drill, the lessor 
or owner of the mineral interest may forfeit the lease. 
With this type of clause, a "surrender" clause is in-
cluded which gives the lessee power to surrender the 
lease during the primary term. On the other hand, the 
clause may be of the "unless" type. Under this clause, 
19 Summers, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAs, sec. 152 (1938). 
20 Morris, "Oil and Gas Interests in Decedents' Estates," TRUSTS AND 
EsTATEs, Oct. 1954, 890. 
21 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, Vol. 2, sec. 10.6 at 516. 
22 An excellent discussion of the problems of obtaining and continuing 
oil and gas leases in relation to personal representatives, both domestic 
and foreign, written from the point of view of an oil company attorney 
will be found in Morris, supra note 20. 
23 Summer, op. cit., supra note 19, sec. 292. A good general discussion 
of the modern oil and gas lease. 
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the lessee must pay a specified delay rental each year to 
have the lease continue for the next year throughout 
the primary term. If the delay rental is not paid, the 
lease terminates automatically. If, however, during the 
primary term, there is a well drilled and oil or gas is pro-
duced, the lease will thereafter continue as long as 
there is production in paying quantities. From the time 
production begins, the delay rentals cease and the 
lessor is compensated with royalty payments which will 
be the value of a fraction, usually one-eighth, of the 
oil produced. Thus under an oil and gas lease, the lessor 
will be entitled to receive from the lessee either delay 
rentals or royalties. On the death of the lessor, will his 
personal representative appointed in one state be per-
mitted to collect royalties and delay rentals paid on an 
oil and gas lease in another state? 
The oil and gas lease is generally regarded as an 
interest in land, and consequently the delay rentals and 
royalties are usually treated as analogous to rents and 
profits from land. 24 Therefore, the rules which determine 
who is entitled to receive rents and profits from land 
should determine who is entitled to receive delay rentals 
and royalties on oil and gas property owned by the de-
cedent. 
The rule at common law was that land went directly 
to the heirs and devisees and they were entitled to 
receive the rents and profits from the land.25 In those 
states where the common law is still applicable, it 
would seem that the personal representative has no 
right to collect rents and royalties arising from an 
oil and gas lease. 
However, many states have passed statutes which 
24 Morris, supra note 2o at 891. 
25 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, Vol. 3, sec. 14.6, 14.7. 
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give the personal representative control over decedent's 
real property and the right to collect the rents and 
pro:fits. 26 Under such statutes, the royalties and rentals 
should be paid to the personal representative. Fre-
quently, however, the personal representative will be 
appointed at the decedent's domicile, but the oil and 
gas lease will cover property in another state. As a 
general rule, the oil companies do not pay the rentals 
and royalties to a foreign domiciliary representative, 
but instead insist on the appointment of an ancillary 
administrator in the state where the lease is located 
whom they will pay. 27 The problem is very analogous 
to the case of voluntary payment of a debt to a foreign 
personal representative. As we shall see in connection 
with that problem, most courts would treat the pay-
ment as a valid discharge,28 but there is enough doubt 
as to the result that the only completely safe course for 
a debtor in the absence of statutory protection is to 
pay only a local administrator. This same doubt exists 
as to the validity of payments of royalties and rentals 
to a foreign personal representative, and the oil com-
panies will not take the risk. Therefore, it is very un-
26 A typical statute of this type is found in Kansas: 
"The executor or administrator shall have a right to the possession 
of all the property of the decedent, except the homestead and allowances to 
the surviving spouse and minor children. He shall pay the taxes and collect 
the rents and earnings thereon until the estate is settled or until delivered 
by order of the court to the heirs, devisees, and legatees. He shall keep in 
tenantable repair the buildings and fixtures under his control and may 
protect the same by insurance. He may by himself, or with the heirs or 
devisees, maintain an action for the possession of the real estate or to 
quiet title to the same." Gen. Stat. of Kan., sec. I s-401 (1949). 
Among the states which are large oil and gas producers and have 
adopted similar statutes are the following: Deering's Cal. Code, Probate, 
sec. 581; N.D. Rev. Code, sec. 30-1304 (1943); 58 Okla. Stat. Ann. 290; 
S.D. Code, sec. 35.IIOI (1939); Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec. 6-1309. 
27 Morris, supra note 20 at 894, 898. 
28 See infra Chapter V, pp. ISI-163. 
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likely that a foreign personal representative will ever 
have the opportunity to collect the assets of decedent 
which arise out of oil and gas leases in the absence of 
legislation expressly providing for this situation. 
One problem may be briefly considered in connection 
with oil and gas leases, which shows graphically the un-
fortunate consequences of traditional legal thought as 
to the authority of personal representatives. One type 
of oil and gas lease which is in common current use is 
that which contains the "unless" clause. The lease is 
extended from year to year during the primary term by 
the payment of a specified delay rental, usually on a per 
acre basis. This rental must be paid before the year 
expires or the lease will terminate automatically. 29 If 
the lessor dies during the term, there is a serious prob-
lem as to who should be paid the delay rental in order to 
keep the lease alive. 
If the lessor under an "unless" lease dies domiciled in 
a state other than the one in which he owned the lease, 
there are three possible recipients of the delay rental. 
The lessor may pay the heirs or devisees of decedent, he 
may pay the domiciliary personal representative, or he 
may pay an ancillary administrator appointed in the 
state where the oil and gas lease is located. The problem 
which is raised should be distinguished from the collec-
tion of assets discussed in the next chapter. The delay 
rentals are not assets to which the estate is entitled. It is 
entirely in the discretion of the lessee whether they are 
to be paid or not. Therefore, this is not a fund to which 
local creditors are entitled, and the rules designed to 
protect them by limiting the authority of a foreign 
personal representative to act in the forum should not 
29 Summers, op. cit., supra note 19, sec. 288. 
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be used in determining the result. The real problem is 
the question of extending the oil and gas lease. What 
acts are sufficient to constitute an effective extension? 
Since an oil and gas lease is treated as an interest in 
land, this question will be determined by the law of the 
state in which the oil and gas lease lies. The problem is 
to determine what sort of payment that state will treat 
as adequate to extend the lease. 
It is frequently true that the lease will be a very 
valuable piece of property to an oil company and they 
will want to take every possible precaution to protect 
themselves. I have been told that in order to insure that 
the lease on oil property which is likely to be highly 
productive will be extended, an oil company may make 
double or even triple rental payments. This seems un-
necessary. However, the seriousness of the problem is 
obvious when the lessor dies shortly before the end of 
the period during which payment may be made. The 
lessor must act rapidly and be sure that the right party 
is being paid. It would seem that the forum, in deciding 
whether the payment was satisfactory to extend the 
lease, should only be concerned with the question of 
whether the payment was made in good faith and to a 
person entitled to represent the decedent. 30 The forum 
30 This would seem to follow from the cases which have held that a 
payment in good faith by the lessee which through inadvertence does not 
reach the lessor in time will not cause the "unless" lease to terminate. 
Gloyd v. Midwest Refining Co., 62 F.(2d) 483 (wth Cir. 1933); Brazell v. 
Soucek, 130 Okla. 204, 266 P. 442 (1928). However, probably the majority 
rule and one adopted in recent cases is that time is of the essence in an 
"unless" lease and failure to pay the rental on time or payment to the 
wrong bank will cause the lease to terminate. Keeler v. Dunbar, 37 F.(2d) 
868 (5th Cir. 1930); Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 206 Okla. 496, 244 P.(2d) 
832 (1952) (where fault was attributable to lessee although done in good 
faith). The problem discussed in the text does not deal with time of pay-
ment, but the proper party to receive payment and the courts should be 
more likely to adopt the minority rule. 
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should not decide the payment was invalid on the basis 
that the rule designed to protect local creditors pre-
vents a foreign personal representative from acting in 
the jurisdiction. The oil company should be protected 
either if it pays the money into the court which is 
handling the principal administration to be distributed 
by it to the proper party, or if it seeks an ancillary ad-
ministration in the forum and pays the delay rentals 
into the local court on behalf of that administration. 
CHAPTER v 
Collection of Assets by a Foreign 
Personal Representative 
MANY of the activities that an executor or ad-ministrator performs outside the state of his appointment are done without resorting to the 
courts. As we have seen previously, the duties of the 
personal representative are to collect the assets, to 
conserve and keep them safely, to account for them to 
the court of administration, to pay or bar all claims 
against the property of the decedent, and to distribute 
the assets left to persons entitled to the succession ac-
cording to the decree of the probate court.! All of these 
functions with one exception can be performed in the 
state of appointment and consequently raise no prob-
lems within the scope of this work. However, many of 
the assets which a personal representative must collect 
will be found located in states other than that of ad-
ministration. In order to collect these assets, he may 
have to bring suit. The questions arising out of such 
actions were discussed in Chapter II. On the other hand, 
he may be able to collect these assets without bringing 
an action. This may be accomplished by transferring the 
title of decedent's property in another state to a third 
person and accounting for the purchase price of the 
property to the court which appointed him. He may be 
able to enter another state, take possession of decedent's 
movable property, and remove it to his jurisdiction. 
He may also persuade a debtor or bailee of the decedent 
1 See supra Chapter I, pp. 21-24. 
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to deliver the assets to him voluntarily. This chapter 
will consider the problems raised by efforts of a personal 
representative to collect property belonging to the 
decedent in states other than the one in which he was 
appointed when there is no need to apply to the courts 
for assistance. 
It must be conceded that the state has the right not 
to permit any property within its borders belonging to 
decedent to be removed by the foreign personal repre-
sentative.2 This has resulted in the general common-law 
rule which prohibits foreign personal representatives 
from suing to collect assets. Such a rule, as we have seen, 
is merely a matter of the positive law of the particular 
state and may be relaxed in any situation which that 
legal order feels proper. Thus, the foreign personal 
representative may be permitted to sue as a matter of 
comity. 3 He may also be allowed to remove property of 
the decedent from the jurisdiction by comity.4 
Actually, it is not realistic to speak of a state's not 
permitting a foreign administrator to remove decedent's 
property. If he sells property within the jurisdiction to 
a third party for which he receives a consideration, the 
purchase money can be included in his account as an 
asset. Similarly, if he persuades a bailee willingly to 
deliver him personal property, or if a debtor voluntarily 
pays a debt owed to decedent, such assets will then be 
included in the inventory of the personal representative 
2 Duehay v. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co., I05 F.(2d) 768, I'24 A.L.R. 
I'268 (D.C. Cir. I939). "No state need allow property of a decedent to be 
taken from within its borders until debts due [local] creditors have been 
satisfied ... ; Hensley v. Rich, I9I Ind. 294, IJ'2 N.E. 632, IS A.L.R. 
III8 (I9'2I)." 
3 See supra Chapter II, pp. 50-53. 
4 Swan v. Bill, 95 N.H. I 58, 59 A.(2d) 387 (I948); In re Brown's Es-
tate, '2I Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 346 (I944). 
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and will be administered by him. The real problem is 
how the state in which the assets were collected will 
treat the transaction. If the transfer of property is 
treated as invalid, then the purchaser from the foreign 
personal representative will not receive title and the 
property if still within the jurisdiction may be adminis-
tered by a locally appointed administrator. If the de-
livery of a chattel or the payment of a debt is treated as 
being improper, a local administrator may recover the 
value of the chattel or the debt from the person who 
surrendered it to the foreign administrator. This will 
give the local administrator a fund to administer in the 
state similar to the assets which were taken out of the 
state. Such a result places an innocent party who dealt 
with the foreign personal representative in the unfor-
tunate position of paying twice. This procedure does 
not prevent the state which appointed the foreign repre-
sentative from administering the assets obtained in 
what the forum regards as a void transaction, but it 
does insure that the same assets will be locally adminis-
tered for the benefit of local creditors. 
Since the activity of the foreign personal representa-
tive does not directly involve litigation, the determina-
tion of questions involving collection of assets must be 
decided "after the fact." If the transaction concerns the 
validity of a conveyance of property by a foreign execu-
tor, there may be a replevin action brought by or against 
the person claiming through the foreign administrator, 
and the effect of the transfer will be determined in that 
proceeding. If the situation involves the delivery of 
movable property or the payment of a debt to a foreign 
personal representative, the problem will be whether 
such delivery or payment will be a bar to a subsequent 
action brought by a local administrator. The fact that 
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the question is being litigated after the parties have at-
tempted to change their legal relations and that an 
innocent party will suffer if the attempt is treated as 
void has undoubtedly influenced the decisions on these 
questions. 
In this area, the courts have naturally had some dif-
ficulty in rationalizing the results of the cases. They are 
committed to the theory that the personal representa-
tive is a creature of the state which appointed him and 
that he can have no existence outside its territory. 
This theory was developed in the cases dealing with 
suits by or against foreign executors or administrators. 5 
If this theory is applied logically to the situations dis-
cussed in this chapter, the transaction with the foreign 
personal representative respecting property of the 
decedent having a situs within the forum will be treated 
as void. As one might expect, the courts have been un-
willing to reach this result. It is in this area that the 
concept of the artificial personality of the foreign repre-
sentative limited to the state in which he was ap-
pointed is most unsatisfactory in explaining the results 
in the cases. 
Another important point to notice is whether the 
foreign personal representative who collected the asset 
was a domiciliary representative or an ancillary ad-
ministrator. One of the explanations usually given in 
the cases is that the domiciliary representative takes 
title to all the personal property of decedent wherever 
located, 6 and the fact that he cannot sue to recover 
property does not mean that he cannot give a valid 
acquittance when he collects the property in those 
5 See discussion supra Chapter II, pp. 30-3 I. 
6 In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 366, ro8 P. (zd) 39I (r94o); In re 
Brown's Estate, ZI Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(zd) 387 (I944). 
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states. 7 This concept seems based on two reasons. The 
first is an idea which is expressed in the older cases, 
viz., that the ancillary administrations are subordinate 
to the domiciliary and their only purpose is to adminis-
ter the assets located in the jurisdiction and then to 
transmit the remainder to the domicile for distribution. 8 
This doctrine has gone out of favor, and the tendency 
is to treat the ancillary and domiciliary administrations 
as completely independent of one another and supreme 
within their respective jurisdictions.9 The second rea-
son, and a more forceful one, is that the succession to 
movable property is determined by the law of decedent's 
domicile at date of death10 and it is this same law which 
appoints the domiciliary representative. 11 Since the law 
of the domicile will treat the representative it appoints 
as having title to all the personal property of the de-
cedent, subject to the right of local administration in 
other states, the courts in those states treat the domicili-
ary representative as having title to personal property 
in their jurisdictions until a local administrator is ap-
pointed. Needless to say, this theory that a domiciliary 
representative has title to personal property located in 
other states is in direct conflict with the notion that a 
personal representative is a creature of the state that 
7 Wilkins v. Ellett, I08 U.S. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (r88J). 
8 Cureton v. Mills, IJ S.C. 409, 36 Am. Rep. 700 (1879). 
9 Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 164 F. 817, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 553 
(8th Cir. 1908); Voyles v. Robinson, 151 Miss. 585, r8 So. 420 (1928); 
State ex rei. Finley v. District Court, 99 Mont. 200, 43 P.(2d) 682 (1935). 
10 RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 303 (1934). 
11 A third reason is given in the case of In re Brown's Estate, 2I Del. 
Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 387 (1944). "This is because the domiciliary adminis-
trator is generally looked upon as being more closely connected with the 
persons interested in the estate of the decedent than a foreign representa-
tive would be .... " I personally fail to understand how the connection of 
a domiciliary representative is any closer to decedent's heirs or creditors 
than that of an ancillary administrator. 
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does not exist outside its territory. Although modern 
cases tend not to differentiate between a domiciliary 
representative and an ancillary one as respects legal 
power, some cases still distinguish between the legal 
effect of a collection of assets by the one or by the 
other, and therefore this is an important distinction to 
bear in mind. 
1. DuTY TO CoLLECT AssETS 
A preliminary problem concerns the duty to collect 
assets outside the state of appointment. It would be ex-
pected that courts which generally hold to the theory 
that the personal representative is an artificial per-
sonality that does not exist outside the state of appoint-
ment would conclude that there is no obligation on him 
to perform acts in other states. However, the majority 
of cases which have decided the question have held that 
a personal representative does have a duty to collect 
assets located in other jurisdictions.12 This duty is dif-
ficult to describe precisely and will depend largely on 
the facts of the particular case. 
Generally, the personal representative must make an 
effort to collect a debt due the decedent even though he 
may not be able to sue to recover the debt. 13 This is 
based on the theory that the law presumes that men 
will pay their just debts.H This duty also applies to the 
12 In re Brown's Estate, 21 Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 387 (1944); Shultz 
v. Pulver, II Wend. 363 (N.Y. 1833); Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 
28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878); Shinn's Estate, 166 Pa. 121,30 A. ro26, 45 Am. 
St. Rep. 656 (1895); Welsh v. Welsh, 136 W.Va. 914, 69 S.E.(2d) 34 
(1951). 
Contra: Bowman v. Carr, 5 Lea 574 (Tenn. 188o); Farmer's Bk. of 
Woodland Mills v. Vinson and Williams, 9 Tenn. App. 51 (1928). 
13 Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878). 
14 Shultz V. Pulver, II Wend. 363 (N.Y. 1833). " ... [the debtor] was 
abundantly able, and with the means in his hands and in the case of an 
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collection of the personal property of decedent in other 
states. 15 If a suit is needed to collect the asset and the 
law of that jurisdiction prohibits him from bringing an 
action as a foreign personal representative, he may be 
required to secure ancillary administration himself or 
through an agent.1 6 
The standard of duty which will be applied is that 
of the reasonably prudent businessman. Thus, it was 
held in the case of Shinn's Estate17 that the investment 
of estate funds by a personal representative in mining 
property owned by the decedent in a foreign jurisdic-
tion, which was a highly speculative venture and which 
greatly depreciated in value, was a violation of his duty 
and that he was personally liable for the funds invested. 
In the same case, however, it was held proper for him 
to pay off a debt owing to a foreign creditor when the 
decedent had pledged with the creditor collateral greatly 
exceeding in value the debt and thereby securing for the 
estate the asset consisting of the collateral which had 
been pledged. It seems proper to make necessary ex-
penditures out of estate funds to collect foreign assets 
providing the expenditures are such as a reasonably 
prudent businessman would make. 18 
honest debt, we are not to presume that a suit would have been necessary. 
The law will not presume that mankind in general refuse to pay their 
honest debts when they have abundant means till compelled by its process; 
nor is the fact so." 
15 Shinn's Estate, r66 Pa. I'2I, 30 A. ro26, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895). 
16 In re Brown's Estate, '21 Del. Ch. 562, 52 A.(2d) 387 (1944). Wil-
liams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, '28 Am. Rep. 330 (r 878): "Whether ad-
ministrators in this State should take out ancillary administration, or try 
to do so, in the State of a nonresident debtor, must depend upon the cir-
cumstances of each case ... in determining this latter point, the magni-
tude of the debt, the solvency of the debtor, the distance and probable 
expense, were to be considered." 
17 r66 Pa. r2r, 30 A. 1026,45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895). 
18 Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 2.8 Am. Rep. 330 (r 878); Shinn's 
Estate, r66 Pa. I'2I, 30 A. ro26, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895). 
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A question might be raised whether a personal repre-
sentative should be treated as having a duty to collect 
assets in a jurisdiction where there is an ancillary ad-
ministration. The only case I have found dealing with 
the issue holds that there would be no duty to collect in 
such a situation.t9 Certainly, one of the factors which is 
important in determining whether a duty exists is the 
likelihood of collecting the asset. The personal repre-
sentative would not be permitted to sue and would not 
have much of a chance to persuade a debtor or bailee to 
deliver the asset to him in the face of an ancillary ad-
ministration. Also, one of the main reasons for imposing 
this duty is to prevent assets from being lost to the 
estate through failure to be collected. If there is an an-
cillary administration, it is more reasonable to place 
the duty to collect assets within that jurisdiction on 
the local administrator. Consequently, there should 
be no duty on a personal representative to collect assets 
in a jurisdiction where an ancillary administration has 
been gran ted. 
This question of a duty to collect may arise in two 
ways. The court which appointed the personal represen-
tative may compel him on application of an heir or 
creditor to make an effort to collect the foreign asset. 20 
However, if he is unwilling to do so, the court will prob-
ably remove him and appoint a more enthusiastic ad-
ministrator.21 This result is based on the difficulty of 
supervising the administrator's attempts to collect in a 
foreign jurisdiction and of determining whether those 
efforts were sufficient. The more common way to place 
such a duty on a personal representative is to charge 
19 Grant v. Reese, 94 N.C. 720 (1886). 
20 Welsh v. Welsh, 136 W.Va. 914, 69 S.E.(2d) 34 (1951). 
21 Ibid. 
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him in his account with the foreign asset he should 
have collected. 22 This method is subject to the criticism 
that the administrator or executor would undoubtedly 
have made satisfactory efforts to collect the asset if 
he were informed prior to the filing of his final account 
that he was to be treated as responsible for that asset. 
Of course, he could escape this uncertainty as to his 
duty by applying to the court which appointed him for 
an order clarifying his duty in regard to the collection 
of specified foreign assets. 
In older times when the concept that a personal 
representative was a legal creature limited to the terri-
tory of the state which created him was prevalent and 
when the population was sufficiently immobile so that 
most of decedent's property would normally be located 
in one state, it was easy to say that there was no duty. 
However, today the property of a decedent's estate 
will often be widely scattered. In collecting such prop-
erty, it is recognized that there are many instances 
where a personal representative may sue in a foreign 
jurisdiction to collect assets, and that in many other 
situations the personal representative may receive the 
asset from a holder who surrenders it voluntarily and 
this will be a valid discharge of the obligation. Under 
these circumstances, the personal representative should 
be placed under a duty to make some effort to collect 
foreign assets. It is impossible to define this duty with 
any accuracy. It will depend on the size of the asset 
and the expense involved in collecting it. If the expense 
equals or exceeds the value of the asset, there would 
naturally be no duty to collect. Also, the personal repre-
22 This was done in: Shultz v. Pulver, II Wend. 363 (N.Y. 1833); 
Williams v. Williams, 79 N.C. 417, 28 Am. Rep. 330 (1878); Shinn's Es-
tate, 166 Pa. 121, 30 A. 1026, 45 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1895). 
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sentative must have some reasonable means of discover-
ing the existence of the asset. He must make a reason-
able inquiry, but he need not conduct exhaustive 
investigations outside the state of administration in the 
hope of discovering collectible assets. It would seem 
that a duty to collect should exist only if in the course 
of the reasonable conduct of the administration he 
comes across a note or other record showing the exist-
ence of this asset or he is informed by some reliable 
party in interest. If the collection requires an ancillary 
administration, he should be required to take out the 
administration himself or see that someone else does to 
the end that the asset is not lost to the estate. 
2. CoLLECTION OF CHATTELS 
It is possible that an estate of much size where the 
assets are located in several jurisdictions will consist in 
large part of movable chattels. If the chattels are easily 
transported, such as vehicles, jewelry, or securities, the 
foreign personal representative may take possession 
and remove them into the state of administration. If 
the assets are not in the control of any one in the forum, 
the foreign administrator can accomplish this without 
any difficulty. Once he has the assets in his possession 
in the state of his appointment, he will be required to 
account for them to the probate court there. There is 
little that the forum in which the assets were located 
can do about the removal. If the property is in the 
control of a custodian or bailee, the foreign personal 
representative must persuade the person having control 
to deliver the chattels to him. If that person refuses to 
do so, the foreign personal representative would not be 
permitted to sue him because of the general common-
law prohibition against such suits unless he brings him-
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self within one of the recognized exceptions or there is a 
statute permitting such an action. If he can convince 
the bailee or custodian to surrender the chattel to 
him, he has effectively collected it. 
An analogous problem based on the same principle 
concerns the case of stock certificates held by a foreign 
personal representative in a domestic corporation. He 
generally will not be permitted to sue to force the cor-
poration to issue new certificates to him. 23 However, if 
the corporation voluntarily issues new share certificates 
to the foreign personal representative, it will be pro-
tected in an action brought by a subsequently appointed 
local administrator to compel the corporation to issue 
the stock to him.24 
The case authority dealing with this problem is 
limited because it is difficult to litigate the question of 
a foreign personal representative's right to collect chat-
tels. If they are not voluntarily delivered to him, he is 
barred from seeking relief in the courts of that state. 
About the only way that such a question could arise 
would be for the foreign personal representative to 
collect and remove assets of decedent located in the 
forum. Then a local ancillary administrator would be 
appointed and sue either the foreign administrator25 or 
the bailee who delivered the chattel to him for con-
version.26 The cases which have considered the question 
23 See supra Chapter II, p. 42. 
24 Union Trust Co. v. Pacific T. & T. Co., 31 Cal. App. 64, 159 P. 82o 
(1916). 
25 Morrison v. Hass, 229 Mass. 514, II8 N.E. 893 (1918). In this case, 
an executor who qualified in New York collected assets of decedent in 
Massachusetts. An administrator appointed subsequently in Massachu-
setts sued the executor for conversion. The court gave judgment for the 
defendant on the ground that he was entitled to collect assets in Massa-
chusetts as long as he did not have to resort to the courts to do so. 
26 The decisions which hold that a corporation which issues new share 
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hold that a foreign personal representative is entitled 
to collect personal property of decedent located in the 
forum. 27 
Some states have adopted statutes which permit 
foreign personal representatives to collect the personal 
property of decedent located in the jurisdiction and 
which protect the person who delivers the property to 
him. An illustrative example occurs in the statutes of 
Alabama: 
"Any executor or administrator who has obtained letters 
testamentary or of administration on the estate of a person 
who was not, at the time of his death, an inhabitant of this 
state, in any other of the United States, and who has not 
obtained letters of administration thereon in this state ... 
may maintain suits and recover property in this state ... 28 
"A delivery of property or the recovery of judgment, 
under the provisions of section I 51 of this title, is a protec-
tion to the defendant, or to the person delivering the property, 
to the extent of such judgment, or the value of such prop-
erty."29 
These statutes usually require that the foreign personal 
representative file his letters of appointment and post a 
bond before he collects the property. 
There is a problem whether an ancillary adminis-
trator as well as a domiciliary representative is entitled 
certificates to a foreign personal representative may not be sued by a local 
administrator, plus the cases which state generally that a foreign ad-
ministrator or executor has the right to collect personal property, would 
indicate that a bailee is not liable to a local administrator for assets which 
he delivered to a foreign personal representative. 
27 In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 366, 108 P.(2d) 391 (194o); Coca-Cola 
v. New York Trust Co., 22 Del. Ch. 344, 2 A.(2d) 290 (1938) (collection 
of shares of stock); Morrison v. Hass, 229 Mass. 514, II8 N.E. 893 (1918); 
Swan v. Bill, 95 N.H. I 58, 59 A.(2d) 346 (1948) (taking possession of a 
leasehold); Potter v. First Nat. Bank, 107 N.J.Eq. 72, 151 A. 546 (193o); 
Valentine v. Duke, 128 Wash. 128, 222 P. 494 (1924). 
28 61 Ala. I 51 (1940). 
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to collect the chattels of the decedent located in other 
states. Nearly all of the cases which have discussed the 
issue deal with collections by the domiciliary personal 
representative. Since the explanation generally given is 
that, as domiciliary representative, he receives title to 
all of the decedent's personal property, wherever lo-
cated,30 it might be that the courts would not reach the 
same result if the collection were by a foreign ancillary 
administrator. Of course, if the property can be removed 
from the forum by the ancillary administrator, he has 
effectively collected it. The court which appointed him 
is probably not likely to order him to return the property 
to the state from which it was taken. The only remedy 
the forum has would be against a bailee who surrendered 
the property to the ancillary administrator. 
The case authority on this question is limited and 
therefore not completely conclusive. It is advisable for 
a person having control of decedent's property to pro-
tect himself by refusing to deliver it to a foreign per-
sonal representative unless he is sure that there will be 
no legal reaction against him. If the law of the particular 
jurisdiction is not certain by virtue of a clear decision 
or a statute permitting such collections, it would be 
wiser to deliver the property only to a local adminis-
trator, unless the foreign personal representative can 
obtain a court ruling showing that he is entitled to the 
assets. 
3· VoLUNTARY PAYMENT oF DEBTS TO A FoREIGN 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
By far the most litigated, discussed, and important 
question in this area of the collection of decedent's 
29 61 Ala. 155 (1940). 
30 See supra p. 142. 
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assets concerns the effect of voluntary payment by a 
debtor of decedent to a foreign personal representa-
tive.31 Most estates which are probated will have some 
assets consisting of debts due to decedent. Since the 
orthodox theory is that a simple debt will be treated 
as property at the place where the debtor is,32 and since 
debtors and the deceased creditor as human beings in a 
modern society move about freely and frequently, it is 
very likely that the situs of the debt at the time of the 
probate proceeding will be in a state other than the 
jurisdiction in which the administration is being had. 
Therefore, one of the earliest problems a personal repre-
sentative will face is this one of collecting debts owed 
to the decedent by persons residing in other states. 
Unless the personal representative has a negotiable 
instrument or note representing the debt, or there is 
statutory permission, he will generally not be permitted 
to sue the debtor in that jurisdiction. Thus, the only 
means of collection would be to persuade the debtor to 
pay the debt to him voluntarily. 
Obtaining voluntary payment from a debtor of the 
decedent residing in a foreign jurisdiction is not so 
difficult or infrequent an occurrence as might be imag-
ined. A great majority of debtors are quite willing to 
31 This problem has been discussed in several articles. The first two 
listed suffer somewhat in their explanation of the cases because of their 
emphasis on the completely sovereign aspect of each state as the control-
ling factor, but they are good discussions of the problems raised by volun-
tary payment and the case authority. 
Beale, "Voluntary Payment to a Foreign Administrator," 42 HARV. 
L. REv. at 597 (1929); Mersh, "Voluntary Payment to Foreign Adminis-
trator", 18 GEo. L. JoURNAL 130 (1930); Basye, "Dispensing with Ad-
ministration", 44 MrcH. L. REv. at 410 et seq. (1945). 
A good collection of the cases dealing with the major problems will be 
found in the annotation at Io A.L.R. 276. 
32 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 49 L.Ed. 718 (r88J). 
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discharge any obligations they may have and will pay 
the debt on demand. A substantial number of the cases 
involve payment of deposits by a bank. The bank is 
certainly willing to pay, and to a large extent its busi-
ness reputation is dependent on prompt and voluntary 
payment. Furthermore, the debtor does not ordinarily 
want to go through the delay of waiting for an ancillary 
administrator to be appointed so that payment can be 
made to him. Certainly if, as frequently must happen, 
the debtor is without legal advice, he is likely to regard 
the foreign personal representative as the proper party 
to discharge the obligation and will pay him without 
realizing the legal consequences of the representative's 
place of appointment. Once the payment has been 
made, and this will frequently happen, our problem is 
whether such payment discharges the obligation of the 
debtor so that he will not be liable to a second recovery 
against him in an action by a local administrator. 
The problem can be a complex one, and the solution 
in each instance will depend on several varying factors. 
Such facts as whether the foreign personal representa-
tive was a domiciliary or an ancillary one, whether 
there were any creditors of decedent in the forum, 
whether there was an ancillary administrator appointed 
in the forum at the time of payment, and whether the 
debt was evidenced by a note or negotiable instrument 
will be important factors in determining whether the 
voluntary payment to the foreign administrator or 
executor will operate as a valid discharge to the debtor. 
In order to make the effect of these factors clear, it will 
be necessary to consider a number of hypothetical situa-
tions which illustrate the various problems. In these 
hypothetical cases, D will be the debtor of decedent, 
F, the foreign personal representative to whom the 
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debt is paid, and A, the ancillary administrator ap-
pointed in the state where D resides. 
The first situation to be dealt with is one which does 
not actually come within the scope of this work, but it 
should be considered because it has influenced the 
thinking of the courts in solving the problems treated 
in this section. D enters the state where F was ap-
pointed. IfF gets personal jurisdiction over D and ob-
tains a judgment against him, that judgment will be a 
bar to any action brought by A on the same debt in the 
state where D resides.33 When the judgment is rendered, 
the debt merges into the judgment and that judgment 
is the individual property of F. In a subsequent action 
brought by A, this judgment will be res judicata under 
the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States 
Constitution. Similarly, if D enters the state where F 
was appointed and while there voluntarily pays him the 
debt in good faith, that payment will be a bar to a subse-
quent action by A.34 This is based on the idea that F 
has the right to collect any assets of decedent which can 
be found in the jurisdiction in which he was appointed, 
and he has collected the asset to the exclusion of any 
other personal representative when it is voluntarily 
paid to him there. Naturally, the courts which have had 
to treat the problem of the effect of voluntary payment 
to a foreign administrator see little but a technical dis-
tinction between that problem and the situation where 
payment is made in the state where the administrator 
was appointed. Thus in the cases discussed in this sec-
tion, one of the reasons always given for the result is 
the analogy with the result in the case where the debtor 
33 Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, z S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (r88J). 
34 Wilkins v. Ellett, ro8 u.s. zs6, '2 S.Ct. 64I, '27 L.Ed. 7I8 (I88J); 
Riley v. Moseley, 44 Miss. 37 (187o). 
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enters the state where an administrator was appointed 
and there pays him. 
The next hypothetical case represents the strongest 
situation for treating voluntary payment to a foreign 
personal representative as a valid discharge of the 
obligation. F is the domiciliary representative. He enters 
the state where D resides, and D voluntarily pays the 
debt to him. There are no local creditors in the state, 
and at the time, there is no ancillary administrator. 
The cases have generally held that such voluntary 
payment when there is no ancillary administration and 
no domestic creditors are prejudiced will constitute a 
valid discharge of the debt. 35 There is some authority 
to the effect that if there are local creditors at the time 
of the payment who are prejudiced by the removal of 
assets from the jurisdiction, D will be liable in an action 
brought on the same debt by .A. 36 This test of prejudice 
to local creditors has been criticized because "The ef-
fect of the payment is left to the subsequent determina-
tion of fact unknown when the payment is made; 
namely, the existence of unsatisfied creditors."37 This 
35 Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (1883); 
Selleck v. Rusco, 46 Conn. 370 (1878); Citizens' Nat. Bk. v. Sharp, 53 
Md. 521 (1879); Schluter v. Bowery Sav. Bank, II7 N.Y. 125, 22 N.E. 
572, 5 L.R.A. 541 (1889); McCully v. Cooper, II4 Cal. 258, 46 P. 82 
(1896) (dictum); Gardiner v. Thorndike, 183 Mass. 81, 66 N.E. 633 (1903) 
(dictum). 
Contra: Crohn v. Clay County Bank, 137 Mo. App. 712, II8 S.W. 498 
(1909); Young v. O'Neal, 3 Sneed 55 (Tenn. 1855); Vaughn v. Barrett, 
5 Vt. 333 (I8JJ). 
36 Klein v. French, 57 Miss. 662 (188o); Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson, 
123 S.C. 208, II6 S.E. 451 (1922). 
See also: Richardson v. Neblett, 122 Miss. 723, 84 So. 695, 10 A.L.R. 
272 (1920). Voluntary payment to a foreign personal representative was 
held not to be a discharge because he had failed to comply with the 
statutory requirement of filing his letters before he received the payment. 
37 Mersh, supra note 31 at 146. 
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criticism points up the undesirable feature of the com-
mon-law rule, i.e., the fact that a debtor, when he pays 
the foreign personal representative, can never be posi-
tive that such payment will be a valid discharge. Still, 
under the state of the common-law decisions in the 
United States, it is probable that a majority of the 
courts would turn their decision on this factor of whether 
the payment operated to the prejudice oflocal creditors. 
If at the time of the voluntary payment by D to F, 
there is an ancillary administrator, A, appointed in the 
state where D resides, does the payment discharge D's 
obligation? The few cases which have considered this 
question have held that if the payment were made in 
good faith and with no knowledge of the existence of the 
ancillary administrator, it would be a bar to a subse-
quent action brought by A. 38 The leading case on this 
point isMaas v. German Savings Bank.39 D, a New York 
bank, voluntarily paid a deposit of decedent to F, 
the domiciliary representative appointed in New Jer-
sery. A had previously been appointed administrator 
in New York, and he brought this action against D to 
recover the deposit. It was conceded that there were no 
creditors of decedent in New York and that the pay-
ment was made in good faith and without knowledge of 
the appointment of the plain tiff. The New York Court 
of Appeals held that the voluntary payment was a valid 
discharge as long as it was made in good faith. It was 
contended that the bank had constructive notice of the 
ancillary administration because A's appointment was 
made in the prescribed manner with notice and was a 
matter of court record. However, the court held that 
38 Compton v. Borderland Coal Co., 179 Ky. 695,201 S.W. 20 (1918); 
Maas v. German Savings Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (1903). 
39 176 N.Y. 377. 68 N.E. 658 (190J). 
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actual notice of the appointment of a domestic adminis-
trator would be necessary before there would be a suffi-
cient lack of good faith to destroy the validity of the 
payment. 
The foregoing discussion has presupposed that F, to 
whom the payment was made, was the domiciliary 
personal representative. The early cases dealing with 
the problems of voluntary payment usually rationalized 
the result on the theory that the domiciliary adminis-
trator or executor takes title to all of the decedent's 
personal property, wherever located, and this includes 
choses in action such as debts. 40 While he might be 
unable to sue to recover this property, his title is such 
that he can give a good discharge to the debtor even 
though the payment occurred outside the state of his 
appointment. Now the ancillary administrator has not 
been treated as receiving title to any of the decedent's 
assets other than those located in the jurisdiction where 
he was appointed. So our next problem is whether 
voluntary payment by D to F when F is an ancillary 
administrator will be a bar in a subsequent action 
brought by A. The leading case on this question is 
Wilkins v. Ellett. 41 D, a resident of Tennessee, paid 
there to F, an administrator appointed in Alabama, 
a debt which he owed decedent. Later A was appointed 
administrator in Tennessee and brought this action to 
recover the debt. In a previous case involving the same 
fact situation,42 where the trial court found that dece-
dent's domicile was in Alabama and consequently that 
F was a domiciliary representative, the Supreme Court 
40 This theory has been rather vigorously criticized in Beale, supra note 
31 at 59g-6o4. 
41 I08 u.s. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718 (188J). 
42 Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740, 19 L.Ed. ss6 (U.S. I869). 
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of the United States had held that the payment was a 
valid discharge. The case was retried and the lower 
court found that decedent was domiciled in Tennessee, 
so that F was to be treated as ancillary administrator. 
The Supreme Court still held that the payment was a 
good discharge of the obligation. It based the result 
largely on the decision in the previous case, saying that 
it was immaterial whether F was an ancillary adminis-
trator or not. While it is difficult from the viewpoint of 
theory to fit this case in with those involving payment 
to a domestic representative, the cases decided since 
have followed the holding in Wilkins v. Ellett. 43 The 
courts seem more concerned with reaching a result 
which will protect the debtor from having to pay twice 
than one which will fit into a neat, logical pattern of 
explanation. 
The discussion thus far has assumed that the pay-
ment was of a simple con tract debt. Another factor 
which can complicate the problem and may cause a dif-
ferent result is the existence of a negotiable instrument 
or promissory note as evidence of the debt. It is gen-
erally held that F who has the note representing the 
debt is entitled to receive the payment if the debtor 
is willing to make payment. 44 This result is the same 
as in the normal case involving voluntary payment by 
the debtor to a foreign personal representative. One 
case has held, however, that if the note is held by A, 
the local administrator, voluntary payment by D to F 
43 Morrison v. Berkshire Loan & Trust Co., 229 Mass. 519, II8 N.E. 
895 (1918); Carr v. Prudential Ins. Co., 27 N.Y.S.(2d) 349 (1941). 
44 McNamara v. McNamara, 62 Ga. 200 (1879); Thorman v. Broderick, 
52 La. Ann. 1298, 27 So. 735 (1900); Goodlett v. Anderson, 75 Tenn. 286 
(1881). 
Contra: Bull v. Fuller, 78 Iowa 20 (1889); Mcllvoy v. Alsop, 45 Miss. 
365 (1871). 
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will not protect him in an action brought later on the 
note by /./.. 45 In view of the tendency of modern courts 
to adopt the "mercantile theory" in regard to com-
mercial paper which holds that the debt is property 
where the note is, 46 it is likely that any modern court 
would hold that the only personal representative en-
titled to collect the asset would be the one in possession 
of the note. Therefore, a debtor should not feel safe in 
paying a foreign personal representative unless he can 
surrender the note which evidences the debt. 
A question may be raised whether there is any legal 
obligation on the debtor to pay a foreign personal rep-
resentative when he demands payment. This is not an 
easy question to have litigated, because generally the 
foreign administrator who demands payment is not en-
titled to go to court to collect the debt. However, in 
states where the foreign personal representative is per-
mitted to bring an action, the question has been de-
cided, and the courts have held that there is no duty 
on a debtor to pay a foreign personal representative. 47 
He is entitled to wait and pay an ancillary administra-
tor appointed in the jurisdiction, who can unquestion-
ably give a valid discharge of the obligation. One of the 
cases reached this result in spite of a statute aimed at 
protecting debtors who make such voluntary payments. 
It held that such a statute merely removed from the 
debtor certain restrictions and did not impose on him 
an obligation to pay.48 This result seems strange. It 
45 Amsden v. Danielson, I9 R.I. 533, 35 A. 70 (I896). 
46 See supra Chapter II, pp. 4I-43. 
47 Cameron v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash., 53 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. I943); 
Joy v. Swanton Sav. Bank, III Vt. 106, IO A.(2d) 216 (I940). 
48 Joy v. Swanton Sav. Bank, III Vt. 106, IO A.(2d) 2I6 (1940): 
"It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature by the passage of the 
statute in question intended to remove from a certain class of debtors, to 
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unquestionably is sound to say that there is no duty 
to pay an obligation to a foreign personal representa-
tive who cannot sue to collect the debt. A legal duty 
presupposes that the right-holder can resort to the 
courts to compel the obligor to perform his duty. How-
ever, in those situations where states have adopted 
statutes permitting foreign administrators to sue, this 
permission must mean that the foreign administrator 
can sue to collect obligations owing to decedent and 
the court must give judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
if such obligation is owing. It would seem that the only 
proper construction of such a statute would be that the 
debtor is obligated to pay when sued, and satisfaction 
of a judgment against him or payment under threat of 
suit should be a discharge of his obligation. 
Many of the obligations owed to decedent which 
might be voluntarily paid to a foreign personal repre-
sentative will be secured by some security arrangement 
such as a mortgage. May a foreign executor or adminis-
trator who has the power to discharge a simple debt 
also discharge mortgages? This will, of course, depend 
on the law of the forum in which the mortgaged prop-
erty lies. It would seem to follow as a logical extension 
of the rule that if a foreign personal representative can 
discharge a debt voluntarily paid to him, he might also 
discharge a mortgage securing that debt. There is some 
case authority to support this position49 and legislation 
which has adopted the principle. 5° Certainly, any dis-
some extent at least, the restrictions imposed on them by the above rule 
of law [the common-law rule in Vermont that voluntary payment to a 
foreign personal representative is not a valid discharge] ... Nothing can 
be drawn from the act to show that it was intended to impose upon such 
debtors the absolute duty of paying over on demand .... " 
49 Dexter v. Berge, 76 Minn. 216, 78 N.W. IIII (1899). 
60 See infra p. 164. 
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charge of the debt which is recognized by the law gov-
erning the release of the mortgage would mean that the 
remedies on the mortgage would no longer be available, 
even to a local administrator. 
As might be expected, there has been a great deal of 
difficulty in satisfactorily explaining the result in cases 
involving voluntary payment. Beale, who is the fore-
most exponent of the traditional theory concerning the 
territorial limitation of a personal representative's au-
thority, has developed a very complicated explana-
tion."! When D has made a voluntary payment to F, 
the forum in which D resides can compel him to pay 
.A, the domestic administrator, a second time. How-
ever, if F is the domiciliary administrator and there 
are no local creditors in the forum, .A, after he has ad-
ministered the estate in his hands, will transmit the 
assets including the second payment by D to F for dis-
tribution. Now the estate in the hands ofF will contain 
two payments made by D. He will be entitled to re-
cover the amount of his first payment from F on a 
theory of unjust enrichment. In order to avoid this cir-
cuity of action, the forum will treat the first payment 
as an equitable discharge and will not permit a second 
recovery by the domestic administrator. This reason-
ing is a logical and adequate, although involved, ex-
planation of the majority rule that payment to a domi-
ciliary representative when there are no local creditors 
will be a valid discharge, but it does not explain the 
cases which go further and hold that payment is valid 
if made to a foreign ancillary administrator or when 
there are local creditors. Also, this explanation has 
never actually been used by the courts as an explana-
51 Beale, supra note 31 at 6os, 6o8. 
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tion for their decisions, nor does it seem accurately to 
reflect the true motivations for the result. 
The result can be explained much more simply in 
terms of an almost instinctive reaction as to what is 
just in this situation. The courts seem to realize that 
the concept of separate administrations does not re-
flect the attitude of the layman in dealing with a de-
cedent's estate. The debtor in the creation of the debt 
dealt with one person, and when he made the payment 
of that debt to a valid legal representative of the dece-
dent in good faith, he thought he was to be discharged. 
This payment will create assets of the estate which will 
be available for the payment of claims and distribution 
to heirs. The fact that the asset is in the hands of a 
foreign, rather than a local, personal representative 
may mean that the interests of local creditors may not 
be so well protected, but the debtor is also a local citi-
zen who is entitled to some protection from the forum. 
Usually, the creditors will have been lax in not securing 
an ancillary administration before payment was made. 
Certainly, it is obviously unjust enrichment to require 
the debtor to pay a second time and thus double the 
assets available for the payment of debts. For these 
reasons, the forum, which can as a matter of comity 
recognize the authority of the foreign personal repre-
sentative, will treat the payment to him as a valid 
discharge. 
The state of the decisions at common law as related 
to the varying fact situations makes it impossible to 
state categorically what the law is. A debtor may be 
fairly safe in relying on payment to a foreign domi-
ciliary representative when he is sure there are no local 
creditors and no local administration as a discharge of 
his debt which will bar a subsequent action by a local 
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administrator. If he is not sure about the existence of 
local creditors, or if there is an ancillary administration, 
or if his obligation is evidenced by a promissory note 
which the foreign personal representative does not pos-
sess, the only completely safe course for the debtor is 
to refuse to pay any but a local administrator or to 
wait until the foreign representative has obtained a 
court order directing him to pay. 
4- STATUTES AFFECTING VoLUNTARY PAYMENT TO A 
FoREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The uncertainty which the common-law rules raise 
as to the effect of a voluntary payment to a foreign 
personal representative was bound to produce legisla-
tive activity in an attempt to work out a more satis-
factory situation. Certainly the banks and insurance 
companies who occupy the position of debtors to per-
sons who will frequently die domiciled in a jurisdiction 
other than the one in which they are located would agi-
tate for legislative remedies. 62 As a result, over half of 
the states in this country have adopted statutes in one 
form or another which deal with the effect of a volun-
tary payment to foreign personal representatives or a 
delivery of personal property belonging to decedent. 
The statutes vary considerably in their provisions, but 
they fall roughly into two classes. 
The first group of statutes are those which provide 
that a foreign personal representative has the power to 
62 The influence of banking circles in motivating this type of legislation 
is very evident in the statute passed in Georgia, I IJ Ga. Code Ann. 2406: 
"Such foreign executor or administrator may transfer the stock of any 
bank or other corporation in the State standing in the name of the dece-
dent, and check out deposits made by him and dividends declared on his 
stock, first filing with the bank or corporation a certified copy of his ap-
pointment and qualification." 
164 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
release mortgages and liens. A typical one is the fol-
lowing: 
"When an executor or administrator has been appointed 
in any other state or foreign country of the estate of a person 
not a resident of this state at the time of his decease, and no 
executor or administrator thereon be appointed in this state, 
or when a guardian of a minor has been appointed in any 
other state or foreign country, such foreign executor, ad-
ministrator or guardian upon filing and recording in the 
recorder's office of the county in which the mortgage held 
by the estate of such deceased person or minor is recorded an 
authenticated copy of his appointment, may execute satis-
faction or deeds of release of a mortgage upon property 
situate in this state as and with like effect as executors, 
administrators and guardians appointed in this state." 53 
Six states have adopted statutes of this nature. 54 All of 
these require the foreign personal representative to file 
his letters for record before he can release the mort-
gage. While the statutes do not expressly provide that 
any voluntary payment to a foreign personal repre-
sentative made in good faith will be a valid discharge, 
by implication any statute which provides that a for-
eign personal representative may discharge the security 
for a debt gives him the power to collect and discharge 
the debt. 
The second, and by far the more numerous variety of 
statute, provides specifically that the payment of debts 
and delivery of personal property of decedent to a for-
eign personal representative will be a valid acquittance. 
The following is a representative statutory provision of 
this type: 
53 Arizona Code, sec. 62-5II (1939). 
64 Arizona Code, sec. 62-5u (1939); Gen. Stat. of Conn., sec. 7116 
(1949); Idaho Code, sec. 15-813; N.D. Rev. Code, sec. 35-0125 (1943); 
58 Okla. Stat. Ann. 262; Ore. Rev. Stat. 86.130. 
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"A payment by a resident or citizen of this state to a 
fiduciary appointed in another state of, or on account of, a 
debt due to his decedent, ward or trust, made before letters 
are granted in this state, shall be as valid and effectual as if 
made to a fiduciary duly appointed in this state. The foreign 
fiduciary may, before letters are granted in this state, release 
and discharge real or personal estate from a mortgage, judg-
ment or other lien or encumbrance held by his decedent, 
ward or trust, with like effect as if he had received letters in 
this state." 55 
Statutes similar to this have been adopted in a large 
number of states. 56 These statutes usually require that 
the foreign personal representative must file his letters 
before he will be entitled to collect decedent's debts and 
give a valid discharge for them. Some of the statutes 
require that the debtor wait a specified period, either 
three months 57 or six months, 58 after the death of the 
decedent, and if by that time there is no domestic per-
sonal representative appointed, he may safely pay a 
foreign executor or administrator. A number of the 
statutes provide that payment will be a valid discharge 
only if the debtor had no knowledge at the time of the 
55 N.J. Stat. Ann. 3A:13-1. 
56 61 Ala. I 5I, I 52 (I940); I2 Del. Code Ann., I 562; Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 
734.30; II3 Ga. Code Ann. 2406; Smith Hurd Ill. Stat., Ch. 3, sec. 4I6; 
Gen. Stat. of Kan., sec. 59-1707; Ky. Rev. Stat., sec. 395.170 (1953); 
Rev. Stat. of Me., ch. 154, sec. 89; Ann. Code of Md., Art. 93, sec. 83 
(limited to transfer of stock and payment of public bonds); Ann. Laws of 
Mass., ch. 204, sec. 3; Miss. Code, sec. 622 (I942); Vernon's Ann. Mo. 
Stat., sec. 466.oio; Rev. Laws of N.H., ch. 353, sec. 28; N.J. Stat. Ann., 
3A:13-1; Ore. Rev. Stat., sec. I I6.185 (limited to debts or personal prop-
erty not exceeding $500 in value); Gen. Laws of R.I., ch. 575, sec. 25, 26; 
Code of S.C., sec. 19-6oo; Vt. Stat., sec. 8746, 8777, 9189 (limited to pay-
ment to foreign domiciliary personal representative); Code of Va., sec. 
64-I23 (I95o); Wise. Stat., sec. 235.56 (1953); Wyo. Comp. Stat., sec. 
66-135 (I945). 
57 Fla. Stat. Ann., sec. 734.30; Ore. Rev. Stat., sec. ri6.I85. 
58 Rev. Stat. of Me., ch. 154, sec. 89; Ann. Laws of Mass., ch. 204, sec. 
3; Rev. Laws cf N.H., ch. 353, sec. 28. 
166 FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 
existence of a domestic representative if he had already 
been appointed, and a few say that payment is valid 
only if there is no local representative. The statutes do 
not generally make the distinction between payment to 
a domiciliary or ancillary administrator, nor between 
the existence or absence of local creditors that the 
common-law rules do. Thus the statutes make impor-
tant modifications on the common-law rules. They also 
have the virtue of making the law more certain. In a 
state where such a statute has been passed, a debtor 
who is assured that the conditions of the statute have 
been complied with can make a voluntary payment to 
a foreign personal representative with confidence that 
he will not have to pay it a second time. 
5· DEBTS DuE TO DECEDENT FROM THE UNITED STATEs 
A special problem is raised because of the dual na-
ture of government in this country. Over the forty-
eight separate legal systems operating in mutually ex-
clusive geographical areas is imposed one federal legal 
system which is coextensive in territory with all the 
states. When a personal representative is appointed in 
one of the states, he derives his authority from that 
legal order, and most of his activities are confined 
within its geographical limits. The United States as a 
legal entity exists in the terri tory in which the personal 
representative was appointed and also in each of the 
forty-seven other states. When the United States owes 
a debt to the decedent, there is a problem where the 
debt is to be collected and by which personal repre-
sentative. This problem first came before the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Vaughan v. Northrup 59 
69 IS Pet. I, Io L.Ed. 639 (U.S. I84I). 
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The United States owed a debt to decedent for mili-
tary service in the Revolutionary War. The defendant 
was appointed his personal representative in Kentucky 
and came to the District of Columbia and collected the 
sum from the Treasury of the United States. While there 
he was sued by heirs of the decedent for their distribu-
tive shares. The case was decided in an opinion written 
by Mr. Justice Story, who always speaks with great 
authority on matters of conflict of laws. In the course 
of the opinion, he said: 
"The debts due from the government of the United States 
have no locality at the seat of government. The United 
States, in their sovereign capacity, have no particular place 
of domicile, but possess, in contemplation oflaw, an ubiquity 
throughout the Union; and the debts due by them are not 
to be treated like the debts of a private debtor, which con-
stitute local assets in his own domicile. On the contrary, the 
administrator of a creditor of the government, duly ap-
pointed in the state where he was domiciled at his death, has 
full authority to receive payment, and give a full discharge 
of the debt due to his intestate, in any place where the 
government may choose to pay it; whether it be at the seat 
of government, or at any other place where the public funds 
are deposited." 60 
Thus it seems that a personal representative has the 
authority to collect debts due from the United States 
anywhere he can persuade the Treasury of the United 
States to pay him. 
There is a further problem which arises when there 
is more than one personal representative. The Supreme 
Court has held that the United States "may in their 
discretion, exercised through the appropriate officers, 
ao 15 Pet. (U.S.) at 6. Quoted with approval and followed in: United 
States for the use of Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100, 15 L.Ed. 289 (1855); 
Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. 654, 3 S.Ct. 417, 27 L.Ed. 1068 (1883). 
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pay a debt, due to the estate of a deceased person, 
either to the administrator appointed in the State of 
his domicile, or to an ancillary administrator duly ap-
pointed in the District of Columbia .... " 61 This places 
the decision as to which personal representative should 
be paid solely in the discretion of the Treasury officials. 
As a matter of legal reasoning, such a result seems 
proper. However, the discretion should always be exer-
cised in favor of the domiciliary personal representa-
tive. This is the principal administration and is the one 
toward which all unifying movements should be made. 
The United States should have no interest in protecting 
a group of creditors in a specific locality and should 
lend the weight of its authority to unifying the ad-
ministration by paying any funds it owes the decedent 
to the domiciliary representative. To pay them to any 
other administrator would increase the problems of 
multiple administrations. 
6. SuMMARY 
A foreign personal representative can enter the juris-
diction and there take possession of movable chattels 
to be removed to the state of his administration. Simi-
larly, if the asset is a debt owed by a resident of the 
forum, he may persuade the debtor to pay it to him 
voluntarily. These assets will have been effectively col-
lected as far as the foreign personal representative is 
concerned. The important problem then becomes how 
the forum will treat the transaction as regards the 
bailee or debtor who delivered the assets to the foreign 
administrator. The great majority of cases will reach 
the conclusion that such delivery was proper so as to 
61 Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. at 659, 3 S.Ct. 417, 27 L.Ed. 1068 
(I88J). 
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prevent a second recovery by a subsequently appointed 
local administrator. Over half of the states have stat-
utes which expressly make valid the delivery of chat-
tels or the payment of debts to a foreign administrator. 
In those states which retain the common law, the most 
unfortunate feature of the rules is the uncertainty as to 
legal consequences. A bailee or debtor in such a juris-
diction who surrenders assets to a foreign personal rep-
resentative can rarely be sure that he has been dis-
charged of his obligation. 
CHAPTER VI 
The Unified Administration 
I. THE NECESSITY FOR A UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION 
T HE general rule from which all discussion must start is that a personal representative who is ap-pointed in one jurisdiction has no authority per 
se to act in any other. This is the result of two theories. 
The most likely explanation for the development of 
the rule was the extremely influential concept of the 
sovereign character of each legal order. The rule was 
developed in the ecclesiastical courts of England, where 
quite probably each archbishop was jealous of the 
power of the other and therefore would not permit the 
other's appointees to act in his jurisdiction.1 The rule 
was popularized in the legal world by Story, who 
founded his system of conflict of laws on a sovereignty-
comity theory. We have seen that a modern writer like 
Beale will still explain the rules as the result of the 
lack of power of a legal order to make its law by its 
own force operate in other jurisdictions.2 This theory, 
in order to be a satisfactory explanation, presupposes 
that the other states, because they are not compelled 
to do so, will refuse to recognize that the laws of that 
state do have force in their jurisdictions. As a matter 
of fact, these other jurisdictions frequently recognize 
the operative force of the law of the first state in their 
territories, and this forms the basis of those rules 
generally classified in the field of conflict of laws. In 
1 See supra Chapter I, pp. 15-16. 
2 See quotation, supra Chapter II, p. JI. 
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many situations involving foreign personal representa-
tives, effect is given to the law of another state. This 
should cause us to realize that the important point of 
view of analysis is not that of the state which appointed 
the personal representative, but rather the state in 
which the personal representative attempts to perform 
some action and which must determine whether that 
action is proper. Therefore we have to turn from the 
logical-legal explanations of a Beale and consider the 
question from the attitude of the forum. Why has the 
forum adopted the general rule excluding foreign 
executors and administrators? What exceptions has it 
made to this general rule? Why were these exceptions 
made? Should the exceptions be extended further? 
Should the general rule be abolished altogether? 
The real and only justification for the general rule 
limiting the authority of the foreign personal repre-
sentative to the territory of the appointing state is the 
desire to protect local creditors. In the vast majority of 
cases, the only purpose which a foreign executor or ad-
ministrator can have in wanting to act in the forum is 
to collect decedent's assets. If he is permitted to do so, 
the local creditors can no longer satisfy their claims out 
of property located in the jurisdiction. Story pictured 
the undesirable consequences of permitting the re-
moval of decedent's assets when he wrote: 
Persons, domiciled and dying in one country, are often 
deeply indebted to foreign creditors, living in other countries, 
where there are personal assets of the deceased. In such 
cases it would be a great hardship upon such creditors to 
allow the original executor or administrator to withdraw 
those funds from the foreign country, without the payment 
of such debts, and thus to leave the creditors to seek their 
remedy in the domicile of the original executor or adminis-
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trator, and perhaps there to meet with obstructions and 
inequalities in the enforcement of their own rights from the 
peculiarities of the locallaw."3 
In order to protect the local creditor's interest, the 
forum as a general rule has required that decedent's 
property located in the jurisdiction be administered 
there, and after all local creditors have been paid the 
proceeds will be transmitted to the principal admin-
istration for distribution. Therefore, in weighing the 
desirability of a unified administration against the cur-
rent requirement of separate administrations, on one 
side of the scales must be placed the interests of local 
creditors in local assets. 
Notwithstanding the necessity of caring for local 
citizens who have claims against the estate, many ex-
ceptions have been made in favor of permitting action 
in the state by a foreign personal representative. Thus 
we have seen that there are many situations where a 
foreign personal representative is permitted by com-
mon law or legislation to sue, 4 that he may be allowed 
to sellland,O and is generally permitted to collect mov-
able chattels and debts located in the forum. 6 This 
indicates a rather extreme dissatisfaction with the 
operation of the general rule. So the next logical ques-
tion is, why have the courts and legislatures in general 
been so willing to make the exceptions? 
The result of applying the general rule is to require 
an ancillary administration in the state where the 
property is located. Such an administration is quite 
3 Story, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2nd Ed., sec. 
5I2 (I84I). 
4 See supra Chapter II, pp. 35-54· 
5 See supra Chapter IV, pp. I:l5-I28. 
6 See supra Chapter V. 
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expensive. There will be the added cost which will 
always arise from duplication of effort, and more par-
ticularly there will be court costs, attorney's fees, and 
administrator's fees. This added expense must be paid 
out of the assets of the estate. The expense will diminish 
the amount of the property available for distribution 
to the heirs, devisees, or legatees of the decedent. They 
are as entitled to protection, not only from the domi-
ciliary court, but all courts, as is any group or class of 
creditors. The heirs and beneficiaries of the decedent 
should be entitled to demand as inexpensive an ad-
ministration of the estate as is possible to insure that 
they will receive more of the decedent's property. 
However, if the estate is insolvent, the added expense 
of various ancillary administrations would mean that 
there is less of decedent's property available to pay 
decedent's claims. Treating the estate as a whole and 
the decedent's creditors as a single group, the applica-
tion of the rule harms the very class it was designed to 
protect. Therefore, on the other side of the scales we 
can place the interest of the heirs and legatees and also 
the creditors as a general class in having as inexpensive 
an administration as possible so that there will be more 
assets for the payment of claims and for distribution. 
Another point which argues against the ancillary ad-
ministration is the time factor. The general practice is 
that the ancillary administration will follow the estab-
lished probate proceeding of the state, and after all the 
claims have been paid and the administrator has made 
his final accounting, the remaining assets will be trans-
mitted to the principal or domiciliary administration 
for distribution. This means that the domiciliary ad-
ministration must be kept open until various ancillary 
administrations are concluded. This problem of co-
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ordinating the various administrations may prolong the 
principal administration for months and will thus delay 
the distribution of property. The law should have a 
definite policy in favor of not tying up property for 
lengthy periods of time and for seeing that the de-
pendents of decedent get clear title to his property as 
soon as possible. Thus another factor to be weighed 
against the general rule is the delay in the conclusion 
of probate proceedings caused by ancillary admin-
istration. 
Another important fact which militates against 
separate administrations is the uncertainty as to the 
proper personal representative with whom to deal. If a 
third party resides in the domiciliary state, he may 
deal with the domiciliary personal representative with 
confidence that any transactions will be valid. Likewise, 
if the party resides in a state where an ancillary admin-
istration has been taken out, he may carry out any 
transactions with the ancillary administrator. How-
ever, if he lives in a state in which there is no ancillary 
administration, he can never be sure that a later ad-
ministration will not be taken out and therefore can 
never rest assured that in transactions begun with the 
decedent a completion with the domiciliary representa-
tive will be treated as valid in the state where he re-
sides. Since third parties, regardless of where they live, 
have created contractual obligations with the decedent 
as a single person, they ought to be entitled in the 
event of his death to look to a single person to whom 
they will perform. Therefore, it is important to achieve 
certainty and unity in the successor or personal repre-
sentative of the decedent. 
Another factor which is becoming of more importance 
in the conditions of our modern society is a necessity 
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for a unified policy of conservation and management of 
an estate. Many estates today, even moderate-sized 
ones, are made up largely of business enterprises and 
interests spread over a number of states which the 
decedent has held and managed as integrated property. 
The value of such an estate will depend largely on the 
market values of the property interests, which will be 
higher when operated in an integrated fashion. Such 
an estate on decedent's death can only be satisfactorily 
managed as a whole if advantages are to be taken of 
fluctuating values and continued business operation. If 
the estate is managed by several administrators com-
pletely independent of one another, the value of the 
estate may decline sharply. Therefore, another reason 
against having ancillary administration is the necessity 
for a unified management of the estate. 
Thus we see that in deciding the factors pro and con 
on this question, on the side of the separate admin-
istrations there is the desire to protect local creditors. 
In favor of some program of unified administration, we 
have (1) the desire to eliminate expense, (2) the pre-
vention of delay, (3) the necessity to achieve certainty 
as to decedent's representative, and (4) the avoidance 
of multiple management of integrated assets. Since 
these various factors may not be of equal weight in 
reaching an answer, there should be a brief considera-
tion of how important it is today to protect local 
creditors by requiring an ancillary administration. 
When Story wrote, it was not clear whether a juris-
diction might discriminate against a foreign creditor by 
refusing to pay his claim until all claims presented by 
creditors residing in that state were paid. If a local cred-
itor residing in the forum can be made junior to all claim-
ants who are citizens of the state where domiciliary ad-
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ministration is being had, or if the domiciliary state can 
refuse to pay any but resident creditors, there is much 
force in arguing the necessity for an ancillary adminis-
tration in the forum. In deciding this question, the 
practice of the states in their treatment of foreign 
creditors is much more important than their theoretical 
power to discriminate against the foreign claimants. 
This problem has been largely resolved in this country 
by the decision in Blake v. McClung. 7 This involved a 
receivership in Tennessee of an English corporation 
which was insolvent. There was a Tennessee statute 
which gave a priority in the distribution of the corpora-
tion's assets to Tennessee creditors over those residing 
in other states. The Supreme Court of the United States 
held that this statute was unconstitutional under the 
"privileges and immunities" clause.8 In the opinion, 
the court said: 
"We adjudge that when the general property and assets 
of a private corporation, lawfully doing business in a State, 
are in course of administration by the courts of such State, 
creditors who are citizens of other States are entitled, under 
the Constitution of the United States, to stand upon the 
same plane with citizens of such State, and cannot be 
denied equality of right simply because they do not reside in 
that State, but are citizens residing in other States of the 
Union.'' 9 
While the case deals with the administration of insolvent 
corporations, the case is very analogous to the adminis-
tration of a decedent's estate, and the result would be 
the same if a state attempted to give a preference to its 
7 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 432 (1898). 
8 United States Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2. "The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States." 
9 172 U.S. at 258. 
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own citizens having claims against a decedent's property 
over creditors from other states. 
While the above decision does not prevent dis-
crimination against foreign corporations having claims,10 
and certainly does not prevent foreign countries from 
giving priorities to their nationals over claimants from 
the United States, it is unlikely that a creditor of de-
cedent will be discriminated against among the class of 
creditors to which he belongs if he files a claim in a 
foreign estate administration. So the only real difficulty 
involved is the inconvenience in presenting a claim in a 
foreign jurisdiction. In the time of Story, this' was a 
real problem. Today, however, with our almost instan-
taneous communication systems and our very rapid 
transportation facilities, there is little real inconvenience 
involved in presenting a claim in the administration 
being had in a foreign tribunal.~ Certainly, this slight 
inconvenience and the expense involved do not out-
weigh the interest of the heirs and other creditors in 
having a unified administration. 
Even if there were discrimination against a creditor 
in a foreign jurisdiction in exceptional cases and also 
some little inconvenience in presenting and collecting 
his claim, a very forceful argument can be made in 
favor of unified administration. In modern societies, a 
party dealing with other persons must take many 
risks. If the other party is insolvent, he may not be 
10 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 432 (1898), 
held that a foreign private corporation was not a citizen within the meaning 
of the privileges and immunities clause and therefore could be discrim-
inated against in favor of local creditors. There has been some doubt 
thrown on this position by cases decided later by the Supreme Court of 
the United States which hold that a private corporation is a citizen within 
the privileges and immunities clause. See: Kentucky Finance Corporation 
v. Paramount Auto Exchange, 262 U.S. 544, 43 S. Ct. 636, 67 L.Ed. II12 
(1923). 
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able to enforce fulfillment of the obligation. The con-
tract may be unenforceable because of impossibility of 
performance. Another risk which the party can be 
made to take is that if the other party dies, he will be 
left to whatever remedies are provided him by the 
domiciliary administration in collecting his debts. 
Certainly a nondomiciliary forum is just as interested in 
achieving a system of speedy, unified, and inexpensive 
administrations as it is in protecting local creditors. 
This can only be accomplished if it will refrain from 
requiring an ancillary administration and will recognize 
the foreign domiciliary personal representative in all 
matters, in the hope that the foreign jurisdiction will 
reciprocate by treating its domiciliary administrations 
in the same manner. If the only way to bring this about 
is to send the local creditor to the domiciliary admin-
istration in another jurisdiction, there is no really 
serious objection to that. The multitude of legislation 
which has this effect indicates that the states have no 
real qualms about refusing to protect local creditors if 
they will receive fair treatment in the state of principal 
administration. 
It should be abundantly clear by now that the writer 
is completely in favor of a single unified administration 
on a decedent's estate. It seems to me that the ad-
vantages to be gained so greatly outweigh the desire 
to protect local creditors that there can be little serious 
debate. This is the view which has been reached by the 
vast majority of the writers who have considered the 
problem.11 The really important question is how to 
11 Basye, "Dispensing with Administration," 44 MrcH. L. REv. 329 
at 409 (1945); Cheatham, "The Statutory Successor, the Receiver and the 
Executor in Conflict of Laws," 44 CoL. L. REv. 549 (1944); Hopkins, 
"The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 53 YALE L. J. 221 
(1944); Niles, "Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate Law: 
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achieve what is generally regarded as the highly de-
sirable result of a unified administration. 
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR A UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION 
In order to achieve a unified administration, there 
must be some changes made in the present law. This is 
obvious from the number of ancillary administrations 
which are still necessary to administer a large estate. 
Before we decide the best means of bringing about these 
changes, it is important to determine what is necessary 
to achieve the unified administration and to what ex-
tent these requirements are met by the present law. 
The first obvious requirement is that the personal 
representative must be subject to the control of only 
one court. If any case involving the property of the 
estate or raising questions about the management of 
that property, he should be answerable only to the 
court which appointed him. As was seen in Chapter 
III, this is the general result under the existing law. 
With few and relatively unimportant exceptions, 
foreign tribunals will not assume jurisdiction over 
personal representatives in any matter touching their 
representative character. Consequently, this raises no 
problems. 
A second essential is that there be only one admin-
istration on each estate. This may seem a truism, but 
there is a serious question whether a single administra-
tion on a decedent's estate is completely desirable. The 
single administration presupposes the designation of 
one jurisdiction as the only one which can administer 
A Review," 45 MicH. L. REv. 321 at 339 (1947); Note, "The Capacity 
of Executors and Administrators to Sue in a Foreign Jurisdiction," 50 
CoL. L. REv. 518 at 523 (1950). 
Contra: Buchanan & Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in 
View of First National Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. Rev. 9II at 950 
(1935). 
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decedent's property. The obvious state to select is the 
domiciliary one. However, there are instances where 
the domiciliary state is not the best jurisdiction in 
which to hold the administration. If a decedent were 
domiciled in Michigan at the date of his death, but all 
of his property consisted of a business operated in 
New York and all of his creditors and debtors resided 
there, it would be very unsatisfactory to attempt to 
administer that estate wholly in Michigan. To attempt 
to lay down a standard which provides that the state 
where the most property is located or where the ma-
jority of the parties are found is to be the place where 
the single administration is to be held would lead to the 
unfortunate result of so uncertain a criterion that the 
states would be fighting over which one was entitled 
to administer the assets. 
One solution to this problem is to retain the principle 
of separate administrations and try to eliminate only 
undesirable and unnecessary ancillary administra-
tions. The way to accomplish this seems to be to leave 
the matter in the discretion of the probate court to 
whom the parties apply for ancillary administration. 
If the domiciliary personal representative can show 
that only a small portion of the decedent's estate is in 
the forum and only a few of the heirs and creditors in 
relation to the total number are present there, the pro-
bate court should have the jurisdiction to refuse to 
grant the administration. Such a provision appears in 
the Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act. 
"The [probate court] may deny the application for ancil-
lary letters if it appears that the estate may be settled 
conveniently without ancillary administration. Such denial 
is without prejudice to any subsequent application if it 
later appears that ancillary administration should be had."12 
12 Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act, section 3· 
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This must be accompanied by legislation which gives 
the foreign domiciliary representative the power to 
perform all the functions of administration in the 
forum. If such discretion were wisely exercised by the 
courts, the worst features of the separate administra-
tions could be eliminated. 
Such a solution does not seem satisfactory to me, 
however. Two of the reasons previously given for the 
necessity of the unified administration were the need 
for management of integrated business interests by a 
single personal representative and the need to achieve 
certainty as to the personal representative so that 
obligors of the decedent could deal with him with 
confidence. As long as there are ancillary administra-
tions, such policies cannot be completely effectuated. 
Further, leaving the matter in the discretion of the 
various probate courts with such a broad standard of 
decision may well mean that the courts in many lo-
calities will require that there be ancillary administra-
tions in nearly as many situations as it is required 
under the present law. 
I feel that it is necessary to provide for one admin-
istration on an estate. Since the succession to movable 
property is determined by the law of the domicile13 and 
since the administration there is always regarded as 
the principal one by Anglo-American courts, the 
domiciliary administration should be selected as that 
single administration. It is true that frequently a sub-
stantial part of the property and a majority of the 
decedent's creditors will be located in other jurisdic-
tions. This does not present an insurmountable barrier 
to the unified administration. Let us take the extreme 
hypothetical case posed before. A decedent was domi-
13 REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws, sec. 303 (1934). 
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ciled in Michigan, but his property, a going business, 
and all the parties were in New York. If New York 
were to permit the personal representative appointed 
in Michigan to perform the functions of administration 
in its jurisdiction, the problem could be handled ade-
quately. The Michigan court could authorize the 
personal representative to manage the business property 
in New York. It could require him to follow the same 
procedure for the payment of claims in New York as 
he does in Michigan. He would give notice in New 
York of the administration and be available there at 
specified times over a designated period to receive 
claims against the estate. The claims, after having 
been approved by the probate court at the domicile 
in Michigan, could be paid in New York. Such a pro-
cedure, while following closely an ancillary administra-
tion, does not mean that the domiciliary representative 
has to subject himself to the procedure and control of 
each legal order in which the decedent left property. 
Such activity in other jurisdictions could be handled 
by the personal representative himself or by an agent. 
The personal representative should be required to 
follow this procedure only in those states where the 
decedent left a substantial portion of his property and 
where a number of creditors are who would be incon-
venienced by having to come to the domiciliary forum 
to present their claims. Such a procedure would ade-
quately handle the rare situation where it would be 
better to have a nondomiciliary forum as the place of 
unified administration. It will also enable the creditors 
in those jurisdictions where it is most common and 
profitable today to require an ancillary administration 
to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner. 
The third necessity for a unified administration is 
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that the domiciliary representative be treated as 
having title to all of the decedent's property wherever 
located for purposes of administration. This will re-
quire that the states forego their right to require an 
ancillary administration which gives title of the prop-
erty within the jurisdiction to the local administrator. 
While this will be a substantial difference in the pro-
bate law of Anglo-American states, it is not a revolu-
tionary or startling change. There are many analogous 
situations where a fiduciary in much the same position 
as a personal representative, such as a universal suc-
cessor, statutory receiver, or trustee, is treated as 
having title to property in other jurisdictions. 
As was pointed out in the first chapter, the universal 
successor who performs the functions of administration 
in civil-law systems takes title to all of the decedent's 
property. This title will be recognized even by com-
mon-law courts as to property in their jurisdictions.14 
It the universal successor can be treated thus, it is 
difficult to see why the domiciliary personal representa-
tive cannot be. 
Secondly, a statutory receiver is said to have title to 
the property of a corporation wherever it may be. The 
receivership is strikingly similar to a probate admin-
istration, and the receiver is very much akin to the 
personal representative. 15 When a business is insolvent, 
he takes over and manages all its property, frequently 
operates the business, and then pays the assets at the 
14 The Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213 N.Y. 429, 108 N.E. 72 (191 5); 
Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 341 (1863). 
15 The similarities between the personal representative and the statutory 
receiver are noted and a strong argument is made for the treatment of the 
personal representative in a similar fashion to the statutory receiver in 
Cheatham, "The Statutory Successor, the Receiver and the Executor in 
the Conflict of Laws," 44 CoL. L. REv. 549 (1944). 
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conclusion of the receivership in equal shares to the 
creditors. He is a fiduciary conserving the property for 
the benefit of the corporation's creditors. Originally, 
the receiver was appointed by a court of equity and 
was said to be limited to the territory of the appointing 
court, just as a personal representative is. 16 This result 
is based on the same theory, i.e., that an appointee 
cannot have authority to act outside the jurisdiction 
ot the court which appointed him. It was also justified 
on the same policy, that the state wanted to protect 
local creditors of the corporation by requiring an ancil-
lary receivership on the corporation's property in the 
jurisdiction. It became obvious that this was totally 
unsatisfactory when a large nation-wide corporation 
went into receivership and had to be operated. So it 
was held that in the situation where the receiver was 
appointed in pursuance of a statute of the state of in-
corporation which made him an assignee of the corpora-
tion's property, he had title to that property which will 
be recognized in other states.17 According to Beale, 
"Other states will recognize this succession (so like the 
French doctrine of univeral succession on death), and will 
give this statutory receiver all movables of the corporation 
within the state, and will allow the statutory receiver to sue 
on a claim due to the corporation."18 
It is difficult to see how a statute of a state can be 
more effective in assigning title to the property of a 
corporation than a decree of a court created by the same 
legal order, but certainly the result, although not too 
16 Standard Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Cooper & Griffen, 30 F.(2d) 842 
(W.D. N.C. 1929). 
17 Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222, 26 L.Ed. 337 (188o); Clark v. Willard, 
292 U.S. 112,54 S.Ct. 615,78 L.Ed. n6o (1934). 
18 Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, I570. 
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logical, is a necessary and desirable one. If the statutory 
receiver can take title to all the property of a corpora-
tion organized in the state, it is hard to understand why 
the personal representative cannot take title to all the 
property of a decedent domiciled in the jurisdiction at 
his death. Of course, this depends on the attitude of 
the nondomiciliary states in which the decedent left 
property, but if they are going to recognize the title 
of a foreign statutory receiver, they ought to be pre-
pared to do so with a foreign personal representative. 
Also, a trustee is a similar fiduciary who has always 
been treated as having title to the trust res regardless 
of its location. 19 This may be because the common law 
never distinguished between the personalities of a 
trustee and of an individual as was done with the re-
ceiver and the personal representative. 20 In the modern 
English legislation, principally the Administration of 
Estates Act of 1925,21 it has been provided that the 
personal representative holds the property of the 
estate as a trustee. This raises the problem whether 
such a provision will be treated as vesting title to all of 
the decedent's property, wherever it may be located, in 
the English executor or administrator in the same way 
19 Shirk v. City of La Fayette, 52 F. 857 (C.C. D.Ind. I892); Roby v 
Smith, I3I Ind. 342,30 N.E. I093 (I89I). 
2° Cheatham, supra note IS at 553-554. 
21 "Subject to the powers, rights, duties and liabilities herein-after 
mentioned, the personal representatives of a deceased person shall hold 
the real estate as trustees for the persons by law beneficially entitled 
thereto .... " 9 Halsbury's STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 2nd Ed., 7I6 (Land 
Transfer Act, I897· 6o & 6I Viet. 65, sec. 2). 
"On the death of a person intestate as to any real or personal estate, 
such estate shall be held by his personal representatives-
( a) as to the real estate upon trust to sell the same; and 
(b) as to the personal estate upon trust to call in sell and convert into 
money such part thereof as may not consist of money .... " 
9 Halsbury's STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 2nd Ed., p. 734 (The Administra-
tion of Estates Act, I925. I 5 Geo. 5 c. 23, s. 33). 
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as was done with the statutory receiver or as an ordinary 
trustee. This depends not so much on the wording of 
the English legislation as it does on the effect given it 
by the courts of other jurisdictions as to property lo-
cated there. I feel that such a provision will not change 
the rules discussed in this book. The nondomiciliary 
courts will be inclined to say that the legislation as to 
the nature of the personal representative applies only 
to property within the jurisdiction of the English 
Parliament and that it cannot enlarge the control of 
an English personal representative over property out-
side England. 
Two things are required on behalf of the nondomi-
ciliary states in addition to refraining from requiring 
ancillary administrations in order to place title in the 
domiciliary representative. The foreign domiciliary 
personal representative must be permitted to collect 
all the assets of the decedent located in the jurisdiction 
and to give a valid discharge to all obligations satisfied 
to him. Secondly, he must have the power to bring any 
necessary actions in the courts of the state to compel 
an obligor of the decedent to perform the obligation 
to himself and to recover property of the decedent 
from wrongful possessors. Nearly half of the states have 
legislation permitting such suits22 and over halt have 
statutes providing that a foreign personal representative 
can give a valid discharge to a person who pays a debt 
or surrenders property of the decedent to him. 23 In 
those states, little change is necessary. Our problem is 
to secure changes in the states which retain the com-
mon law and to work out a uniform system throughout 
the nation. By no means should such attempts at uni-
22 See supra Chapter II, note 92. 
23 See supra Chapter V, pp. I6J-I66. 
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formity and unity in the administration of a decedent's 
estate be limited to the United States, but it is here 
that the problems caused by the separate administra-
tions are the most frequent and pressing. 
3· MEANS OF AcHIEVING THE UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION 
This area of the administration of decedents' estates 
points up more than any other the unsatisfactory re-
sults of the forty-eight separate private law systems 
we have in this country. The United States is by 
population, customs, and geography one nation. The 
state boundaries are unquestionably artificial. There-
fore, the population and its movable property are 
extremely fluid. And yet that population and property 
are governed by widely differing legal systems depend-
ing on their location at any given time. This condition 
gives rise to a multitude of conflict of law problems 
which are often bewildering and frequently difficult of 
solution. It is this situation which has made the United 
States the cradle for much of modern conflict of laws. 
There is nothing inherently necessary in maintaining 
the states as separate legal institutions. The movement 
for uniform legislation and the expansion of federal 
activity in many legal areas indicate the desirability of 
one legal system for the entire country. One such legal 
order could provide for a unified administration of 
decedents' estates in the territory of the United States 
and thus eliminate all the problems raised by separate 
administrations. Since this would require drastic consti-
tutional amendment, such a solution is not even re-
motely possible and the answer must come from other 
directions. 
As long as there are a number of separate legal orders 
in the territory of the United States, a completely uni-
fied administration is a rather forlorn hope. Even if all 
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the legal orders participated in the achievement of a 
system of unified administrations, it is very likely that 
the multiple statutes and decisions would reach a 
variety of results in the various states.24 However, the 
fact that about half of the states retain the common-
law rules with little or no statutory modification indi-
cates that the desire to solve this problem is not all-
pervading. Therefore, we must treat unified admin-
istration as an ideal and work toward the elimination of 
as much of the unnecessary ancillary administrations 
as possible. 
The states could as a matter of comity through court 
decision go a long way towards achieving a sufficient 
unified administration and, as a matter of fact, have 
done so. If the courts would permit a foreign personal 
representative always to sue to collect assets, would 
refuse to permit any actions brought against a foreign 
personal representative, and would not interfere with 
his collection of local assets, there would be little need 
for an ancillary administration. If this were coupled 
with the power to refuse to grant an ancillary admin-
istration in the state unless it were absolutely necessary 
for efficient administration, most of the problems would 
be solved. However, the doctrine of stare decisis will 
influence the courts to retain most of the rules which 
are currently in force, and the evolutionary process 
which the common law takes is not rapid enough to 
give an immediate solution. The answer would seem to 
have to come from legislation. . 
The legislation must be adopted in all the forty-eight 
24 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was adopted in all forty-
eight states quite early. The experience with that piece of legislation has 
been that cases decided in pursuance of the same act by different courts 
in different states do not always produce uniformity. See Britton on 
BILLS AND NoTEs, 19-22. 
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states. There has been a great deal of piecemeal legisla-
tion dealing with specific problems, but in only about 
half of the states. In order to achieve unified admin-
istration of a decedent's estate, there must be legisla-
tion adopted in each state in which the decedent might 
leave property, and that legislation must have in effect 
the same provisions. This will, of course, require the 
enactment of some uniform legislation. 
Naturally, the desirability of such legislation has not 
escaped the notice of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and they have 
promulgated and adopted two acts in this area. The 
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act26 was 
adopted by them in I 94+ It has not been adopted in 
any state.26 The Act in essence provides that in the 
absence of an ancillary, administration, the foreign 
personal representative "may exercise all powers which 
would exist in favor of a local representative." This 
will include the power to maintain actions and to give a 
valid discharge to persons who deliver property or pay 
debts to him. The Act has the further advantage of per-
mitting such action only by the domiciliary representa-
tive. A unified administration requires action by only 
one administrator, and the logical one to select is the 
domiciliary representative. 
The Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates 
Act27 was adopted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1949· It has 
been adopted in Wisconsin.28 In addition to providing 
25 See infra Appendix A. 
26 HANDBOOK oF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERs oN 
UNIFORM STATE LAws, 1953. Table at 317. 
't1 See infra Appendix B. 
26 HANDBOOK oF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATES LAws, 1953· Table at 317. 
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that the probate court may refuse to grant ancillary 
administration, the purpose of the Act is to permit the 
foreign personal representative appointed in the domi-
cile to act as ancillary administrator. Not only is he 
preferred in the appointment of an ancillary admin-
istrator, but he may be substituted for a local admin-
istrator already appointed. The Act attempts to achieve 
as unified an administration as possible by providing 
that in the insolvent estate all creditors, regardless of 
their residence, are entitled to share equally in the 
assets of the ancillary administration, taking into ac-
count what they have received in other administra-
tions. The important provision in this Act is that which 
provides that the probate court may refuse to grant an 
ancillary administration if the estate can be con-
veniently settled without it. There can be no truly 
unified administration as long as there is any ancillary 
administration on the estate. If the jurisdiction will 
refrain from requiring local administrations except when 
absolutely necessary, it will be possible to achieve a 
high degree of unity in probate administrations in this 
country. 
Any legislative remedy which is to be adopted in the 
various states must have two viewpoints, that of 
administrations which are domiciliary in the state and 
that of estates where the decedent is domiciled else-
where. In the case of the nondomiciliary estate, the 
provision must be that the domiciliary representative 
takes title to all of the property of the decedent in the 
state and that he may maintain actions to collect this 
property and may discharge obligations due to the 
estate. The Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives 
Act is well drafted to accomplish this and consequently 
should be adopted in all the states. In addition, the 
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state must adopt legislation providing that no ancillary 
administration may be had in the state on a non-
domiciliary estate. The Uniform Ancillary Administra-
tion of Estates Act, while well drawn to eliminate the 
unnecessary ancillary administration, still retains the 
principle of separate administrations and should not 
be adopted. Under such a legislative program, the 
domiciliary representative could perform all the func-
tions of administration in the state. 
Some changes must be made in the probate practice 
of the state dealing with a domiciliary estate in order to 
achieve unified administration. It must be made clear 
and certain that creditors from other jurisdictions 
will be treated in exactly the same way as creditors 
resident in the state in order to alleviate the fear of 
other states that their residents might be discriminated 
against. Secondly, the personal representative must be 
placed under a duty to collect all the assets in those 
states which participate in this program of a unified 
administration. Finally, in those frequent situations 
where a decedent maintained extensive contacts with 
another jurisdiction or jurisdictions so that he has 
substantial property interests and creditors there, the 
personal representative should be required to give 
notice of the administration, and to receive and pay 
claims in that locality. 
There is doubt whether many states will be interested 
in adopting such a legislative program. The strongest 
reason is probably the inertia which is usually respon-
sible for maintaining the status quo. A second reason 
for the retention of the present system is that the 
ancillary administration provides fees for the bar which 
will not be available under a unified administration. 
Only a minority of the lawyers are motivated by this 
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consideration, but their active interest in retaining the 
ancillary administration is usually strong enough to 
overcome the less enthusiastic efforts of the rest of the 
bar at reform. The third reason, and the one which is 
always given to support the rule, is the desire to protect 
local creditors. As we have seen, the state of the com-
mon and statute law in this country at present is such 
that foreign administrators can remove assets from the 
jurisdiction in a large number of situations, and thus 
the local creditors are often unprotected. Further, under 
a system of unified administration where the domiciliary 
state treats all creditors equally, the interests of local 
creditors will be protected just as well as they can be 
by requiring an ancillary administration. So this reason 
is not so impelling as it would seem at first. 
One plan has been suggested which will exert strong 
pressure towards a uniform system of unified adminis-
trations in the United States.29 The Federal Government 
has authority to enact bankruptcy legislation under 
which the property of any person who is insolvent may 
be administered. Under this power, it could provide a 
system of single administration on any decedent's 
estate which is insolvent. The solvent estates would 
still be under the control of the separate states, but as 
the experience of the bankruptcy legislation indicates, 
the states are strongly influenced to make their law 
conform to any federal enactment in the field. 
It is impossible to see an adequate solution to this 
problem in the immediate future. The difficulties are 
likely to become worse rather than better. The rules 
of ancillary administration were developed in a semi-
feudal society where the population was almost com-
29 Nadelmann, "Insolvent Decendent's Estates," 49 MicH. L. REv. 
II29 at II6I-II62 (1951). 
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pletely immobile. A person today no longer lives his 
life in as nearly a stationary fashion as a building or 
tree. In the jet age, a person's community may well 
become the world. In the world of tomorrow with its 
ever-increasing commercial types of property, to 
attempt to chop up a man's property interests into 
segments based on their location at his death and to 
administer each segment separately from the rest will 
lead to the most unsatisfactory results. This is one 
area where it is imperative to change the rules designed 
in an older society for those which are more suitable 
for the present and the future. As Justice Holmes said 
in another connection: 
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past."30 
30 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. L. Rev. 457 at 469 (1897). 
APPENDIX A 
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act 
(This text was taken from the Handbook of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(1944) 325) 
Be it enacted . . 
Section 1. (Definitions.) As used in this act: 
(1) "Representative" means an executor, administrator, 
testamentary trustee, guardian or other fiduciary of the 
estate of a decedent or a ward, duly appointed by a court 
and qualified. It includes any corporation so appointed, 
regardless of whether the corporation is eligible to act under 
the law of this state. This act does not change the powers or 
duties of a testamentary trustee under the non-statutory 
law or under the terms of a trust. 
(2) "Foreign representative" means any representative 
who has been appointed by the court of another jurisdiction 
in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, 
or in which the ward is domiciled, and who has not also been 
appointed by a court of this state. 
(3) "Local representative" means any representative 
appointed as ancillary representative by a court of this state 
who has not been appointed by the domiciliary court. 
(4) "Local and foreign representative" means any repre-
sentative appointed by both the domiciliary court and by a 
court of this state. 
Section 2. (Powers of Foreign Representative in General.) 
When there is no administration or application therefor 
pending in this state, a foreign representative may exercise 
all powers which would exist in favor of a local representa-
tive, and may maintain actions and proceedings in this 
state subject to the conditions imposed upon nonresident 
suitors generally. 
Section 3· (Proof of Authority in Court Proceedings-
194 
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Bond.) Upon commencing any action or proceeding in any 
court of this state, the foreign representative shall file with 
the court authenticated copies of his appointment, and of his 
official bond if he has given a bond. If the court believes that 
the security furnished by him in the domiciliary administra-
tion is insufficient to cover the proceeds of the action or 
proceeding, it may at any time order the action or proceeding 
stayed until sufficient security is furnished in the domiciliary 
administration. 
Section 4· (Proceedings to Bar Creditors' Claims.) Upon 
application by a foreign representative to the [probate] 
court of the county in which property of the decedent or of 
the ward is located, the court shall cause notice of the 
appointment of the foreign representative to be published 
once in each of [three] consecutive weeks in some newspaper 
of general circulation in the county. The claims of all 
creditors of the decedent or of the ward, unless filed with 
the court within [ ] after date of the first publication, 
are barred as a lien upon all property of the decedent or of 
the ward in this state, to the extent that claims are barred 
by a local administration. If before the expiration of such 
period any claims have been filed and remain unpaid after 
reasnnable notice thereof to the foreign representative, 
ancillary administration may be had. 
Section 5· (Effect of Local Proceedings.) The Powers 
granted by this act shall be exercised only when there is 
no administration or application therefor pending in this 
state, except to the extent that the court granting local 
letters may order otherwise, but no person who, before 
receiving actual notice of local administration or application 
therefor, has changed his position by relying on the powers 
granted by this act shall be prejudiced by reason of the 
application for, or grant of, local administration. The local 
representative or the local and foreign representative shall 
be subject to all burdens which have accrued by virtue of 
the exercise of the powers, or otherwise, under this act and 
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may be substituted for the foreign representative in any 
action or proceeding in this state. 
Section 6. (Uniformity of Interpretation.) This act shall 
be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it. 
Section 7· (Short Title.) This act may be cited as the 
Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act. 
Section 8. (Repeal.) [ and] all [other] acts or parts of 
acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act 
are hereby repealed. 
Section 9· (Time of Taking Effect.) This act shall take 
effect .... 
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Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act 
(This text was taken from the Handbook of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(I949) 330) 
Be it enacted ... 
Section I (Definitions) As used in this act: 
(I) "Representative" means an executor, administrator 
[testamentary trustee], guardian or other fiduciary of the 
estate of a decedent or a ward, duly appointed by a court 
and qualified. It includes any corporation so appointed, 
regardless of whether the corporation is eligible to act under 
the law of this state. [This act does not change the powers or 
duties of a testamentary trustee under the non-statutory 
law or under the terms of a trust.] 
(2.) "Foreign representative" means any representative 
who has been appointed by the court of another jurisdiction 
in which the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death, 
or in which the ward is domiciled, and who has not also 
been appointed by a court of this state. 
(3) "Local representative" means any representative 
appointed as ancillary representative by a court of this 
state who has not been appointed by the domiciliary court. 
(4) "Local and foreign representative" means any repre-
sentative appointed by both the domiciliary court and by a 
court of this state. 
Section 2.. (Application for Ancillary Letters and Notice 
Thereof.) 
(I) §Gualifications of and Preference for Foreign Representa-
tive. 
(a) Any foreign representative upon the filing of an 
authenticated copy of the domiciliary letters with the 
[probate court] may be granted ancillary letters in this state 
notwithstanding that the representative is a nonresident of 
this state or is a foreign corporation. 
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(b) If the foreign representative is a foreign corporation 
it need not qualify under any other law of this state to 
authorize it to act as local and foreign representative in the 
particular estate if it complies with the provisions of sections 
4 and 5 of this act. 
(c) If application is made for the issuance of ancillary 
letters to the foreign representative, the court shall give 
preference in appointment to the foreign representative 
unless the court finds that it will not be for the best interests 
of the estate or the decedent shall have otherwise directed. 
(2) Intervention upon application. When application is 
made for issuance of ancillary letters any interested person 
may intervene and pray for the appointment of any person 
who is eligible under this act or the law of this state. 
(3) Notice to foreign representative. When application is 
made for issuance of ancillary letters to any person other 
than the foreign representative, the applicant shall send 
notice of the application by registered mail to the foreign 
representative if the latter's name and address are known 
and to the court which appointed him if the court is known. 
These notices shall be mailed upon filing the application if 
the necessary facts are then known, or as soon thereafter as 
the facts are known. If notices are not given prior to the 
appointment of the local representative, he shall give similar 
notices of his appointment as soon as the necessary facts are 
known to him. Notice by ordinary mail is sufficient if it is 
impossible to send the notice by registered mail. Notice under 
this subsection is not jurisdictional. 
Section 3· (Denial of Ancillary Letters.) The [probate 
court] may deny the application for ancillary letters if it 
appears that the estate may be settled conveniently without 
ancillary administration. Such denial is without prejudice 
to any subsequent application if it later appears that ancil-
lary administration should be had. 
Section 4 (Bond.) No nonresident shall be granted ancillary 
letters unless he gives an administration bond. 
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Section 5· (Agent to Accept Service of Process.) No non-
resident shall be granted ancillary letters and no person 
shall be granted leave to remove assets under Section 7, until 
he files in the [probate court] an irrevocable power of attorney 
constituting the [clerk of the court] as his agent to accept and 
be subject to service of process or of notice in any action or 
proceeding relating to the administration of the estate. 
The [clerk] shall forthwith forward to the representative at 
his last known address any process or notice so received, by 
registered mail requesting a return receipt signed by addressee 
only. Forwarding by ordinary mail is sufficient if when tend-
ered at a United States Post Office an envelope containing 
such notice addressed to such representative, as aforesaid, 
is refused registration. 
Section 6. (Substitution of Foreign for Local Representative.) 
(I) Application and procedure. If any other person has been 
appointed local representative, the foreign representative, 
not later than [fourteen] days after the mailing of notice to 
him under section 2, unless this period is extended by the 
court because the foreign representative resides outside 
continental United States or in Alaska, or for other cause 
which the court deems adequate, may apply for revocation 
of the appointment and for grant of ancillary letters to 
himself. [Ten] days' written notice of hearing shall be given 
to the local representative. If the court finds that it is for the 
best interests of the estate, it may grant the application and 
direct the local representative to deliver all the assets, 
documents, books and papers pertaining to the estate in 
his possession and make a full report of his administration 
to the local and foreign representative as soon as the letters 
are issued and he is qualified. The local representative 
shall also account to the court. The hearing on the account 
may be forthwith or upon such notice as the court directs. 
Upon compliance with the court's directions, the local 
representative shall be discharged. 
(2) Effect of substitution. Upon qualification, the local and 
foreign representative shall be substituted in all actions and 
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proceedings brought by or against the local representative 
in his representative capacity, and shall be entitled to all 
the rights and be subject to all the burdens arising out of the 
uncompleted administration in all respects as if it had been 
continued by the local representative. If the latter has 
served or been served with any process or notice, no further 
service shall be necessary nor shall the time within which any 
steps may or must be taken be changed unless the court in 
which the action or proceedings are pending so orders. 
Section 7· (Removal of Assets to Domiciliary 'Jurisdiction.) 
(1) Application. Prior to the final disposition of the an-
cillary estate under section 12. and upon giving such notice as 
the [probate court] directs, the foreign representative or the 
local and foreign representative may apply for leave to 
remove all or any part of the assets from this state to the 
domiciliary jurisdiction for the purpose of administration 
and distribution. 
(2.) Prerequisites to granting application. Before granting 
such application, the court shall require compliance with 
section 5 and the filing of a bond by the foreign representative 
or of an additional bond for the protection of the estate and 
all interested persons unless the court finds that the bond 
given under section 4 by the local and foreign representative 
is su:fficien t. 
(3) Granting application-terms and consequences. Upon 
compliance with this section, the court shall grant the 
application upon such conditions as it sees fit unless it finds 
cause for the denial thereof or for postponement until 
further facts appear. The granting of the application shall 
not terminate any proceedings for the administration of 
property in this state unless the court finds that such pro-
ceedings are unnecessary. If the court so find, it may order 
the administration in this state closed, subject to reopening 
within [one year] for cause. 
Section 8. (Effect of Adjudications for or against Representa-
tives.) A prior adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction for 
or against any representative of the estate shall be as con-
clusive as to the local or the local and foreign representative 
as if he were a party to the adjudication unless it resulted 
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from fraud or collusion of the party representative to the 
prejudice of the estate. This section shall not apply to 
adjudications in another jurisdiction admitting or refusing 
to admit a will to probate. 
Section 9· (Payment of Claims.) No claim against the 
estate shall be paid in the ancillary administration in this 
state unless it has been proceeded upon in the manner and 
within the time required for claims in domiciliary adminis-
trations in this state. 
Section IO. (Liability of Local Assets.) All local assets are 
subject to the payment of all claims, allowances and charges, 
whether they are established or incurred in this state or 
elsewhere. For this purpose local assets may be sold in this 
state and the proceeds forwarded to the representative in 
the jurisdiction where the claim was established or the 
charge incurred. 
Section II. (Payment of Claims in Case of Insolvency.) 
(I) Equality subject to preferences and security. If the 
estate either in this state or as a whole is insolvent, it shall 
be disposed of so that, as far as possible, each creditor whose 
claim has been allowed, either in this state or elsewhere, 
shall receive an equal proportion of his claim subject to 
preferences and priorities and to any security which a 
creditor has as to particular assets. If a preference or priority 
is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in this state, the 
creditor so benefited shall receive dividends from local 
assets only upon the balance of his claim after deducting the 
amount of such benefit. The validity and effect of any 
security held in this state shall be determined by the law of 
this state but a secured creditor who has not released or 
surrendered his security shall be entitled only to a proportion 
computed upon the balance due after the value of all security 
not exempt from the claims of unsecured creditors is deter-
mined and credited upon the claim secured by it. 
(2) Procedure. In case of insolvency and if local assets 
permit, each claim allowed in this state shall be paid its 
proportion, and any balance of assets shall be disposed of in 
accordance with section I2. If local assets are not sufficient 
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to pay all claims allowed in this state the full amount to 
which they are entitled under this section, local assets shall 
be marshalled so that each claim allowed in this state shall 
be paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking into 
account all dividends on claims allowed in this state from 
assets in other jurisdictions. 
Section 12. (Transfer of Residue to Domiciliary Representa-
tive.) Unless the court shall otherwise order, any moveable 
assets remaining on hand after payment of all claims allowed 
in this state and of all taxes and charges levied or incurred 
in this state shall be ordered transferred to the representative 
in the domiciliary jurisdiction. The court may decline to 
make the order until such representative furnishes security 
or additional security in the domiciliary jurisdiction, for the 
proper administration and distribution of the assets to be 
transferred. 
Section 13. (General Law to Apply.) Except where special 
provision is made otherwise, the law and procedure in this 
state relating generally to administration and representatives 
apply to ancillary administration and representatives. 
Section 14. (Uniformity oj Interpretation.) This act shall 
be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it. 
Section 15. (Short Title.) This act may be cited as the 
Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates Act. 
Section 16. (Repeal.) [ .... and] all [other] acts or parts of 
acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are 
hereby repealed. 
Section 17. (Time of Taking Effect.) This act shall take 
effect .... 
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Amendment to Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estates 
Act 
(The text of this amendment was taken from the Handbook 
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (1953) 241.) 
Section I I of the Uniform Ancillary Administration of 
Estates Act as approved in 1949 is amended to read as 
follows: 
Section I I. (Payment of Claims in Case of Insolvency.) 
(I) Equality subject to preferences and security. If the 
estate either in this state or as a whole is insolvent, it shall 
be disposed of so that, as far as possible, each creditor whose 
claim has been allowed, either in this state or elsewhere, 
shall receive an equal proportion of his claim subject to 
preferences and priorities and to any security which a creditor 
has as to particular assets. If a preference, priority or security 
is allowed in another jurisdiction but not in this state, the 
creditor so benefited shall receive dividends from local 
assets only upon the balance of his claim after deducting the 
amount of such benefit. Creditors who have security claims 
upon property not exempt from the claims of general credi-
tors, and who have not released or surrendered them, shall 
have the value of the security determined by converting it 
to money according to the terms of the security agreement, 
or by such creditor and the personal representative by 
agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation, as the 
court may direct, and the value so determined shall be 
credited upon the claim, and dividends shall be computed 
and paid only on the unpaid balance. Such determination 
shall be under the supervision and control of the court. 
( 2.) Procedure. In case of insolvency and if local assets 
permit, each claim allowed in this state shall be paid its 
proportion, and any balance of assets shall be disposed of 
in accordance with Section I2.. If local assets are not sufficient 
to pay all claims allowed in this state the full amount to 
which they are entitled under this section, local assets shall 
be so marshalled so that each claim allowed in this state 
shall be paid its proportion as far as possible, after taking 
into account all dividends on claims allowed in this state 
from assets in other jurisdictions. 
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